The Political Theory of Liberal Socialism, Matthew McManus, Abingdon: Routledge, 2025.
Reviewed by Peter Lamb
Introduction
Karl Marx engaged in political and intellectual competition with radical liberals for much of his life, but recognised the important and indeed necessary contribution of liberalism as a driving force in historical development. He did so from a position requiring far more extensive social change than liberals could ever countenance. For liberals to do so would mean moving beyond the limits of liberal ideology, which was circumscribed, not least as a result of the intrinsic intertwinement of political and economic forms of liberalism; the latter restricted the political.[1] Hence, even the more radical liberals were restricted to economic reforms which, for socialists including Marx, were inadequate for the purpose of addressing social rather than political questions. Thereafter, the Marxist tradition, and, indeed, the broader socialist movement to which it contributed, has endeavoured to achieve social gains that distinguish it from even progressive variants of liberalism. There is, indeed, tension between two ontologies: the core individualism of liberalism on the one hand; the belief that humans are social beings on the other. This second ontology underpins socialist attempts to achieve equality and social freedom.[2]
In his new book The Political Theory of Liberal Socialism (2025) Matthew McManus considers whether such ontological tension can be overcome, offering detailed analysis of attempts to achieve that goal by a range of political thinkers since the nineteenth century. He also discusses a number of earlier thinkers on whose ideas modern and contemporary liberalism built, but who cannot be considered to belong to the liberal socialism category. He considers, furthermore, whether Marx’s socialism fits into that category.
McManus thus provides an extensive discussion of the development and scope of a tradition of political theory which combined socialist and liberal tenets. The present review discusses whether his resulting conception of liberal socialism assesses the boundaries of the two ideologies which comprise it adequately. His thoughts on the place of Marx in relation to this tradition will be analysed, and a case will be made for revising McManus’ categorisation.
Historical developments and principles
In charting the development of liberal and socialist theories and the extent of affinities between them, McManus provides a valuable contribution to the discipline of history of political thought, offering illuminating discussions of a range of thinkers and their places in those developments. Many of these thinkers are conventionally seen as liberals, while others clearly hold combinations of some tenets of liberalism and some from socialism. Among McManus’ chosen thinkers, furthermore, are some who are traditionally considered to be either in or on the margins of the Marxist tradition. He offers a new, thoughtful and scholarly contribution to the long debate about the possible extent of compatibility between liberalism and socialism, identifying liberal socialism as a tradition which sought and indeed continues to seek the accommodation of features of liberalism within a socialist outlook.
McManus approves of the argument that a crucial characteristic of socialism is the combination of distinctive interpretations of equality, freedom and community (pp. 12–14).[3] These combined tenets are manifested in different ways in the various subtypes of socialism, including, as McManus recognises, Marxism (p. 131). As his elaboration on that recognition is surprisingly limited, given his general erudition and scholarship, it may be useful to suggest here that the way in which the three tenets are represented in Marxism can be appreciated by referring to Erik Olin Wright’s depiction of Marxism as revolving around three nodes: class analysis, class emancipation, and historical trajectory. Much of Wright’s work is best described as neo-Marxist and thus dissatisfies many Marxists; but, in this case, the conciseness and simplicity of his description may facilitate consensus which, due to disagreement among them, greater complexity could make unachievable. Class analysis includes a critique of structural economic and social inequality; class emancipation is required to achieve significant social freedom; a theory of historical trajectory perceives community in terms of an exploited and oppressed class which must recognise itself in solidarity as a collective in order to embark on the path to emancipation.[4]
More broadly, this combination and interpretation of tenets differentiates socialism from liberalism; the core individualism of the latter gives a different substance to the concepts of equality, freedom and community than that of socialism–including its liberal socialist subtype. Given that liberalism and socialism each have conceptual boundaries, the questions of whether they can be fully reconciled with one another, and if so how, have often been asked since the nineteenth century.[5] In the course of his discussion, an attribute of McManus’ work in the book is the focus on the overlapping nature of ideologies, such as between conservatism and the right wing of liberalism and, of course, between left-liberalism and socialism.
McManus charts the ways in which early liberal political thought achieved a clear break from previous normative political philosophy. The latter had defended supposedly natural inequalities, thus legitimating the utilisation of the state for purposes of political domination by an already powerful minority. He discusses ways in which writers in the liberal category, wherein John Locke is particularly significant and influential, in fact identified, discussed and sought to justify the replacement of older forms of political domination with a new one, in which what were portrayed as the property rights of the wealthy were, surreptitiously, given priority over the economic and social needs of the majority.
