This interview with Shi Yongqin was originally commissioned by Mr. Shen Wentao for Wenyi Yanjiu (文艺研究Literary Research) (monthly) but, for some reason, the journal did not publish it. Wenyi Yanjiu was founded in May 1979. It is a large comprehensive literary theory journal supervised by the Ministry of Culture and hosted by the Chinese Academy of Arts. It is one of the important contemporary literary theory journals in China and has a significant influence in the domestic academic community.
Shi Yongqin, born in Shanghai in 1949, graduated from the Russian Department of Beijing Normal University in 1982. In 1984, he joined the Institute of Foreign Literature at the Chinese Academy of Arts, later transferring to the Institute of Marxist Literary Theory, where he engaged in translation and research on literary theory. For nearly 20 years, he has focused primarily on translating and researching the works of Leon Trotsky. His published translations include Trotsky’s Autobiography: My Life, The Prophet Speaks on the October Revolution, Trotsky on the Chinese Revolution, and Trotsky on the Anti-Fascist Struggle, as well as the biography The Prophet Trilogy (co-translated and fully edited). He has also published several related research papers. This interview, conducted by Shen Wentao at the request of our journal, explores Trotsky’s contributions to the development of Marxism.
Shen Wentao: Mr. Shi, I have been following your translations and related research on Trotsky. Your translator’s preface to Trotsky’s Autobiography: My Life was the first article in officially published Chinese works to fully affirm Trotsky. Your participation in translating and editing The Prophet Trilogy has significantly influenced domestic readers’ comprehensive understanding of Trotsky, the Bolshevik Revolution, and Stalin’s distortions and betrayals. In recent years, you have consecutively published three important works by Trotsky on the October Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, and the Anti-Fascist Struggle. From your “Translator’s Preface to the Reissue of ‘The Prophet Trilogy’“, we learn that, besides these three published works, you have also translated his The Challenge of the Left Opposition (three volumes), Trotsky on Culture, Trotsky on Socialist Construction, and three volumes of his collected works after being exiled by Stalin. In my view, you are currently the most diligent person in China in translating Trotsky’s works. Additionally, your related research articles have proposed new insights into significant issues in the history of the Russian Revolution. It is an honor to be entrusted by Literary Research to ask you to discuss Trotsky’s contributions to the development of Marxism.
Shi Yongqin: This is a broad topic. Trotsky was a truly encyclopedic figure. According to Western scholars, his complete works amount to over 80 volumes, with another estimate suggesting 150 volumes. It is necessary to point out that he was not a writer who confined himself to a study; he was primarily a professional revolutionary. He led the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917, organised and commanded the Red Army during the Civil War, and made outstanding contributions during the postwar economic recovery period. After Lenin’s death, he fought a life-and-death struggle with Stalin to defend Marxism, Leninism, and to strive for party-democracy and correct domestic and foreign policies. His activities were not limited to politics and revolution; they also spanned military, cultural, economic, and ideological fields, leaving an indelible mark in each. Isaac Deutscher, the author of The Prophet Trilogy, said that Trotsky’s life was so rich and brilliant that any segment of it could constitute the biography of an outstanding historical figure. I wonder where you would like to start.
SW: Let’s start with his theory of permanent revolution. Trotsky proposed the theory of permanent revolution before the 1905 revolution and continuously supplemented and developed it thereafter. Could you discuss the content of the theory and its practical impact on the Russian Revolution? Lenin never publicly supported “permanent revolution.” Did he oppose this idea?
SY: Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution is not complicated and can be summarised as follows: due to the weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie, it was incapable of carrying out the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its conclusion. Therefore, the leadership of this revolution historically fell to the Russian proletariat. Since the proletariat took the lead in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, it could not allow the movement to stop at the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and would inevitably push it directly into a socialist revolution. This theory challenged the prevailing notion among socialist parties at the time that socialist revolutions would first erupt in advanced capitalist countries. It also contradicted the widely accepted three-stage theory within the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which posited that, in a backward country like Russia, the bourgeois-democratic revolution must first be completed, followed by a long period of developing productive forces, and, only then, once these forces reached the level of advanced countries, could a proletarian revolution occur. According to this view, the proletarian revolution in Russia was relegated to a distant future. Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution demonstrated the possibility for the proletariat in backward countries to directly transition from a bourgeois-democratic revolution to a socialist revolution, making the socialist revolution in Russia not a distant historical prospect but the immediate outcome of the bourgeois revolution they were striving for. It can even be said that without the theory of permanent revolution, there would have been no October Revolution, nor the subsequent shift of the international communist movement’s focus to revolutions in backward countries, which led to the significant Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927 and the sweeping national-liberation movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution played a midwifery role in the transition of socialism from theory to reality. However, when this theory emerged at the end of 1904, it faced unanimous attacks from both factions of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Despite the victory of the October Revolution being a triumph of Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution, after Lenin lost his ability to govern and passed away, the ruling majority labelled this theory as Trotsky’s heretical opposition to Marxism-Leninism. Even when members of the Trotskyist opposition surrendered to Stalin, they began by criticising his theory of permanent revolution, further reinforcing the perception that this theory was a non-Marxist heresy.
First, let’s examine the relationship between the October Revolution and the theory of permanent revolution. There is a common view in China that the February Revolution completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, and the Bolsheviks subsequently completed the socialist revolution—the October Revolution. This is a misinterpretation. The February Revolution did not complete the bourgeois-democratic revolution; it only overthrew the Tsarist autocratic regime but did not accomplish the other major task of the bourgeois-democratic revolution—land reform. Trotsky once said that, if the Provisional Government had completed land reform and ended the War, there would have been no October Revolution. Land reform was completed by the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution, meaning the proletarian revolution was completed during the bourgeois revolution, and the bourgeois revolution was only fully completed after the victory of the proletarian revolution. If this were not the case, even if the Bolsheviks had seized power, they could not have won the subsequent civil war without the support of the peasants. The theory of permanent revolution was fully validated in the October Revolution, showing that there was no interval between the proletarian and bourgeois revolutions; they were intertwined and occurred simultaneously.
Another point to clarify is that, initially, Trotsky believed the theory of permanent revolution was only applicable to Russia’s unique situation. Therefore, during internal party-struggles, when the majority faction targeted this theory, Trotsky, to resolve conflicts, suggested it could be placed in the museum of revolutionary history. However, after the theory was re-examined during the strategic and tactical debates on the Chinese revolution, Trotsky changed his view, believing it was applicable to all backward countries. Consequently, when opposition leaders like Radek and Preobrazhensky prepared to surrender and launched critiques of the theory of permanent revolution, Trotsky fiercely defended it.
You mentioned that Lenin never publicly supported the theory of permanent revolution, which is incorrect. After the February Revolution, Lenin began advocating for the Bolsheviks to seize power. At that time, the Bolshevik leadership believed this was Lenin’s acceptance of Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution, and some, including Stalin, strongly resisted it. Reviewing Lenin’s earlier works clarifies why they held this view. From 1905 until the February Revolution of 1917, Lenin consistently advocated for the proletariat’s leadership in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. In this regard, he and Trotsky had no disagreement. However, their predictions about the outcome of the bourgeois-democratic revolution were entirely different: Lenin believed the result would be the establishment of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, which could only be a democratic dictatorship, not a socialist one. It could not touch the foundations of capitalism and could, at most, implement reforms beneficial to the peasants and thorough democracy. This indicates that Lenin also divided the Russian revolution into three stages: the bourgeois-democratic revolution, resulting in the establishment of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, which would then create conditions for a socialist revolution, to be carried out once conditions were ripe. This was not significantly different from the three-stage theory popular among Russian socialists at the time. The difference between Lenin and the Mensheviks and some Bolsheviks was that he insisted on the proletariat’s leadership in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, while the latter did not even demand this, believing the proletariat could only play an auxiliary role in such a revolution. In 1905, Lenin predicted that the revolution’s outcome would be the establishment of a provisional government tasked with implementing the Social-Democratic Labour Party’s minimum programme, thus excluding the immediate realisation of the maximum programme, i.e., seizing power for a socialist revolution. In a 1909 article, he explicitly criticised Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution, saying it ignored the bourgeois nature of the revolution, i.e., the proletariat not only leading the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its conclusion but ultimately seizing power and directly transitioning to a socialist revolution. No wonder that, when Lenin proposed that the Bolsheviks should seize power after the February Revolution, it met with resistance from the Bolshevik leadership, such as Stalin and Kamenev, who refused to publish Lenin’s “Letters from Afar” in Pravda. After returning to Russia, Lenin’s “April Theses” also faced resistance from the party-leadership. What in his letters and theses made his comrades find them unacceptable and unpublishable? It was his call for workers to carry out a second revolution, overthrowing the landlord-capitalist government that continued the imperialist war. This greatly surprised the Bolshevik leadership, who were prepared to act as the opposition in the Soviets and support the Provisional Government to some extent. Lenin had to work hard to change their stance and lead the Party towards the struggle for power. Lenin adopted Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution after the February Revolution, although their expressions were not entirely identical. In Lenin’s writings, the proletariat’s seizure of power was described as the second stage of the revolution. However, since these two stages were closely linked, and the second stage of achieving the maximum programme began even before the minimum programme was fully realised, it essentially merged the first and second stages, making it substantively identical to Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution. This is fully evidenced by contemporary evaluations of Lenin’s shift in stance and the resistance from the Bolshevik leadership. In other words, Lenin’s actions demonstrated his support for Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution, which was more important than verbal acknowledgment and support. However, Lenin could not fully convince the party leadership or eliminate their deeply ingrained three-stage theory. Therefore, at critical moments, significant divisions arose within the party-leadership, most notably before the October Revolution, when Zinoviev and Kamenev publicly opposed the uprising in the press. At these crucial moments, Trotsky’s stance was entirely consistent with Lenin’s. This might explain why, during the October Revolution and its preparation, Lenin could not rely on his disciples and had to fight against them, while heavily relying on Trotsky, who had just joined the Bolsheviks in May 1917 (Russian calendar).