A key theme of McManus’ narrative is the development of this early Lockean liberalism, based on what C.B. Macpherson (whose work is the topic of McManus’ Chapter 8) later called possessive individualism, into a more egalitarian type of liberal thought and theory. This new subtype of liberalism retained the positive elements that helped expose pre-liberal political philosophy as reactionary, but, unlike the early liberals, perceived the economic and social needs in terms of rights. This, in turn, according to McManus, was developed by the most progressive liberals, including Thomas Paine, Mary Wollstonecraft and John Stuart Mill, and socialists, notably Eduard Bernstein and R.H. Tawney, into a left liberalism and, eventually, liberal socialism. The latter was characterised, in part, by a synthesis of individualist ethics with methodological collectivism. A problem of definition has, however, emerged which has not been helped by some socialists including Bernstein who, as McManus notes, asserted that ‘one might call socialism “organized liberalism”’ (p. 149). As will be discussed later in the present review, he could have enhanced the quality of the book significantly had he considered and discussed this problem and its implications more directly and thoroughly.
McManus argues that the liberal socialism which developed as an alternative to liberalism has the following core principles:
- A concurrent commitment to a methodologically collectivist social ontology and normative individualism.
- A commitment to each person having as equal an opportunity to lead a good life as possible through the provision of shared resources and the design of institutions to enable the development of their human powers.
- A commitment to instituting a basic social structure characterised by highly participatory liberal-democratic political institutions and protections for liberal rights concurrent with the extension of liberal democratic principles into the economy and family to establish more egalitarian economic arrangements free of domination and exploitation. (pp. 17–18)[6]
He would, as I will suggest below, have been able to present a more convincing and indeed more useful definition had he amended the second and third of these principles.
How liberal can liberal socialism be?
The notion of liberal socialism has recently faced criticism, some of which has been influenced by the right-wing philosophy of F.A. Hayek, on the grounds that a supposedly liberal-socialist government will be unstable. This, according to the Hayekian view, is because socialist economic planning amounts to a comprehensive doctrine, and any such doctrine, even if reasonable, will be rejected by some reasonable people. A socialist government would thus, it is asserted, become ‘heavy handed and illiberal or cease to be socialist in any robust sense’.[7] Such criticism, in effect but not overtly, amounts to a dismissal of liberal socialism on the grounds that it could be neither comprehensively socialist and fully liberal.
One might answer the right-wing criticism by stressing that socialism and liberalism are ideologies in the descriptive sense; in other words, they are world views, each of which interprets societies and humanity, prescribes what should be done, and recommends political and socio-economic organisation. Ideologies are types, each having subtypes based on variations of the interpretations, recommendations and organisations. A subtype can be expressed by placing an attributive adjective before the noun; the latter representing the type. In seeking to reconcile the two ideologies McManus, who, in earlier work, offered a concise critical discussion of the Hayekian line, does not go down it or any similar philosophical path.[8] To do so on this issue would, indeed, lead down a blind alley.
A problem with McManus’ view is, nevertheless, that it perceives liberal socialism so widely that it lacks precision. Indeed, his interpretation could incorporate so much of liberalism that it almost loses sight of the methodologically collectivist social ontology which he deems a crucial feature of liberal socialism. This, in turn, leads him to struggle, at times, to distinguish clearly between the two ideologies. For example, McManus, at one point, while discussing the work of Carlo Rosselli, writes that ‘liberal socialists, like other liberals, see liberty as both the means and end of their program’ (p. 156). Liberal socialism is thus, inadvertently, according to this logic, portrayed as a form of liberalism. Elsewhere in the book (in his chapter on Marx, on which this review focuses later) McManus says that liberal socialism ‘can be theoretically understood as a species of liberal egalitarianism on the very left end of liberalism’s political spectrum’ (p. 133). McManus is thus broadly in agreement with several contemporary thinkers he discusses in Chapter 11, including Chantal Mouffe and Norberto Bobbio, who consider themselves as liberal socialists, implying that this can be achieved by somehow rescuing political liberalism from economic liberalism (pp. 207–26).
McManus might, instead, have drawn more constructively on another contemporary theorist he discusses in Chapter 11: Axel Honneth. McManus notes that ‘Honneth hopes to show how existing societies fail to successfully instantiate their professed ideals and are constantly in need of reform and transformation according to their own intrinsic standards’ (p. 219). Had McManus focused on his own words ‘and transformation’, he may have noticed that they are potentially very significant in analysis, as they can help locate Honneth firmly in the liberal-socialist camp, rather than in the realm of left liberalism or liberal egalitarianism. Indeed, McManus acknowledges in his next paragraph, that: ‘For Honneth, it was the transition from the “liberal premise of freedom” which holds that subjects are “free to pursue their aims without hindrance” to the idea of self-realization or self-determination that was vital to socialism’ (p. 219). Bearing in mind that he acknowledges Honneth’s argument for social freedom, perhaps McManus could have made the case for including him in a narrower liberal-socialist category which excludes thinkers who are better-placed within liberalism, whether or not they consider themselves as socialists. Significantly, with his conception of social freedom, Honneth achieves the combination of methodological collectivism and normative individualism that McManus sees as the first principle of liberal socialism. To pursue this line, it would be necessary to amend his other principles, as was suggested earlier in the present review.
The Political Theory of Liberal Socialism misses the opportunity to engage in an exercise of critical theory for which McManus’ scholarly research, agile thinking and lively writing in the book could actually provide the basis. Indeed, as has just been discussed, in some statements, he comes very close to positions from which he could begin an argument that liberal socialism exists outside of liberalism. Notwithstanding his admirable work in identifying and offering exposition and explication of liberal and socialist categories of thought, McManus could have offered an interesting new dimension by considering how an immanent critique could be performed by separating the theories which he considers as examples of the liberal-socialist category into left liberalism and a narrower liberal socialism. The former would be a division of liberalism characterised by the adoption of some socialist ideas while the liberal core would remain. Liberal socialism, by way of contrast, would adopt some liberal ideas into a socialist core. Although I am taking the following part-sentence out of its context in McManus’ book, it gets tantalisingly close to beginning to make this point: ‘… the liberal egalitarian tradition overlaps with liberal socialism (even if it is not coextensive with it)’ (p. 198). This indicates his awareness that liberal egalitarianism and liberal socialism are different ideologies, even though he seems to sometimes lose sight of this difference and its significance.
Egalitarianism is a broad category into which the ideas of socialists and liberals can be placed. Much liberal thought is, however, restricted to formal and political egalitarianism. Imagine a Venn diagram consisting of two overlapping circles representing the ideologies of liberalism and socialism respectively. Socio-economic (as well as simply political) egalitarianism is a feature of the area where the circles overlap; but if one were to pull the circles apart this form of egalitarianism would remain as a core characteristic of that which represents socialism, but would only appear in some instantiations of the one representing liberalism. The locations of socio-economic egalitarianism in liberal ideology, moreover, range from the periphery to positions adjacent to the core.[9] This situation has historical roots.
Socialism emerged because liberalism was inadequate for, and indeed hindered, attempts to extend equality into the social and economic spheres. Only by such extension could people collectively comprising the working class achieve a reasonable standard of life. Socialists, who believed that liberalism still had something valuable to offer adopted some of its tenets, reworking them into an ideological position which sought to extend and deepen equality. Bearing this in mind, had McManus presented a clearer general definition of ideology and its features, identifying core concepts and less crucial ones, he could have given himself the opportunity to present a firmer definition of liberal socialism, importantly stating why and how it is distinguishable from liberalism.
One way in which McManus could have taken the opportunity would have been to focus more closely on the structure of the term ‘liberal socialism’. The attributive adjective and noun which comprise the term indicate that the focus should be on a subtype of socialism characterised by retention of some tenets of the liberal tradition, which is, nevertheless, transcended rather than amended. These liberal concepts can be located at positions adjacent or peripheral to the core. The narrower conception of liberal socialism thus envisaged could draw on the following very relevant thought expressed by McManus, in his chapter on J.S. Mill, about nineteenth century socialism.
Socialism … was clearly an offspring of the same Enlightenment soil from which liberalism itself had sprouted. Indeed, for many socialists, the failure of liberalism lay in the partiality and class specificity of its undeniable achievements. While ‘bourgeois society had emancipated the (upper) middle classes from the aristocracy and formally established equal rights for ‘all’ (with all initially being propertied white men) through appeal to reason, it had stopped short of demanding emancipation for the lower orders. (p. 99.)