Additionally, Lenin reiterated Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution at the Second Congress of the Communist International. When outlining the non-capitalist development path for backward countries, he said: “In all colonial and backward countries, we not only form the core units capable of independent struggle, i.e., party organisations, and immediately propagate the organisation of peasant Soviets adapted to pre-capitalist conditions, but the Communist International must also theoretically explain that, with the help of the proletariat in advanced countries, backward countries can transition to the Soviet system without going through the capitalist development stage, and then transition to communism after a certain period of development.”
SW: In recent years, there has been a strong trend within the domestic academic community to deny the October Revolution. Some openly claim that the October Revolution was a violent revolution, that violent revolution was an early thought of Marx, and that his later thought was democratic revolution. They say that the October Revolution brought us not Marxism but Leninism, which they equate with Blanquism, a theory of conspiratorial insurrection. Some even go so far as to claim that the October Revolution was a revolution bought by the German Kaiser. What is your view on these issues?
SY: The significant shift in the academic evaluation of the October Revolution reflects changes in the times and social consciousness. However, the fundamental reason for this shift is the lack of objective historical research on the October Revolution. In my essay “Revisiting the October Revolution”, I mentioned that the previous reverence for the October Revolution and today’s denial of it are superficially opposed but share a common cause: a lack of understanding of the October Revolution. This is evident from the publication of historical materials on the October Revolution. Before my translation of Trotsky’s Account of the October Revolution was published, the only related material available was a 154-page book published by the Commercial Press, The October Socialist Revolution in Russia, which was part of their World History Data Series. The reference materials for this book were mainly the 10-volume Great October Socialist Revolution: A Compilation of Documents published in the Soviet Union in the 1950s, along with relevant articles from the Collected Works of Lenin. How can one conduct research with such limited materials? The commemorative articles and editorials published at that time can all be categorised as reverence. In fact, before the reform and opening up, this was a forbidden area of research. The conclusions I have reached through my translation and related research on Trotsky today—such as the October Revolution being a Soviet democratic revolution rather than a violent revolution, Lenin not being able to personally lead the October Revolution, and the New Economic Policy being a crippled economic policy—would have been considered counterrevolutionary.
As for the claim that violent revolution was an early thought of Marx and that he later advocated for democratic revolution, this is based on a misinterpretation of his words. The phrase “but this time it is no longer as the private property of individual producers, but as the common property of the producers, directly as social property” is taken out of context. The following sentence expresses the opposite idea: “However, this expropriation within the capitalist system itself is manifested in a form of antagonism, as the possession of social property by a few.” Looking at the subsequent articles by the author of this claim, it becomes even clearer. He opposes the so-called “turning left while signalling right” and openly advocates for the capitalist road, singing praises for capitalism.
Was the October Revolution a Blanquist conspiracy or a proletarian revolution? Was it a violent revolution or a Soviet democratic revolution? A few years ago, while some people denied the October Revolution because it was a violent revolution, there was also a voice that denied it because it was not violent enough to be considered a revolution. These two diametrically opposed arguments highlight the awkwardness of revolution in the post-revolutionary era. Shouldn’t this prompt a rethinking of the nature of the October Revolution? Before the October Revolution, apart from the well-known public opposition to the uprising by Zinoviev and Kamenev in the newspapers, there was also a fierce conflict between Lenin and Trotsky over the timing and method of seizing power. Lenin advocated for an immediate uprising from mid-September, and his dissatisfaction and criticism of Trotsky grew increasingly intense, accusing him of delaying, which he saw as a crime, self-destruction, and betrayal. Trotsky, on the other hand, believed that time was on the side of the Soviets and confidently pushed the situation in a direction more favourable to the Soviets. In fact, Trotsky’s plan was to seize power after the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets passed a resolution transferring all power to the Soviets, and he was confident that such a resolution would be passed. However, he did not stick to his plan to the end and organised an armed uprising on the evening of October 24, on the eve of the Second Congress of Soviets. This can be seen as a compromise with Lenin. Therefore, in my essay “Revisiting the October Revolution”, I proposed that the October Revolution was a Soviet democratic revolution. My essay not only refuted the attacks on the October Revolution from the perspective of violence but also explained why the October Revolution was “not violent enough”.
After the reform and opening up, related research was no longer a forbidden area, but, unfortunately, in the initial stages, many researchers’ thinking remained stuck in past frameworks. For example, during the Bukharin fever of the 1980s, following the official rehabilitation of Bukharin by the Soviet Union, Bukharin not only regained Lenin’s positive evaluation of him in his will—”the Party’s greatest and most valuable theoretician, naturally the most beloved figure in the entire Party”—but his opposition to the Trotskyist opposition and later the United Opposition of Trotsky and Zinoviev, and his defence of the theory of socialism in one country, were all re-evaluated as merits. Some even went so far as to call the economic policy jointly implemented by him and Stalin, which history has proven wrong and which has been declared bankrupt in practice, the Lenin-Bukharin New Economic Policy, claiming it to be the only correct economic policy for building socialism. Some scholars even claimed that the study of the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) should start with Bukharin.
To this day, objective historical research in this field is still lacking. The current popular views you mentioned are equally unhelpful for readers to objectively understand this period of history. Those who promote these views aim to deny the Russian Revolution, drawing hasty conclusions on historical issues, and are praised for having a “strong sense of problem awareness”. However, in historical research, problem awareness is the most undesirable. For example, one scholar claimed that John Reed’s description of the October Revolution as “Ten Days That Shook the World” was nonsense, saying that the October Revolution did not shake anything and that people at the time saw it as just another government change. She argued that the Bolsheviks’ dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in January of the following year was the real world-shaking event. This scholar’s view is merely an expression of her personal emotions and is by no means an objective evaluation of historical events. Whether a historical event is shocking cannot be judged solely by how people at the time evaluated it, especially since those who held such views were only a part of the population, and they soon felt its impact, as evidenced by the subsequent civil war. More importantly, the consequences of the event must be considered. From the consequences of the October Revolution, it is not an exaggeration to say it was shocking. As for claims that the October Revolution was a revolution bought by the German Kaiser or that the Bolsheviks practiced communal wives, these are nothing but malicious slander and defamation. It is regrettable that the book The History of Russia in the 20th Century, which spreads such lies, became highly popular after an interview with one of its authors was published in the Yanhuang Chunqiu magazine. It is said that several publishers are now competing to buy the rights to this book and plan to translate and publish it. Additionally, some people use the argument that the civil war was fratricidal in order to deny the October Revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. If the Civil War was fratricidal, wasn’t the World War also fratricidal? The difference is merely that the former was on a smaller scale, within one country, while the latter was on a larger scale, with the flames of war spreading worldwide and causing more deaths and injuries. Another difference is that the World War was caused by conflicts of interest among various national capitals, while the Civil War was caused by class struggle. In the eyes of these people, the global slaughter brought by the former is justified, while the latter is utterly condemnable. The October Revolution was a product of World War I, aimed at opposing imperialist war and global fratricide. Is there a problem with that? A history lacking objective research can easily turn into a narrative. However, the narrative style and tendencies vary in different periods.
SW: Please discuss Trotsky’s contributions to the issue of colonial revolutions.
SY: On 5 August 1919, Trotsky submitted a strategic shift proposal to the Central Committee, in which he wrote: “Asia can become the stage for imminent uprisings… It seems that an international situation is forming where the road to Paris and London passes through Afghanistan, Punjab, and Bengal.” At that time, the Bolshevik leadership still placed their hopes for revolutionary expansion on the advanced Western countries. Of course, Trotsky himself had also firmly believed that revolutions would soon erupt in Western countries. When he saw that the Western revolutions were not unfolding as quickly as they had hoped, he immediately turned his attention to colonial revolutions, which is directly related to his theory of permanent revolution. This theory allowed him to see that the national liberation movements in colonial countries could potentially directly transition to a socialist path and significantly impact capitalist countries. His proposal caught the attention of the Central Committee, and at the Second Congress of the Communist International held the following year, a programmatic resolution on the national-colonial question was adopted. The Chinese Revolution of 1925-27 was a result of the Communist International implementing this resolution, although by this time Trotsky had already been excluded from the decision-making level and could only criticise and make suggestions regarding the erroneous policies of Stalin and Bukharin, which led to the failure of the Chinese Revolution, in his capacity as a leader of the opposition.
SW: You have translated and published a collection of Trotsky’s writings on the Chinese Revolution. Could you describe Trotsky’s views and opinions on the Chinese Revolution? Were these views and opinions correct at the time?
SY: For a long time, this issue was a taboo in China. Before the reform and opening up, Trotsky’s views and opinions on the Chinese Revolution were completely negated. After the reform and opening up, the atmosphere in the relevant research fields in China has become much more relaxed, and research on Trotsky is no longer a forbidden area. In the past decade or so, some books have been published that discuss and introduce the debates within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) regarding the Chinese Revolution, providing a more objective evaluation than before. However, the translation and research of Trotsky’s works are limited, making it difficult to achieve fundamental breakthroughs in this area. Some authors, after fully affirming Trotsky’s criticism of Stalin and Bukharin’s erroneous policies and his correct foresight, add that, although Trotsky’s criticisms were entirely correct, they were also somewhat misleading because he did not consider the disparity in power. Some authors take a case-by-case approach to this debate, striving for fairness and often giving both sides equal blame. Trotsky and Zinoviev advocated for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to withdraw from the Kuomintang (KMT) during the revolutionary climax, maintain its full independence, and establish Soviets. Stalin and Bukharin opposed the CCP’s withdrawal from the KMT and the establishment of Soviets under the cooperation between the CCP and the KMT. Who was right and who was wrong on this issue? Some authors believe that any view that considers one side entirely correct and the other entirely wrong is one-sided and does not fully reflect reality. They even argue that Zinoviev and Trotsky’s demand to establish Soviets during the revolutionary climax, although it helped people abandon illusions about the KMT, maintain revolutionary vigilance, and prepare for sudden changes, thereby reducing the heavy losses caused by the Ninghan split, was ultimately unrealistic due to an overestimation of revolutionary strength. Trotsky and others’ demand to establish Soviets during the revolutionary period exceeded the actual conditions of the Chinese Revolution and was impossible to achieve immediately. However, Trotsky and Zinoviev’s understanding of the nature, status, role, and tasks of the Chinese Soviets was fundamentally in line with Leninism. Stalin and others’ opposition to establishing Soviets during the revolutionary period objectively aligned with the actual conditions of the Chinese Revolution, but their opposition was based on an overestimation of the KMT, which was not in line with Leninism. The author concludes that Stalin and others opposed Trotsky and Zinoviev’s incorrect suggestion to establish Soviets with incorrect views.
Such objectivity and comprehensiveness are truly astonishing. If something theoretically correct does not align with reality, and something theoretically incorrect does, then the theory itself must be wrong. After all, practice is the only criterion for testing truth. This essentially uses the revolutionary failure caused by Stalin and Bukharin, which led to rivers of blood among communists and workers, to oppose Trotsky and Zinoviev’s hypothetical incorrect suggestion, which was never implemented. Moreover, the author believes that this suggestion could have prepared for sudden changes, thereby reducing the heavy losses caused by the Ninghan split. Even if it could not reverse the defeat, wouldn’t a strategy that could reduce the losses of failure be correct?
The lack of research and introduction of Trotsky is even reflected in authoritative party history works. For example, in the History of the Communist Party of China published by the Central Party History Research Office a few years ago, Trotsky’s understanding of the class nature of the Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei factions during the later stages of the Great Revolution, his judgement that they would betray the revolution, and his criticism of Stalin’s errors in guiding the Chinese Revolution are acknowledged as correct or basically correct. However, it is believed that his understanding of the nature of Chinese society, the nature of the revolution, class relations, and strategic tactics after the failure of the Great Revolution was incorrect. His errors include: during the Great Revolution, the Chinese proletariat should not cooperate with the national bourgeoisie, and communists should not join the KMT; before the Wuhan government betrayed the revolution, the Chinese proletariat should immediately establish Soviet power; after the failure of the Great Revolution, the KMT had completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and the Chinese revolution had entered the socialist revolution stage.
Here, I first point out the author’s indisputable misinterpretation. Trotsky’s insistence that communists withdraw from the KMT is beyond doubt, but he never opposed the cooperation between the Chinese proletariat and the national bourgeoisie. I don’t know where the author got this conclusion. If it was derived from his opposition to communists joining the KMT, it is even more absurd because cooperation does not have only one form, and withdrawal does not mean a break. Trotsky insisted that the CCP cooperate with the KMT as an independent party, i.e., changing intra-party cooperation to extra-party cooperation, and emphasised Lenin’s classic model of the united front: advancing separately, striking together. As for the claim that, after the failure of the Great Revolution, the KMT had completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the Chinese revolution had entered the socialist revolution stage, it shows that the author knows nothing about Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution. It is precisely because the bourgeoisie in backward countries is incapable of completing the bourgeois-democratic revolution that the proletariat-led revolution can continuously move towards a socialist revolution. The main tasks of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution are twofold: national independence and land reform. Did these tasks get completed after the failure of the Great Revolution?
I summarise the differences between the two sides on the Chinese revolution into three points: theoretically, it is the theory of permanent revolution vs. the three-stage theory; in terms of power dynamics, it is revolutionary social mechanics vs. conventional social mechanics; in terms of attitudes towards the Nanchang Uprising and the later Guangzhou Uprising, it is the judgment of the revolutionary high tide vs. low tide. My views are detailed in the translator’s preface of my translation Trotsky on the Chinese Revolution. Due to the limited space of this interview, I won’t elaborate here. If you are interested, you can read the preface in my translation. Here, I just want to point out that Trotsky’s criticism of Stalin and Bukharin’s Chinese policy was not only correct, but more importantly, his foresight of the Chinese revolutionary process was entirely accurate: he issued warnings before the April 12 coup and the Ma-Ri Incident and foresaw the subsequent Ninghan split. After the Wuhan government purged the communists, his and Stalin’s disagreement on armed uprisings essentially lay in their judgement of the revolutionary situation at the time. After the revolution suffered two heavy blows, was it in a high tide or a low tide? Stalin believed the revolution had entered a high tide, so he advocated for armed uprisings to seize power and began to establish Soviets, which he had previously firmly opposed. Trotsky believed the revolution was in a low tide and thus opposed armed uprisings. The failures of the two uprisings (the Nanchang Uprising and the Guangzhou Uprising) provided the most authoritative conclusion on the correctness of these judgements. Stalin’s Chinese policy was based on his erroneous three-stage theory, erroneous foresight, and erroneous judgement of the situation, and reliance on the wrong objects, making failure inevitable. Trotsky’s policy was based on the theory of permanent revolution, correct foresight, accurate judgement of the situation, and reliance on the correct objects. Whether it would have led to the victory of the Chinese revolution or not, it could have avoided the actual disastrous defeat, making the process and outcome more favourable to the proletarian revolution.
SW: What is the difference between Trotsky’s united front and the Stalinist united front?
SY: This question is not entirely accurate, as it suggests that Trotsky had a fixed model for the united front, while Stalin had another. The form and content of the united front are determined by specific situations and tasks. For example, the circumstances and tasks of the Chinese Revolution and the later anti-fascist struggle in Germany were different, and thus the forms of the united front determined by them were also different. Stalin’s united front policies in these two struggles were also different. In China, Stalin’s united front policy was right-leaning, abandoning the proletariat’s leadership in the revolution and relying on the bourgeoisie. In the anti-fascist struggle in Germany, Stalin introduced the ultra-left “Third Period” theory. Under this theory, the German Communist Party (KPD) not only refused to form an anti-fascist united front with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) but also concentrated its attacks on the “social fascists,” i.e., the SPD, treating the main target for a united front as the main enemy. In some cases, such as during the Nazi-initiated referendum to overthrow the Weimar Republic, the KPD even formed a de facto united front with the fascists.
The united front policy executed by the KPD at that time was not only ultra-leftist and sectarian but also foolishly blurred the lines between friend and foe. It is no surprise that they were defeated without a fight in this struggle that determined the fate of humanity. Of course, Stalin’s ultra-left and ultra-right policies did not solely stem from misjudgements of the situation but were also influenced by his empiricist, oscillating logic: the failure of the Chinese Revolution and the grain procurement crisis of 1927 led him to adopt the ultra-left German policy. However, both ultra-left and ultra-right policies brought disaster: the failure of the Chinese Revolution and the rise of German fascism, which led to World War II.
Trotsky’s task for the united front in China was to carry the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its conclusion, which required the proletariat to take the lead in the movement. The Communist Party had to withdraw from the Kuomintang, turn intra-party unity into external cooperation, establish Soviets during the revolutionary climax to create a dual-power situation, and establish a proletarian dictatorship when the time was right. In the anti-fascist struggle in Germany, the task of the united front was to curb the rampant fascism resulting from the KPD’s previous erroneous policies. In this situation, to defend the proletariat’s survival and all it had previously won, the broadest possible united front had to be established. The united front is one of the keys to the success of the proletarian revolutionary struggle. Trotsky’s revolutionary united front, proposed in the context of the Chinese Revolution and the anti-fascist struggle in Germany, could have completely changed the outcomes of these revolutions. It is worth noting that Trotsky did not consider the struggle in Germany at that time to be merely an anti-fascist struggle; he always referred to it as the German Revolution. He predicted that the final battle of this struggle would be between the proletariat and the Nazis, with the proletariat, representing revolutionary hope, defeating the Nazis, representing the reactionary despair of the petty bourgeoisie. The day the proletariat defeated the Nazis would be the day of the German socialist revolution’s victory. Deutscher’s statement that Trotsky’s critique of Stalin’s erroneous policies and his correct proposals during the anti-fascist struggle in Germany were even greater contributions than his role in the October Revolution is not an exaggeration. Trotsky’s strategies and tactics, based on objective and scientific analysis of the situation, could have fundamentally changed the outcomes of the Chinese and German revolutions, serving as a textbook for the proletariat’s struggle for power. Unfortunately, under Stalin’s influence, this valuable legacy was regarded as heresy by Communist parties worldwide.
If we set aside the above factors and talk about the differences between the two men’s united fronts, there are some. Trotsky believed in the revolutionary power inherent in the masses, while Stalin only believed in power. This was particularly evident in the Chinese Revolution. Trotsky advocated for the Communist Party to withdraw from the Kuomintang and independently mobilise the masses, thereby gaining leadership of the movement, establishing Soviets during the climax, and carrying the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its conclusion, transforming it into a socialist revolution. Distrusting the revolutionary power of the masses, Stalin focused on forming relationships with powerful figures like Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yuxiang. After Chiang’s coup, Stalin advocated relying even more firmly on the left-wing of the Kuomintang led by Wang Jingwei, until the latter’s Ma-Ri Incident and the Ning-Han split.
There were also clear differences in how they treated their united-front partners. When Trotsky suggested an anti-fascist united front between the KPD and the SPD, he advised the KPD to clearly tell the SPD that they were not on the same path, that their cooperation was to fight a common enemy, and that through their loyalty to the cause and bravery in the struggle, they would win over the SPD’s supporters. Therefore, there was no deception towards the united-front partners in Trotsky’s united front. In contrast, Stalin’s cooperation with powerful figures was more like a transaction, making deception inevitable. For example, a week before Chiang Kai-shek’s 12 April coup, Stalin said in a speech that, once they had used the right-wing generals, they would discard them like squeezed lemons. However, since Chiang acted first, the Comintern did not get the chance to squeeze and discard him before he launched the coup. Stalin’s conspiracy was not clever, and as Trotsky put it, it sent the Chinese Communist Party and the workers and peasants, bound hand and foot, to Chiang Kai-shek’s slaughterhouse.
SW: The mainstream left-wing analysis of fascism is that it is a reactionary social trend, political movement, and regime form aimed at overcoming crises, combating revolution, and implementing expansion during periods of capitalist crisis. Its fundamental nature is anti-socialist, anti-democratic, and extremely nationalist. Therefore, the Communist International proposed a “united front”, uniting bourgeois democratic countries to oppose fascism. However, Trotsky believed that the emergence of fascism represented the decline of the bourgeois-democratic system, indicating the decay and dead-end of the bourgeoisie. It was either proletarian revolution or fascist barbarism. But the actual situation is that capitalist democracy is thriving in Europe, America, and other countries, and even former socialist countries are learning from them. Does this mean there is a problem with Trotsky’s analysis?