A problem with conceiving of liberal socialism as too wide a category is that the limitations of liberalism, manifested in different ways even after the introduction of universal suffrage, may thereby be neglected. Universal suffrage did not guarantee equal social rights. For this, conceptions of social freedom, economic equality and community would need to override individual acquisitiveness to an extent which liberalism could not accommodate. Liberalism, indeed, has a history of giving concessions when the economic climate allows this, while opposing socialist demands – even demands from the social-democratic wing of socialism – when this endangered the ability of the economically powerful to continue to prosper.[10] A change in this respect emerged in the 1990s following the fall of East-European and Soviet Communism. McManus mentions that this led to disillusion and loss of confidence on the existing Left, leading those who continued to favour liberal socialism to do so less confidently (p. 207). What he might have added was that this did not simply make conditions less difficult for liberals; more was expected of liberalism to provide the better life that many around the world now demanded.[11] Nevertheless, even though the failure of liberalism to deliver continued into the first quarter of the twenty-first century, it maintained dominance in the United States and Europe by converting into neoliberalism or even adopting authoritarian characteristics.[12]
In this climate, it is not unreasonable to assume that various manifestations of liberal socialism may attract attention and indeed support from the Centre-Left, be they each sufficiently socialist to warrant the noun in the label, but flexible enough to accommodate enough liberal demands as to make the attributive adjective realistic. Interest in liberal-socialist theorising and consideration of the possibility of its instantiation may thus increase as the Left explores possible responses.
Marxism and Liberal Socialism
One question that may arise from McManus’s discussion of liberal socialism, especially as Chapter Six of The Political Theory of Liberal Socialism has the title ‘Karl Marx’s Critique of Liberalism’, is where Marxism fits into the picture. At issue is whether liberal socialism can be narrow enough to avoid conflation with the left of liberalism, but wide enough to include some variants of Marxism. In the chapter on Marx, McManus focuses briefly on Marx’s arguments regarding the condition which is needed for humans to achieve social freedom and thus freedom in society. As McManus suggests, Marx’s conception of freedom was largely one of non-domination, and, unlike earlier such conceptions, Marx’s focused on economic rather than simply political forms of domination (p. 132). Liberalism, by way of contrast, seeks to achieve either negative freedom from constraint wherever this is possible or, in some liberal variants, positive freedom as self-fulfilment. McManus could have focused more closely and in more detail at these distinctions regarding freedom, as this may have led him to reconsider the following summary of his three-principles definition and what he perceives as its implications for the force of Marxism:
Liberal socialists reject social atomism for methodological collectivism, support extending liberal rights and democratic freedoms to the economy to resist domination, and are eminently aware of the artificiality and history of social institutions and practices. On this basis, many of the classical Marxist objections to possessive individualism still apply, but lose force when applied to liberal egalitarianism and liberal socialism specifically. (pp. 133–34.)
As will be discussed in a moment, McManus’ statement about Marxism losing force in the passage just quoted from his chapter on Marx raises an interesting point of debate regarding liberal socialism, but is on far less firm ground when applied to liberal egalitarianism. First, however, notice that McManus uses the term ‘classical Marxist’ (p. 133). Marxism is, however, a creative tradition and, whatever McManus means by ‘classical’, whether or not some sort of Marxism in the past loses force is less helpful than to consider creative interpretations of the work of Marx himself. McManus mentions possessive individualism in the passage just quoted, which was the main creative contribution of the quasi-Marxist C.B. Macpherson, who he, later in the book, describes as ‘offering a properly liberal socialist vision’ (p. 173). It would be reasonable to expect McManus to have focused on Macpherson’s conception of the freedom that, creatively, he proposes as a replacement for that of the traditional negative one that is a feature of possessive-individualist liberalism. Macpherson’s developmental liberty, like Marx’s idea of freedom, bears affinities with republican conceptions of freedom.[13]
In the case of liberal egalitarianism, the rights that would be acceptable as equal would be restricted to those which would not thereby require liberalism to transition into liberal socialism. In its liberal form, democracy and the rights which are its key characteristics are limited by the need to satisfy the assumption of property rights inherent in capitalism. In other words, the insulation of property rights from democracy means that the political aspects of liberalism are limited by the economic aspects.[14] Indeed, in an earlier article, McManus clearly recognised this limitation.[15] Even though it may adopt some liberal tenets, socialism, in order to warrant its status as an ideology in its own right, must go beyond liberalism – including liberal egalitarianism. The subtypes within socialism, including liberal socialism, must therefore do likewise. As was noted earlier in this review, McManus argues that liberal-socialist theory rejects social atomism for methodological collectivism and demands the extension and reinterpretation of rights and democratic freedoms beyond the confines within which liberalism can operate. Had he avoided the conflation of liberal socialism and liberal egalitarianism, he could have built a definition of liberal socialism as a theory which overcomes the restrictions of all forms of liberalism, including liberal egalitarianism or left liberalism.