SY: Fascism also has an important characteristic, which is racism. The “Popular Front” against fascism proposed by the Communist International came after Hitler’s rise to power. And the victory of the Nazis was precisely caused by Stalin’s “Third Period” theory of left-leaning isolationism. I believe that, although Trotsky was talking about the entire bourgeois-democratic system, he was targeting the specific situation in Germany at the time. Without Germany’s defeat in World War I, the harsh conditions of the Treaty of Versailles on Germany, and the economic crisis of the late 1920s, German fascism might not have gained momentum. Under the conditions of the time, Germany indeed regressed from a bourgeois-democratic system to fascist dictatorship. That is to say, fascism is the product of a decaying bourgeoisie with no way out, but it might not necessarily lead to the Nazi party coming to power when there are alternatives. Even just before Hitler was about to become chancellor, Trotsky advocated for the German working class to prevent the big financial capital groups from employing Hitler, even if it meant civil war. Therefore, there is a distance between trends and reality; only when circumstances converge can trends become reality. From 1929, in his fight against the ultra-left “Third Period” theory and the erroneous line implemented by the German Communist Party, which ultimately led to Hitler’s rise to power and the defeat of the German Communist Party without a fight, Trotsky always referred to the German proletariat’s struggle to prevent the Nazis from coming to power as the German Revolution, not merely an anti-fascist struggle. In his later criticism of the right-leaning capitulationist “Popular Front,” he still emphasised the leadership of the proletarian party in the united front, believing that the main goal of the proletariat in this struggle was still revolution. He did not consider the impending World War as an anti-fascist war; in his view, this war was a continuation of World War I, a war of unprecedented scale triggered by imperialist countries fighting for colonies and markets.
The essence of capital is to maximise profits. Capitalist colonial expansion, plundering of colonies and semi-colonies, even going to war for colonies, and today’s American hegemonism, are all manifestations of this essential attribute of capital. Capitalist democracy has its positive aspects, but it cannot change the greedy nature of capital. Many problems in the past and present world are caused by capital’s greed. This shows that the role of bourgeois democracy is limited and not as perfect as those who advocate for it claim. The socialist revolution opposes not bourgeois democracy, but its incompleteness and lack of thoroughness. Additionally, the goal of the socialist revolution is not to establish a Stalinist dictatorship, but to eliminate classes and states, liberate all humanity, and bring everyone into a world of full freedom where everyone can enjoy comprehensive development. Compared to this communist blueprint, today’s bourgeois democracy is too limited. Its advantages are only relative to Stalinist tyranny. Moreover, the proletarian dictatorship outlined and established by classical Marxist theorists and Lenin and Trotsky is not the ultimate state of socialism, but a transitional stage. Even in this transitional stage, Stalinist dictatorship is not its intended meaning. As for the claim that “former socialist countries” are learning from democracy, it is problematic. Because the former socialist countries, including China before the reform and opening up, implemented the Stalin model, the success or failure of this model cannot be used to judge the correctness of Trotsky’s analysis.
SW: Could you discuss Trotsky’s activities in leading and organising the Red Army and his opposition to the attacks by bourgeois counterrevolutionary forces, and how these activities contributed to the development of Marxist military theory?
SY: Marx and Engels themselves did not engage in military activities; their related theories merely redefined the relationship between war, class, and society. Although later Marxists explored this area, it was mostly theoretical. For example, the French socialist Jean Jaurès proposed replacing regular armies with militias in socialist countries. Trotsky undoubtedly enriched Marxist military theory through practice. Before becoming the People’s Commissar for Military Affairs, Trotsky had no experience in leading troops; his only military-related work was as a war correspondent from 1912 to the early stages of World War I. During the Civil War, he wrote a new chapter for Marxist military theory. I believe that, aside from specific strategic and tactical ideas, his most important contributions were twofold: resisting extreme radical ideologies and boldly employing military experts.
After the victory of new ideas and ideologies, society often sees the emergence of extreme views under the guise of these new ideas. In the military field, the most representative of these was Tukhachevsky’s “proletarian strategy”, which posited that the proletarian military’s goal was to liberate all humanity, gaining the support of the vast majority of the populace, and that its enemies were a small reactionary minority. Therefore, the proletarian strategy was purely offensive, with no need for defence. Trotsky personally wrote articles to debate him, pointing out the dialectical relationship between offence and defence, emphasising that the proletarian army could not invalidate this relationship, highlighting the revolutionary leader’s clarity and rationality amidst societal fervour.
This issue also manifested in Trotsky’s early struggles with the military opposition during the Civil War. In my essay “Revisiting the October Revolution”, I proposed that the October Revolution was a Soviet democratic revolution rather than a violent one. The seizure of power and the overthrow of the Provisional Government relied mainly on democratic struggle and the support of workers, peasants, and soldiers gained through this struggle. The transfer of power from the Provisional Government to the Soviets was largely peaceful across Russia, allowing the Red Guards and guerrilla units to play a role. However, this mode of combat was unsuitable for the real confrontations of the Civil War. Trotsky, under immense pressure, began establishing a regular army, abolishing the system formed during the anti-war and army disintegration processes, such as soldiers’ committees and the election of commanders.
To build a regular army and achieve victory on the battlefield, Trotsky boldly employed military experts. This policy faced resistance from guerrilla unit commanders, who received covert or overt support from high-ranking party-members like Stalin, Bukharin, and Zinoviev, forming a military opposition that exerted tremendous pressure on Trotsky. Additional pressure came from the betrayal of some experts. Lenin once demanded that Trotsky expel all military experts, to which Trotsky responded that over 30,000 military experts were serving in the Red Army. Lenin later reported that Trotsky’s statement about the number of old officers in the military department gave him a concrete idea of “how to build communism using the bricks originally intended by capitalists to oppose us.” This was also part of Trotsky’s intellectual policy, elevating the use of old officers and intellectuals to the level of whether the proletariat could become the inheritor of humanity’s cultural heritage.
Just after the Civil War ended, Trotsky prepared to replace the standing army with militias, a plan interrupted by the Soviet-Polish War. Another noteworthy issue is that the commissar-system was a method Trotsky adopted out of necessity when employing old officers as commanders at all levels during the Civil War. However, Stalin later institutionalised it, presenting it as a manifestation of party-leadership over the army. For Trotsky, it was merely a temporary measure. He once made an analogy, saying the commissar-system was like scaffolding used during construction; once the building was complete, the scaffolding had to be removed. This suggests that the party-committee system later extended to various sectors was not necessarily a way to embody party-leadership.
As the creator and commander of the Red Army, Trotsky not only formulated military policies and coordinated the relationship between the army and central and local governments but also worked tirelessly under extremely difficult conditions to secure the necessary personnel and materials for the army. He personally drafted countless orders, mobilisations, and battle reports, even writing the Red Army soldiers’ oath himself. During the Civil War, he wrote a vast number of military-related documents, compiled into three thick volumes titled How the Revolution Armed. Throughout the Civil War, he travelled on the Revolutionary Military Council’s special train, always appearing on the most dangerous and critical front lines, even personally participating in attacks on Kazan and enemy fleets and shore batteries from a torpedo boat. He gave numerous speeches to boost morale and encourage soldiers about to go into battle.
Trotsky had unique views on major strategic issues during the Civil War. In three major strategic disagreements, except for the first one on whether to pursue and completely defeat Kolchak, where he supported the new commander’s more conservative strategy, his opinions were correct in the other two: the southern advance route and whether to abandon or defend Petrograd. On the Petrograd issue, he opposed Lenin’s proposal to abandon the city. After his opinion was accepted by the Politburo, he personally went to Petrograd to lead the fight against Yudenich, not only saving the city but also thoroughly defeating Yudenich’s well-equipped army.
Regarding the second strategic disagreement, the southern front was the most challenging during the Civil War. The main reason was that the southern Red Army command’s strategic thinking and attack route were wrong. They aimed their attacks at the Kuban Cossacks, intending to deprive the White Army advancing on Moscow of their rear support. They chose the shortest geographical route for the advance. Trotsky believed the main target should be the White Army, avoiding confrontation with the Kuban Cossacks, who were defending their homeland and would not follow the White Army to Moscow. Attacking their homeland would make them fight desperately and unite more closely with the White Army. The command’s route only considered distance, ignoring the inability to use modern transportation and the local population’s support for the Red Army. This strategic plan had Lenin and the Politburo’s majority support. For over a month, the Red Army struggled on primitive roads, fighting the Cossacks defending their homeland, while Denikin’s White Army swept through Ukraine, threatening the Red Army’s military-industrial hub in Tula. Only then did the Politburo accept Trotsky’s proposal, adjusting the main attack direction and advance route, leading to the final victory in the southern front war.
Trotsky’s critiques and corrections of the command’s strategic plans show that he considered military strategy from political, social, national, class, psychological, and technical perspectives, far surpassing pure military strategists.
SW: You translated Trotsky’s Culture in the Transitional Period written in the 1920s. Could you discuss Trotsky’s analysis of culture during the transitional period following the victory of the Russian Revolution?
SY: The title of this collection is Culture in the Transitional Period, but it is not a collection of academic articles, so it does not contain the analysis of transitional-period culture in Russia that you are looking for. Instead, it includes articles and reports related to cultural issues that Trotsky wrote between 1919 and 1926, most of which address very specific problems. The core theme in these articles is raising the cultural level of the masses, making them aware of the ingrained bad habits in Russian life. Some articles support grassroots initiatives to correct these bad habits and fight against old, harmful customs. Others contain Trotsky’s own suggestions, such as in his speech to publishing workers, where he recommended compiling and publishing a “Newspaper Reading Manual”, equipping urban and rural reading rooms with maps and political maps, and establishing kindergartens, public laundries, and public canteens to liberate women. Of course, there are also high-level proposals and principled issues, such as his 1923 assertion that the Soviet Union had entered an “era of cultural supremacy”, meaning that all work should focus on cultural construction. This idea was shared with Lenin, although in Lenin’s article “On Cooperation”, this term was translated as “culturalism”. Whether the translator thought that translating it as “cultural supremacy” would overly elevate the significance of culture is unknown. However, Trotsky indeed placed cultural construction as a top priority, even stating that only by learning to correctly propose and solve our local, everyday “cultural” tasks would all our previous struggles and the efforts and sacrifices made for them be worthwhile. He summarised cultural tasks as learning to work well: accurately, neatly, and economically; needing a culture of work, a culture of life, and a culture of daily life.