A Marxist objection to possessive individualism would be compatible with liberal socialism, if the latter were to meet the minimum requirements needed for ‘Marxist’ to be the attributive adjective. Let us very briefly discuss this in terms of McManus three principles of liberal socialism. Marxism can fulfil the requirement of the first principle – the combination of methodological collectivism and normative individualism. That Marxism involves methodological collectivism does not, I trust, require explanation here. To illustrate how it also involves normative individualism, it is useful to refer to two articles–by Paul Cammack and Tony Burns respectively. An aspect of normative individualism features in each, even though this might not immediately be detectable.
Cammack discusses the topic of social reproduction in Marx’s work. He draws attention to Marx’s argument regarding two aspects of the production of life, these being the production of one’s own labour and the production of new lives by means of procreation. In each case, Marx perceived a twofold relation: natural and social. The social aspect always involved several individuals cooperating, whatever the conditions, in some manner and to some ends. The industrial revolution had made all individuals in every country subservient to international capital for the satisfaction of their wants. This destroyed the natural character of production and reproduction. In capitalism the human hand of each individual worker carries out a single operation in the production process, unlike previous handicraft production, where each worker produced a complete article. Eventually, the capitalist production changes into machine production, where individual contributions are further decomposed.[16] Cammack’s article include quotations from Capital Volume One in which Marx disapprovingly and acerbically criticises individual capitalists for unprincipled activity to enhance their own wealth, at the expense of other capitalists, with no concern for the ruined health and shortened lives of individual labourers, who are replaced by just enough others for their labour-power.[17] This was, thus, a normative element of his thought.
In the other article, Burns argues that the social formation is an important topic in Marx’s theory. Normative individualism is evident at several points in the article. First, he mentions Marx’s concern that people are transformed into commodities in the capitalist mode of production during the feudal social formation. Burns notes Marx’s argument that capital had, in the feudal social formation, only sporadically brought social labour under its control.[18] Marx considered control of human labour bad for each person and saw capitalism to be worsening the position of most people. Burns mentions that, in precapitalist social formations, the majority of the things produced are for the immediate use of the producers rather than for conversion into commodities as in the case of the capitalist social formation.[19] Marx clearly thought it was better for each person to produce things for themselves and society rather than have them taken from them by capital, as this involved domination which, normatively, he considered to be bad for humans.[20]
It is important to contrast the normative individualism one finds in the work of Marx with liberal theories of individualism, whether the latter propose laissez-faire or a welfare state. Whereas liberals assume that individualism can flourish within capitalist society, Marx argued that capitalist society undermines individualism. Individualism, for Marx, can only flourish in a new society in which alienation will have been overcome.[21]
McManus’s second principle of liberal socialism is sufficiently abstract and subject to interpretation that Marxism could, conceivably, be deemed compatible with it, if some elaboration of its points could be formulated from a Marxist perspective. If so, with reference to McManus’s suggestion, Marxists may perceive there is actually no need to have force. The question that would arise, however, would be whether this would result in such an extensive change in doctrine that it would overstretch Marxism or liberal socialism.
To meet the requirements of both liberal socialism and Marxism, McManus third principle would need to be amended first to commit to a basic structure accommodating progressive liberal-democratic principles in a socialist framework. This would involve qualifying the political institutions and protection of liberal rights to make them compatible with a combination of social, economic and political rights more consistent with the collectivist ontology, while retaining a form of normative individualism.