Trotsky believed that the revolution was a lever to raise the cultural level of the masses. The success of the October Revolution only provided the masses with the opportunity to receive education; truly raising the cultural level of the entire nation and society was not something that could be achieved in the short term. Unlike some leaders of the time who exalted the proletariat, Trotsky soberly recognised that the proletariat had just escaped centuries of enslavement and still bore the consequences of oppression, ignorance, and backwardness, not to mention the peasantry. Seizing power itself did not transform the working class or endow it with all the necessary virtues and qualities; it only provided the opportunity for it to truly learn, develop, and overcome its historical deficiencies. Therefore, his related articles and speeches aimed to raise the awareness of the Soviet masses and cadres and to combat uncivilised phenomena. As one of the top leaders of the time, Trotsky’s speeches and articles always offered unique insights, never resorting to simple, rigid preaching or empty slogans.
Trotsky viewed cultural construction in postrevolutionary Russia from the pinnacle of human civilization. He had no narrow nationalism and was candid about Russia’s backwardness compared to Western developed countries. His criticisms of many backward phenomena in Soviet Russia were based on comparisons with Western developed countries.
At that time, there was a strong trend within the Soviet Union, from the general populace to the upper echelons, to reject foreign civilisations, labelling all these as feudal or bourgeois and criticising them. For a long time, whether in the Soviet Union, China, or other socialist countries, Freudian psychoanalysis was a forbidden area, and the criticism of modernism in the arts continued until the 1970s. In Russia, the unbanning of Freudian theories occurred after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and in China, it happened after the reform and opening up. Trotsky, with a broad mind, always opposed this self-imposed, non-Marxist attitude towards the achievements of human civilisation. In a letter to Ivan Pavlov, the founder of conditioned reflex psychology, in September 1923, Trotsky defined the two schools as follows: “I believe that your theory of conditioned reflexes encompasses Freud’s theory as a special case, with the sublimation of sexual energy… being just higher-order conditioned reflexes formed on the basis of sexual desire.”
He believed that both conditioned reflexes and psychoanalysis considered physiology as the driving force behind human behaviour and emotions. The research method of conditioned reflexes ascended step by step from lower physiological phenomena to the highest psychological phenomena, while psychoanalysis attempted to leap over all intermediate stages, directly linking myths, religion, and poetry to the physiological basis of human psychological phenomena. The former’s advantage was its solidity, but its conclusions were relatively slow; the latter’s advantage was its speed, but it had an element of arbitrariness. From this, he drew policy conclusions about different schools: one cannot simply dismiss a school as non-Marxist and reject it; the government has no reason or right to ban a school, even if it is somewhat unreliable. At the same time, he pointed out the weakness of this theory, which was the way it combined physiological realism with novelistic analysis of psychological phenomena. Compared to the crude criticism of Freudian psychoanalysis in the past and the blind adulation after its unbanning, such judgments were undoubtedly more just and scientific, demonstrating the broad-mindedness of a revolutionary leader towards various theories. Trotsky’s attitude towards modernism in the arts in the 20th century was equally objective and inclusive.
In the years following the victory of the October Revolution, the dramatic changes created a fervent era that enveloped every field in Soviet Russia, including the cultural field. This fervour affected not only ordinary people and general workers but also upper-level leaders. For example, Stalin and Bukharin supported the Proletkult movement at that time. Many advocated using dialectical materialism as a method for literary creation and scientific research. This widespread fervour highlighted Trotsky’s calmness. He used the opportunity of the 100th anniversary of chemist Dmitri Mendeleev’s birth to elaborate to scientists on the relationship between specific scientific research methods and dialectics. He emphasised in scientific language that each science has its own special research and experimental methods, opposing the then-popular trend of using dialectical materialism to dominate scientific research. At the same time, he pointed out that scientific experiments are inherently empirical, and the specialisation and narrowness of knowledge that accompany scientific progress require researchers to have a holistic worldview. Otherwise, it might even hinder their development in their own research fields. In this regard, Marxism provides scientists with a holistic view of observing nature and human society, consistent with their empirically based scientific experience. To protect scientists, he pointed out that scientific experiments are essentially materialistic.
Because Trotsky led and planned the socialist revolution from the pinnacle of human civilisation, he deeply understood that intellectuals were the foundation upon which socialist construction began. How to treat intellectuals and experts was a matter of the fate of the proletarian revolution. He believed that a civilised and well-managed society could not waste skilled and knowledgeable talents and elevated the rational use of intellectuals to the level of believing in the great spiritual power of the revolution. He paid attention to the attitudes towards intellectuals in society and immediately criticised any wrong tendencies he found. For example, he read a short article titled “On the River” in the Whistle newspaper (the organ of the People’s Commissariat for Transport), which said that we should squeeze all the beneficial blood and sweat from experts and then discard them like squeezed lemons. Trotsky criticised this as harmful demagoguery. The Party’s policy towards experts was to attract them to participate in important responsible work, integrate them into the common ranks, including allowing them to join trade unions, and create an atmosphere of comradeship and cooperation around them.
SW: The Chinese translation of Japanese scholar Nagahori Yuzo’s book Lu Xun and Trotsky has caused a significant stir in academic circles across the Taiwan Strait. The book extensively argues the influence of Trotsky’s Literature and Revolution on Lu Xun’s literary views, thereby sparking great interest in this work among readers. Could you discuss Trotsky’s development of Marxist literary theory in Literature and Revolution?
SY: I don’t quite agree with the frequent use of the term “development”. Trotsky criticised Stalin for claiming that Lenin developed Marxism. He believed that in the three components of Marxism—dialectical materialism, historical materialism, and economics—Lenin did not and could not develop the theory. Lenin’s main contribution to Marxism was applying the theory to practice and completing the October Revolution. Even Lenin’s philosophical work Materialism and Empirio-Criticism did not add anything new to Marxism. According to Trotsky, he himself merely applied Marxism to the field of literature and art.
Trotsky participated in the field of literature and art in two capacities: as a policy maker and as a literary critic. As a policy maker, he had a clear understanding of the role of Marxist methods in art. He believed that this method made it possible to assess the conditions for the development of new art, trace new artistic trends, and promote the development of the most progressive trends through critical guidance, but that was all. The Marxist method is not an artistic method; art should walk its own path on its own legs. He explicitly stated that the realm of art is not one that the party should command. Regarding artistic groups and schools, “the party can give conditional trust to those artistic groups that sincerely approach the revolution to help shape the revolution in art”, but “the party can never and will never stand on the side of one group against another in literary struggles or competitions”. When dealing with writers who are not of working-class origin, the Party “does not see literary fellow travellers as competitors to worker writers but as real or potential assistants in the large-scale construction efforts of the working class.” It is necessary to mention that the concept of “fellow travellers” was introduced by Trotsky in his literary criticism. “Fellow travellers” referred to writers not of proletarian origin who were targeted for exclusion by the proletarian cultural faction. The introduction of this concept protected them and ensured their creative rights. Many of them later became important figures in Soviet literary history. This is in stark contrast to the so-called “socialist realism” later established in the Soviet Union and China, which led to numerous wrongful cases due to creative offences, including the model operas during the Cultural Revolution.
Trotsky’s book consists of two parts. The first part, written between 1922 and 1924, includes critiques and analyses of contemporary Russian literary schools and writers, as well as discussions on the Party’s art policies. The second part, written between 1907 and 1914, includes articles on the transformation of Russian intellectuals between the 1905 Revolution and the outbreak of World War I, and several essays on Western cultural life.
Trotsky’s articulation of the Party’s art policy in the book is targeted, scientific, and correct. Unfortunately, his art policy was not implemented. Stalin pursued completely opposite policies in this field, turning not only the realm of art but also science, philosophy, and history into domains commanded by the Party. This was concretely manifested in the socialist realism proposed in 1932 and approved by Stalin. For decades, it became the mandatory method for Soviet writers and critics.
Today’s young people (except those specialising in literary theory and literature) may no longer know what “socialist realism” is. This method, as the basic approach to Soviet literary creation and criticism, required artists to realistically and historically depict reality from the perspective of revolutionary development. At the same time, the realism and historical specificity of artistic depiction had to be combined with the task of ideologically transforming and educating the working people with a socialist spirit. This method imposed high demands on writers, who had to be both prophets (depicting reality from the perspective of revolutionary development) and educators who used socialist spirit to transform and educate the people. However, whether a work “realistically and historically depicts reality from the perspective of revolutionary development” and whether its “realism and historical specificity” are combined with the task of ideological transformation and education of the working people with a socialist spirit were not determined by actual social development and effects but by the leaders and government. Under such circumstances, the so-called socialist realism became a tool for persecution, making wrongful cases inevitable. Many famous Soviet writers and poets were deprived of their writing and publishing rights, imprisoned, exiled, or even executed.
In 1972, Soviet literary theorist D. Malakov proposed the theory of an open system of socialist realism to adapt to the literary community’s desire to break free from the constraints of socialist realism. Although its essence was to break through the framework of socialist realism, it still could not completely abandon this ambiguous doctrine. It merely added an open system, meaning that the basic elements of this doctrine were retained, but the restrictions were relaxed to give writers more creative choices. However, by this time, more than thirty years had passed since the method was proposed. After the Cultural Revolution, this open system also caused a significant stir in China’s literary theory circles.
What impressed me most about Trotsky’s book was his view on literary schools. In the former Soviet Union and pre-reform China, realism was revered, and many acclaimed classic writers, such as Balzac, Dickens, Leo Tolstoy, and Chekhov, were considered realists. Mao Zedong had said that the method of poetry creation should be revolutionary romanticism combined with revolutionary realism. Romanticism alone was insufficient; it had to be combined with realism. Other schools and creative methods were largely negated, labelled as decadent expressions of the feudal ruling class or the bourgeoisie. Trotsky’s view on literary schools was refreshing.
After the Bolsheviks seized power, the mainstream view was that revolutionary literature should be realistic. Trotsky only agreed with this view in a broad philosophical sense—that literature and social reality are inseparably linked. However, he opposed supporting realism as a literary school, considering it foolish and ridiculous. He argued that no school is inherently progressive: realism as a literary school is neither progressive nor reactionary. He then listed the evolution of Russian literary schools over the past hundred years: realism reached its peak in aristocratic literature, followed by the rise of populist writers’ tendentious style, which was replaced by the pessimistic symbolism, and now the prevailing futurism, which is a reaction against it. The alternation of literary schools follows its own laws. Each new literary school originates from previous developments, existing language materials, and expressive techniques.
During the early stages of China’s reform and opening up, the introduction and adoption of contemporary Western literary theories played a significant role in the ideological liberation movement. This was partly because the pursuit of new and different art could no longer tolerate the rigid constraints of socialist realism, and partly because it had no direct connection with political ideology, making it relatively easier to break through. Young people who do not understand these circumstances may find it difficult to comprehend the enthusiasm for literary theory at that time.
Trotsky’s literary criticism work began during his first exile in Siberia. As a Marxist, he primarily focused on revealing the social dynamics, moral ethics, and political climate hidden in the works of writers and poets. However, he did not exhibit the narrow political utilitarianism typical of general Marxist literary criticism. His profound analysis of works complemented his appreciation of aesthetic value, without rigid preaching. He used the spirit of Marxism to evaluate, appreciate, and analyse literary works from ancient to modern times, revealing their significance. Vulgar sociological literary criticism that mechanically applied class concepts, essentially a form of cultural nihilism by the proletarian cultural faction, was always a target of his severe criticism.
SW: Marxism has always emphasized that “the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself.” Could you discuss Trotsky’s views and developments on the democratic principles of the proletarian movement?
SY: I believe this mainly depends on how Marxism is positioned. If it is seen as the truth, as a ready-made conclusion rather than a method for exploring the truth, then it risks becoming a religion, with the party-leader becoming a priest. In a country where the Communist Party is in power, he would become a leader of both the state and the church. Stalin was such a leader. In this situation, proletarian democracy is fundamentally impossible. In July 1924, when discussing the significance and methods of clubs in educating the working class, Trotsky emphasised that education should not bring truth to the people as something immutable and final from the outside, telling them, “Here is the truth, worship it!” Instead, people should recognise the truth from their own lives. He pointed out that Marxism, through Leninism, came to power for the first time. This fact opened up great opportunities for cultural and educational work but also contained significant dangers. The ruling Marxists might use the simplistic method of “Here is the truth, worship it!” in their cultural and educational work, which contradicts the essence of Marxism itself. Authoritative Leninism cannot be imposed on the people from the outside in this way; instead, they should recognise it from the foundation of this living world. Trotsky raised this issue both out of theoretical principles and practical relevance. At that time, the majority faction had already created the theory of the leader’s eternal correctness to marginalise Trotsky. He keenly realised that this notion would bring enormous harm to the party, Soviet society, and the international communist movement. Later, when criticising the Central Committee under Stalin’s leadership for not producing outstanding political figures, Trotsky said that the broad membership was deprived of the opportunity to think independently, make mistakes, and correct them, which was the main reason they could not grow. In the Soviet Union and China, the method of worshiping the truth has always been implemented in education. This method can only cultivate blind followers or fanatical believers, or at best, opportunists who say one thing and mean another. This was the social foundation for Stalin’s purges and Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution. Nowadays, many people are collecting data on the victims of the purges and the Cultural Revolution, exposing the crimes of dictators. I do not oppose such activities. But I think it is more important to explore the causes of these movements. Why did the masses enthusiastically participate in these movements, even becoming enforcers? Dictators can initiate movements, but they cannot personally carry them out. The realisation of the movements depends on the enthusiastic participation and support of the broad masses, including ordinary workers. Without their passionate involvement and fervent support, the movements could not succeed. Regardless of the leader’s purpose, as long as he calls out, and the masses respond enthusiastically, is this not the result of the education method of “worshiping the truth”?
SW: Some people say that Stalin’s industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation were copied from the economic proposals of the Left Opposition led by Trotsky. What exactly did Trotsky propose? What solutions did Trotsky offer for the development of Soviet agriculture and the price-scissors between industrial and agricultural products? Critics of Trotsky and his ideas often claim that Trotsky “ignored the peasants” and incited “conflict between workers and peasants.” What was Trotsky’s actual attitude towards peasants in his revolutionary views? What was Trotsky’s opinion on Stalin’s “agricultural collectivisation”?
SY: Saying it was copied is not entirely accurate. Trotsky defined Stalin’s faction as a bureaucratic-centrist group that swung between the left and right without principles or a firm stance. Correct policies and strategies require foresight, which Stalin, as an empiricist, severely lacked. In both domestic and foreign policies, Stalin could be seen adopting the proposals of the Left Opposition more than once, but not without his personal imprint. For example, during the Chinese Revolution, after the failure of the Great Revolution, Stalin adopted Trotsky’s proposals from the revolutionary peak period to establish Soviets and seize power. However, policies suitable for a revolutionary peak only exacerbated failures during a downturn. The same applies to economic policies; Stalin’s accelerated industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation lacked the scientific rigour and thoroughness of the Opposition’s economic guidelines, instead adding bureaucratic subjectivity, simplicity, and brutality, disregarding objective laws and conditions. Therefore, while Trotsky acknowledged the achievements of Soviet industrialisation under Stalin’s leadership, he consistently criticised it; his criticism of the elimination of kulaks and collectivisation was even more intense. Trotsky used Lenin’s words to criticise those Opposition members who surrendered to Stalin because he was implementing the Opposition’s economic policies, saying that one must look not only at the policies but also at who is implementing them and how.
The accusation that Trotsky disregarded the peasants is baseless. Let me briefly explain the fabrication and origin of this accusation.
Many people now believe that the New Economic Policy (NEP) primarily addressed the peasant issue. Trotsky, starting in 1922, continuously proposed accelerating industrialisation, which was labelled as “super-industrialisation,” denying Lenin’s NEP and disregarding the peasants. This is a serious misinterpretation.
At the end of the Civil War, the Soviet economy was on the brink of collapse. After the suppression of the Kronstadt sailors’ rebellion, Lenin realised that the war-communist economic policy had to be abandoned. With Trotsky’s assistance, who had proposed replacing the surplus-grain requisition system with a tax in kind a year earlier, Lenin formulated the NEP, aiming to restore the economy using capitalist methods. Replacing the surplus-grain requisition system with an agricultural tax was only part of the NEP; more importantly, it involved leasing small and medium enterprises to capitalists to restore the near-collapsed Soviet economy using capitalist methods. Additionally, Lenin had another purpose for this policy: to ally the proletariat with state capitalism to jointly combat the spontaneous forces of the petty bourgeoisie, which, in Lenin’s terminology, referred to the peasants. Therefore, the NEP was not about valuing the peasants but about combating the spontaneous forces of the petty bourgeoisie represented by the peasants.
However, the only fully implemented part of the NEP was replacing the surplus-grain requisition system with an agricultural tax. Due to the capitalists’ apprehension towards the red regime, few came forward to lease enterprises. In other words, the NEP was crippled from the start. The different recovery speeds of industry and agriculture exacerbated this situation. Russia’s almost primitive agriculture was easy to restore; as long as the peasants had production incentives, it could quickly recover without much investment. In the year the NEP was implemented, agriculture recovered to 75% of its prewar level. The situation was different for industry, which had been severely damaged by the revolution and civil war. Damaged factories and workshops needed repair or reconstruction and broken or outdated machinery and equipment needed repair or replacement, requiring substantial capital investment. In 1921, light industry had only recovered to 25% of its prewar level, and the situation for heavy industry was even worse. This led to a new situation: a severe imbalance between industry and agriculture, resulting in the price-scissors between industrial and agricultural products. This was the content and implementation of the NEP.
Trotsky identified this problem and believed that the only solution was to accelerate industrialisation. He delivered a report advocating accelerated industrialisation at the Twelfth Party Congress, which was endorsed by the Politburo and approved by the Congress. However, as Lenin’s illness worsened and he lost his ability to govern, and after his death, the majority in the Politburo, whose main goal was to sideline Trotsky, naturally did not fulfil the agreement to let him lead industrialisation. Their logic in discrediting Trotsky was as follows: the NEP valued the peasants, and Trotsky’s accelerated industrialisation meant abandoning the NEP, thus disregarding the peasants. Since the NEP was formulated by Lenin, valuing the peasants was seen as a key feature of Leninism. Therefore, Trotsky’s alleged crime was not only an economic policy error but also opposition to Leninism.
Trotsky mocked their distortions and slanders, saying that focusing on the countryside should not be an empty slogan but should be reflected in store shelves filled with goods. The majority’s verbal emphasis on the peasants could not solve practical problems like the price-scissors and commodity shortages. The imbalance between industry and agriculture worsened, eventually leading to the grain-procurement crisis of 1927. The main cause of the crisis was the severe lag in industry, where the money peasants received from selling grain could not buy the industrial goods they needed. It was only then that the empiricist Stalin realised that the economic policy he and Bukharin had jointly “defended” was unworkable, and he adopted Trotsky’s proposals for accelerated industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation, exclaiming, “Let the NEP go to hell.”