McManus principles would, however, require further elaboration and clarification to affirm that the qualification is sufficient to be consistent with a specifically Marxist socialism. Indeed, he is not confident that liberal socialism would satisfy Marx. ‘Whether’, he suggests, ‘Marx would have regarded liberalism with a degree of approval as a transitional phase toward a “higher phase of communism” … we can’t say’. He doubts this given Marx’s ‘hostility to the language and aesthetics of bourgeois liberalism’ (p. 134). As a dialectical thinker, he supposes, Marx ‘would have regarded liberal socialism as an advance on possessive individualist liberalism and unbridled capitalism’ (p. 135). Liberal socialism would, however, ‘remain characterized by certain fundamental contradictions so long as the existence of coercive and domineering social institutions like the state remained in place’ (p. 135). While these expressions of doubt are reasonable, they would carry more weight if he had focused more closely on the key features of Marx’s work that became a basis for Marxist thought. To consider this briefly, it is useful to refer once again to Wright’s nodes of Marx’s thought and Marxism: class analysis, class emancipation, and historical trajectory. In terms of Wright’s nodes, Marxism insists that the class struggle is required to achieve the realisation of emancipation as the destination of the historical trajectory.[22] If liberal-socialist theory is insufficient for this outcome, even after the limitations of McManus’s theory are overcome by adding new features in addition and/or as replacements to parts of that theory, then it may be necessary to argue that Marxism will continue to have force against liberal socialism. If so, Marxism needs to be categorised as a different subtype of socialism.
One argument that would lead to the latter conclusion would be that the measures required to ensure that capitalism cannot prevent emancipation will not be achieved by liberal socialism, especially as freedom is conceptualised so differently by liberals and Marxists. Attempts to accommodate liberal understandings of freedom within a socialist theory would be digressive from the class struggle required to achieve freedom of all as understood by Marxists. It may, for example, be argued that, in the contemporary era of global capital, unfree labour is an inherent feature of capitalism due to what Tom Brass refers to as deproletarianisation – unfree labourers not being proletarians – and that struggle by a broader dominated class must continue.[23] The option of accepting that liberal-democratic principles can be fruitfully employed would be rejected by Marxists, who would argue that Marx’s hope that ‘the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all’ will never otherwise be achieved.[24] Brass thus offers an innovative theory and thus an example of the sort of creative Marxism that can serve to challenge McManus’s argument that Marxist arguments lose force when applied against liberal socialism.
Nevertheless, whether or not the changes to McManus’ second and third principles of liberal socialism can be achieved while retaining the essence of both it and Marxism would require an article or chapter to consider arguments and counter arguments properly. Perhaps McManus could do this in a future piece. At the end of his chapter on Marx, he offers the following conclusion: ‘Liberal socialism in the 21st century must learn to pay far more attention to power than many of our predecessors. On this point there is no more magisterial guide than Karl Marx’ (p. 136). McManus’s book would have taken on a valuable new additional dimension had he discussed whether, and if so how, Marx’s work could have served as such a guide in an analysis of the three principles. This may even have prompted him to revise those principles and to define liberal socialism in a more radical way that does not conflate it with left liberalism and liberal egalitarianism. One thing McManus could have borne in mind is, that to revise his definition extensively may mean that the ‘liberal’ attributive adjective would need to be abandoned. Not to make alteration sufficient to avoid conflation may, on the other hand, mean that to allocate Marxism to the liberal-socialism category would require attempts to find a quasi-Marxist compromise. If that option is unsuccessful, attempts to squeeze Marxism into liberal socialism may be futile or Marxism would be abandoned for revisionism.[25]
Conclusion
The Political Theory of Liberal Socialism is likely to raise considerable debate regarding categorisation of the theorists it discusses. A case could be made, for example, that the liberal aspect of Bernstein’s position was not as strong as he believed, and that he does fit into the liberal-socialist category, but believed that liberalism was stronger in its relationship with socialism than it was. One can judge that Keynes, on the other hand, does not qualify as a liberal socialist, even though he used the term to describe his ideas. McManus seems to have reservations whether his ideas are really socialist but does include him in the category (pp. 152–53). Had McManus narrowed his definition of liberal socialism in the way suggested in the present review, perhaps he may have recategorised Bernstein and Keynes. Other assessors of the positions of these two theorists and the others discussed in McManus’s book may disagree. To assess different possible assessments would take a paper in its own right, rather than this review.
To say that the notion of liberal socialism can be more slippery than McManus recognises is less a fundamental criticism of his project than an argument that the implications of what he suggests can be explored more fruitfully. A distinction between liberal socialism and what one might refer to as socialist liberalism can be drawn which enables one to recategorise the political theories that are portrayed as interchangeable in this book. This may lead to a more thorough examination of the relationship between liberal socialism and Marxism. McManus’ book has untapped potential. There is, indeed, much to commend in The Political Theory of Liberal Socialism. It is clearly a very scholarly work in both the history of political thought and the study of political ideologies. Readers who are also interested in critical theory may find this book very resourceful as the basis for immanent critique.