From the above description, we can see a significant error in the previously accepted notion that the wise policies formulated by great leaders are the guarantee of victory and that following them will lead to success. Socialist construction is an unprecedented endeavour, and no matter how great the leader, it is impossible to immediately point out a so-called broad and open road. Moreover, facing unprecedented difficulties, some emergency measures taken under pressure are inevitable. For example, the war-communist economic policy formulated during the Civil War was clearly a temporary measure under wartime conditions, yet some claimed it was not just for wartime but was universally applicable and the normal form of victorious proletarian economic policy (Bukharin’s words). This led to the opposition between war communism and the NEP. Bukharin initially insisted on war communism, which he considered the “normal form of victorious proletarian economic policy”, but after a period of resistance, he eventually accepted the NEP and regarded it as the only correct path for building socialism in backward countries. During the Bukharin fever, many domestic scholars adopted this view, claiming that the years of implementing the NEP were the best economic years in Soviet history. If that were true, why did several commodity shortages occur within just six years? Why did the grain-procurement crisis of 1927 happen? The subsequent commodity-shortages and grain-procurement crises were all results of the majority’s “serious” implementation of the NEP, ignoring the problems that arose during this process—the price-scissors between industrial and agricultural products—and dismissing Trotsky’s warnings about the severity of this situation as panic, labelling his proposals for accelerated industrialisation as super-industrialisation, and slandering him for disregarding the peasants and undermining the worker-peasant alliance.
In terms of economic construction, Trotsky was an explorer without a fixed economic doctrine. His economic proposals varied with time and circumstances. War communism was not his personal economic doctrine; he evaluated it as a temporary measure under wartime conditions, suggesting that some small and medium enterprises could remain non-nationalised if not for the severe wartime conditions, but he did not oppose the policy. In early 1920, after his proposal for a “new economic policy” was rejected by the Central Committee, he proposed the nationalisation of trade unions to address the severe economic difficulties facing the country, leading to a debate within the Communist Party on the trade-union issue. A year after the NEP was implemented, he keenly identified the new problem it created—the price-scissors—and proposed accelerated industrialisation. Additionally, as the Civil War was ending and after it ended, he proposed labour conscription and the militarisation of labour to restore the near-collapsed economy, organising the demobilised army into labour armies. As early as 1920, he proposed a unified planned economy. Although he advocated for a planned economy, his concept of planning was flexible and adaptable, coordinating different factors based on the stability of the national economy and aligning them with the chaotic market factors. He firmly opposed unlimited and abstract planning, considering it “proletarian culture” translated into economic language. He advocated for revising the central bureaucracy through the restoration of local rights, warning that, without this, the local institutions of the People’s Commissariats and central bureaus would disrupt the connections between local institutions, becoming sources of bureaucratic inefficiency and delay. He believed that a unified economic plan could not be achieved through a priori, arbitrary statistical calculations but through continuous examination of the work of production and distribution institutions, the plans of departments, and their implementation, constantly adjusting these plans to establish the necessary consistency among them. This economic creation work should be supplemented by statistical work and the formulation of hypothetical, approximate plans based on statistics, which should be increasingly accurate through practical adjustments. The lack of these two points in Trotsky’s planned economy is precisely the main drawback of the planned economies in the Soviet Union and China.
Trotsky’s approach to agricultural collectivisation was based on providing agriculture with machinery—agricultural machinery and automobiles—through industrialisation. This can also be seen in his criticism of Stalin’s collectivisation. He believed that agricultural collectivisation could only result from mechanisation, with the overall scale of national industrialisation determining the scale of agricultural collectivisation. Without this prerequisite, even if wooden ploughs and poor horses were combined, it would not create large-scale agricultural economies, just as a large number of small fishing boats cannot be used to build a ship.
Regarding Stalin’s Five-Year Plan, Trotsky once said: “The Opposition never advocated catching up with and surpassing the capitalist world in a short period. Before 1928, our assessment of the possibilities of industrialisation was much broader and bolder than that of the bureaucrats. But we never believed that the resources for industrialisation were limitless and that its speed depended only on the bureaucrats’ whip.”
Some people in China, seeing that Stalin’s industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation adopted Trotsky’s proposals, claim that Trotsky’s criticism of Stalin is like the pot calling the kettle black. I think they probably haven’t read Trotsky’s criticisms.
SW: Trotsky has always been known for his radical views. Some say he lacked analysis of the capitalist economic system, indulged in slogans and ultra-leftist ideas. What contributions did Trotsky actually make to Marxist economics?
SY: It is natural that Trotsky was known for his radical views. How could a revolutionary, whose goal was to overthrow the old society and establish a new one, not be radical? However, it is problematic to say that he lacked analysis of the capitalist economic system and indulged in slogans and ultra-leftist ideas. Trotsky was a Marxist, and he fully accepted the analysis of the capitalist economic system presented in Capital. He believed that, up to his time, it was only necessary to add a chapter or volume to analyse and summarise the new phenomena that had emerged in capitalism. Therefore, he focused his main efforts on solving the practical problems of economic construction in the Soviet Union. His planned economy aimed to resolve the main contradiction of capitalism—the contradiction between the socialisation of production and the private ownership of the means of production—and thereby to prove and demonstrate the superiority of the socialist economy. Unfortunately, his failure in the internal party-struggle prevented him from realising his plan. When his plan fell into the hands of his opponent, Stalin, it was distorted and ossified, losing its vitality. It not only failed to demonstrate the superiority of socialism but, instead, proved the relative superiority of capitalism. The failure and dissolution of the Soviet Union were also significantly due to economic failures.
SW: Was the struggle between Trotsky and Stalin merely a power-struggle, with the two being just two sides of the same coin? Or is there a deeper significance?
SY: On this issue, our country initially accepted Stalin’s narrative: Stalin opposed Trotsky to defend Leninism against Trotskyism. After Khrushchev’s secret report, Stalin was no longer sanctified, but the Opposition leaders were not rehabilitated either, leading to the emergence of the power-struggle narrative. Of course, this is also how the West evaluated the struggle. Our readers are particularly inclined to accept this view because we have experienced many factional and political struggles, and most of those purged in various movements were later rehabilitated. When the explanations of factional and political struggles no longer hold, it naturally becomes a power-struggle.
The main reason for this issue is the lack of understanding of the struggle at that time, leading to many misinterpretations and misunderstandings.
How did the internal party-struggle begin? On the surface, it started with a letter from Trotsky on 8 October 1923. I say “on the surface”, because the power-struggle among Stalin and others began during Lenin’s first illness. During Lenin’s leadership, due to Trotsky’s contributions to the October Revolution and the Civil War, he was the second most prominent figure in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), with his portrait displayed alongside Lenin’s across the country. This caused dissatisfaction among Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, who formed an alliance to gain a majority in the Politburo and push Trotsky out of the power centre. Trotsky was well aware of the conspiracy against him but took no action. This was due to multiple factors: his great hope for Lenin’s recovery, his concern that taking action would be misinterpreted as a power-struggle (as the triumvirate had already spread many rumours in this regard), and his awareness of his disadvantage in the Politburo and Central Committee. Additionally, Trotsky had deeper considerations: he believed that the bureaucratic degeneration of the revolutionary leadership was due to the proletariat being exhausted by the Revolution, Civil War, and the resulting industrial collapse. He could not lead this exhausted and demoralised team to victory over the bureaucrats who had seized party and state power. To truly revive the proletariat and restore their initiative as during the Revolution and Civil War, industrial revitalisation was necessary. Therefore, Trotsky chose to lead the arduous task of industrial construction. When Stalin faced the threat of being removed from his position as General Secretary, he suggested that Trotsky deliver the political report at the 12th Party Congress, which Trotsky refused, agreeing only to report on industrial issues. Once Lenin lost his ability to govern and could not implement his proposals, the triumvirate immediately reneged on their agreement, preventing Trotsky from implementing his industrial plan. Their stated reason was to “prevent him from taking risks,” but, in reality, they feared that Trotsky would add the glory of industrial revitalisation to his achievements as the leader of the October Revolution, organiser, and creator of the Red Army. Soon, the triumvirate expanded to a five-member group by adding Bukharin and Rykov, and, by mid-1924, it expanded to a seven-member group with the addition of Tomsky and Kuibyshev. The balance of power increasingly tilted against Trotsky.
The main reason that prompted Trotsky to write the letter was that the five-member group, having seized leadership, controlled the Politburo. They were keen on forming cliques and excluding dissenters but were incapable of identifying and solving the problems facing Soviet society, leading to a severe internal party-crisis and social and economic crises. As the founder of the world’s first workers’ state, Trotsky was deeply concerned about the economic and internal party-situation in the Soviet Union. Isolated in the Politburo, he decided to write to the Central Committee members and the Central Control Commission to highlight the severity of the current crisis and call for collective efforts to overcome it. The letter warned of the internal party, social, and economic crises and proposed solutions. He pointed out that the root of the internal party-crisis was the exacerbation of methods used in preparing for the 12th Party Congress, leading to a rapid deterioration of the party’s condition, fundamentally due to abnormal and unhealthy party-systems. The second reason was the dissatisfaction of workers and peasants caused by fundamental errors in economic policy. He criticised the Organisational Bureau for appointing party members based on their support for the Organisational Bureau and the Central Secretariat’s informal but actual party-system, from provincial secretaries to grassroots branch-secretaries, all appointed by the Central Secretariat. These practices undermined the organisation, caused severe consequences, and created a secretary-class that overshadowed local party-organisations, leading to bureaucratisation. Party-workers saw the Secretariat as the body forming party-opinions and making decisions, refusing to accept the opinions of party-members. The system established a year earlier was continually consolidated and formalised, moving further away from workers’ democracy than the system during war communism. Finally, he warned that the expanding internal party-crisis could not be quelled by repression; the Party was entering its most critical period, and the leadership’s serious mistakes would severely constrain the Party’s initiative, preventing it from fulfilling its historical responsibilities. He called for the abolition of bureaucratic practices in the Secretariat, the restoration of internal party-democracy, and allowing grassroots party-members to express their dissatisfaction.
The five-member group, holding significant power, used this opportunity to make their covert activities public. They denied all of Trotsky’s points, claiming that everything was normal under their leadership. They accused Trotsky’s letter of being a manifesto for factional activities and framed their opposition to Trotsky as defending Leninism against Trotskyism. They claimed that Trotsky’s raising of issues was an attempt to provoke disputes, disrupt party-unity, and attack the Party during difficult times. In a normal party-system, their tactics would not have succeeded, so they further undermined internal party-democracy, using organisational discipline and eventually state repression to conduct ideological struggles. The restoration and defence of internal party-democracy were central to the Trotskyist opposition’s struggle. Notably, when Zinoviev, Bukharin, and others later became oppositionists, they also sought the internal party-democracy they had previously destroyed.