Peter Lamb is retired and unaffiliated. He was Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at Staffordshire University, UK. He is the author of many books, including Harold Laski, the Reluctant Marxist: Socialist Democracy for a World in Turmoil (Palgrave Macmillan, 2024), (Historical Dictionary of Socialism, fourth edition (Rowman and Littlefield, 2024), Socialism (Polity Press, 2019), The First Marx: A Philosophical Introduction, with co-author Douglas Burnham (Bloomsbury, 2018), Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto: A Reader’s Guide (Bloomsbury, 2015) and Harold Laski: Problems of Democracy, the Sovereign State, and International Society (Bloomsbury, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). He has published many articles, chapters and other items on socialism and the work of socialists.
References
Brass, Tom 2017, ‘Class Struggle and Unfree labour: The (Marxist) Road Not Taken’, Science & Society, 81, 2: 197-219.
Burns, Tony 2024, ‘Marx and the Concept of a Social Formation’, Historical Materialism, 32, 3: 158–87.
Cammack, Paul 2020, ‘Marx on Social Reproduction’, Historical Materialism, 28, 2: 76–106.
Carver, Terrell 2019, ‘Liberalism and its Discontents’ in The Bloomsbury Companion to Marx, edited by Jeff Diamanti, Andrew Pendakis and Imre Szeman, London: Bloomsbury.
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McManus, Matthew 2023, ‘Liberal and Democratic Egalitarian Rights: A Critical Legal Conception’, Law, Culture and the Humanities, 19, 3: 624–44.
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Meiksins Wood, Ellen 2000, ‘Democracy’, in The Marx Revival: Key Concepts and New Interpretations, edited by Marcello Musto, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Vallier, Kevin 2020, ‘Liberal Socialism Is Not Stable for the Right Reasons’, Philosophical Topics, 48, 2: 245–64.
Wallerstein, Immanuel 1994, ‘The Agonies of Liberalism: What Hope Progress’, New Left Review I, 204: 3–32.
Wilkinson, Michael A. 2019, ‘Authoritarian Liberalism in Europe: A Common Critique of Neoliberalism and Ordoliberalism’, Critical Sociology, 45, 7–8: 1023–034.
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[1] Carver 2019.
[2] Rooksby 2012, pp. 495–98.
[3] For an argument that equality, freedom and community are the key tenets of socialism see Lamb 2019, p. 1, and pp. 24–6; Lamb 2024, pp. 1–2.
[4] Wright 1993.
[5] Katznelson 2020, p. 527.
[6] As my ellipses indicate, I have omitted some of the details of this definition. McManus summarises these principles as follows later in the book: ‘Methodological collectivism and normative individualism, a developmental ethic, and the defense of liberal institutions, principles, and rights, and their extension into the economy and family to prevent or end domination’ (p. 202).
[7] Vallier 2020, p. 263.
[8] McManus 2020, p. 628, p. 630 and pp. 637–38.
[9] I am drawing on what Michael Freeden called the morphology of ideologies, according to which each ideology has core, adjacent and peripheral concepts. A concept can move between these categories, as over time ideologies develop in historical, geographical or cultural contexts. The flexibility of ideologies is highly unlikely to be extensive enough for a core concept to disappear altogether. Freeden 1996, pp. 77–91.
[10] Ramsay 1997, pp. 1–5 and pp. 253–54.
[11] Wallerstein 1994, p. 13.
[12] Konings 2010; Wilkinson 2019.
[13] A brief discussion of Macpherson’s conception of developmental liberty and its affinities with republican liberalism can be found in Lamb and Morrice 2002, pp. 808–09.
[14] Meiksins Wood 2020.
[15] McManus 2023, p. 626.
[16] Cammack 2020, pp. 79–83.
[17] Cammack 2020, pp. 87–8.
[18] Burns 2024, p. 171.
[19] Burns 2024, p. 174.
[20] Burns 2024, p. 170.
[21] Sayers, 2007, pp. 100–1
[22] Wright 1993.
[23] Brass 2017, pp. 213-18
[24] For this quote, see Marx and Engels 2002, p. 244.
[25] Das 2023, p. 384.