In the subsequent four-year internal party-struggle, the debates covered various aspects. Theoretically, it was Marxist internationalism versus Stalin and Bukharin’s socialism in one country. Economically, it was about addressing the issues arising from the New Economic Policy (NEP)—industrial backwardness relative to the national economy and the resulting price-scissors between industrial and agricultural products—by advocating accelerated industrialisation, agricultural collectivisation, and planned economy, opposing Stalin and Bukharin’s conservative economic policies. On the Chinese revolution, Trotsky advocated for the Communist Party to leave the Kuomintang, transform the internal alliance into an external one, maintain the Communist Party’s independence, and oppose Stalin and Bukharin’s policy of subordinating the Communist Party to the Kuomintang and relying heavily on it, making the Communist Party a tool for the bourgeoisie. History has already provided answers to the correctness of the positions on economic policy and the Chinese revolution, and it was Stalin himself who provided them. After the grain-crisis, Stalin adopted the Trotskyist opposition’s policies of accelerated industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation but took them to extremes. On the Chinese revolution, after the Wang-Ninghan merger, he advocated for the Communist Party to launch armed uprisings and seize power in China. However, since the Chinese revolution was already in decline, the uprisings failed and could not succeed. Some say more explicitly that Stalin plagiarised the Opposition’s policies, which is debatable. However, many fail to see that these policies, in Stalin’s hands, were distorted by bureaucratism.
Did Trotsky have ambitions for power? Two examples can illustrate this. At the start of the internal party-struggle, he was the supreme commander of the Red Army, enjoying high prestige. If he were solely after power, he could have used the military to achieve his goal, especially with Lenin’s “testament” suggesting Stalin’s removal. The second example: between 1930 and 1933, to save the German workers’ movement, Trotsky devoted himself to analysing the German situation, criticizing the erroneous policies of the German Communist Party and the Comintern, and proposing correct strategies and tactics for fighting the Nazis. He did all this out of a sense of responsibility for the revolutionary cause, nothing more. He saw the mistakes and foresaw their severe consequences for the German Communist Party and the proletariat, so he had to sound the alarm. He knew that these activities would only bring him vicious curses from the German Communist Party and the Comintern, not any power.
Looking at the internal party-struggles of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) in the 1920s, despite changes in alignments, with Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin becoming oppositionists at different times, the basic outline remained the same. The Opposition identified problems, raised issues, and demanded changes to erroneous policies. The ruling faction refused to acknowledge these issues, delaying the correction of mistakes until they caused significant disasters, such as the failure of the Chinese Revolution and the 1927 grain-procurement crisis. The opposition called for the restoration of internal party-democracy and the establishment of sound party-systems, while the ruling faction, for personal gain, further undermined internal party-democracy. Ultimately, the entire party was silenced under Stalin’s tyranny, allowing him to boast of his failures as great victories and carry out bloody purges against the party and the people. Even those who had initially helped him destroy internal party-democracy became victims of his dictatorship.
Stalin’s victory in the ideological struggle through violence demonstrated his intellectual weakness, making his victory one of power, not ideas. This is why Deutscher titled the epilogue of The Prophet Trilogy as “Victory in Defeat,” meaning that, although Trotsky lost the internal party-struggle, was exiled, and eventually assassinated by Soviet agents, he remained victorious in the realm of ideas, just as he had been during the October Revolution and the Civil War. Trotsky left behind many valuable documents in this struggle, which are crucial for establishing sound systems within the ruling party under proletarian dictatorship, defending internal party-democracy, and preventing and opposing bureaucratic degeneration of leadership cadres.
SW: As one of the great strategists of the 20th century, Trotsky was ahead of his time, seeing further and thinking deeper. For example, he foresaw the significant role of atomic energy, predicted that the rise of the Nazis would lead to World War II and destroy all the achievements of the German working class, and saw the inevitability of the Soviet-German war. He also foresaw the emergence of Soviet-like workers’ and peasants’ councils in the Spanish Revolution and, with profound insight, predicted the inevitable collapse of the bureaucratic system in the Soviet Union. However, all these predictions did not materialise into the political revolution Trotsky anticipated due to the lack of a qualified proletarian vanguard—the Communist Party. The Fourth International achieved little. Deutscher’s answer is that Trotsky’s strengths and weaknesses were both rooted in classical Marxism. His failure was a microcosm of the major dilemmas faced by classical Marxism as a doctrine and movement—the contradiction and disconnection between Marxist views on revolutionary development and the actual process of class struggle and revolution. What is your view on this, Mr. Shi?
SY: Deutscher was an independent-minded revolutionary and writer, and his The Prophet Trilogy remains the best biography of Trotsky to this day. However, some of his views are just that—his views.
I would like to approach this issue from a different angle. If, after the February Revolution, the Provisional Government had withdrawn from the War and distributed land to the people, the October Revolution would not have happened. How would we then evaluate Marxist revolutionary theory? Would Marxist revolution be seen as a complete utopia? Another question is, if Trotsky had led the Comintern, or if the ruling majority had not been obstinate and had accepted Trotsky’s suggestions, the Chinese Revolution and the German Revolution could have succeeded—not just the later anti-fascist struggle in Germany, but also the German Revolution of autumn 1923. Would there still be a contradiction and disconnection between Marxism and the actual process of class struggle and revolution?
The revolution Trotsky anticipated did not happen, and the Fourth International achieved little, primarily because of his failure in the internal party-struggle. Of course, without his failure in the internal party-struggle, there would have been no Fourth International. Can we say that his failure in the internal party-struggle was a reflection of the contradiction and disconnection between Marxist doctrine and the actual process of the communist movement and revolution? The answer is no. Trotsky’s failure in the internal party-struggle ultimately dealt a severe blow to the proletarian-revolutionary movement. But, at the time, it occurred within the Party, among a very narrow leadership, not on the battlefield of class struggle, so neither the working class nor the Party understood it. Personal factors also played a role in the outbreak and outcome of this struggle. If Trotsky had not sided with the Mensheviks during the split at the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, the majority could not have formed a united front under the name of the old Bolsheviks. Would this struggle have happened? Or, if it did, its outcome might have been entirely different. Marxist doctrine, as a theory of class struggle and the laws of human social development, had no direct connection to that internal party-struggle.
Deutscher’s view also stems from the fact that Trotsky’s predictions of a political revolution or capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union did not materialise at the time. After Stalin’s death, there was neither a political revolution nor the capitalist restoration Trotsky predicted. Deutscher concluded that the development of industry and the spread of education had strengthened and culturally elevated the proletariat, giving hope that the Soviet Communist Party would voluntarily abandon Stalin’s negative influence and return to being a true Marxist-Leninist party, making the Soviet Union a true socialist state. Today, history has concluded that Trotsky’s predictions, though delayed by decades, have come true. Deutscher’s hope was clearly overly optimistic. On this level, there is no contradiction or disconnection between Marxist doctrine and the actual process of the communist movement and revolution.
The current strength of capitalism in the world is more rooted in the negative influence of the Stalinist system than in the weaknesses of Marxism. Unlike today’s intellectuals who turn to the right, after the October Revolution, global intellectuals longed for revolution and turned to the left. After World War II, scientists involved in nuclear weapons research even helped the Soviet Union steal the US atomic bomb secrets. At that time, capitalist countries were on the defensive, much like how communist countries today guard against colour revolutions. McCarthyism in the United States in the 1950s is proof of this. I remember that, until the 1950s and 1960s, the banner of freedom and democracy was still in the hands of socialism, and many national-liberation movements in the Third World leaned towards socialism. China’s Cultural Revolution even received support and emulation from radical French students. The “May Storm” in France in May 1968 is an example; it was part of the anti-American and anti-war student movements across Europe and America in the 1960s. The movement for campus free speech and black voting rights in the United States in 1964 gradually developed into a nationwide anti-Vietnam War peace movement, quickly spreading to Europe. In the mid-1960s, large-scale student anti-war demonstrations also broke out in West Germany. On March 17, 1968, 30,000 students gathered in front of the US Embassy in the UK to protest against the Vietnam War. In France, the “May Storm” was not an isolated incident; it can be traced back to the Algerian War prior to 1962, with deep social and political roots. The largest general strike in the history of the French labour movement also occurred that year. If the French Communist Party, which had been following the parliamentary path for decades, had not immediately stopped the powerful unions from supporting the student rebellion, the face of France might have changed completely.
SW: Since the 1990s, the mainstream trend in China’s intellectual circles has leaned towards Western democracy, with increasingly fierce criticism of the Russian Revolution and the system it established. Your translations of Trotsky’s works and related research articles were completed and published during this period, which seems a bit against the current. Could you talk about why you are interested in Trotsky?
SY: Saying it’s against the current is not the motivation for my work. I’m just doing what I think is valuable, whether it fits the trend or not, I don’t care. However, whether as a scholar or an intellectual, his value lies in having his own views and value-judgements. If everyone just follows the flow, echoing others, then what’s the point? Why study anything? The October Revolution is a major historical event, and its leader Trotsky is a historical figure. Due to different positions and values, it’s normal to have different views on this historical event and figure. But since it’s historical research, whether in favour or against, it should be conducted according to the norms of historical research. It shouldn’t turn into fiction, let alone satire. Unfortunately, in our country, whether in the past or present, the mainstream in this field is not objective historical research.
My real interest in Trotsky started in 1988 when I translated his autobiography My Life. To talk about why I translated this book, that’s a long story, which can probably be traced back to my high-school days. At that time, having your own views and thoughts on political and historical issues, especially on the October Revolution and Trotsky, was not allowed. You had to see things the way newspapers and books said. Although I haven’t done anything outrageous in my life, I’ve never been a conformist in thought. I have my own opinions on many things. I attended Tsinghua High School, which had dormitories, and most students lived on campus. Before the Cultural Revolution started, one morning just after waking up, the loudspeaker broadcast a criticism of Deng Tuo’s Yanshan Night Talks. I had read this book during the summer of my second year and found it very beneficial. I casually said: “To add guilt, there is no lack of words. I’ve read this book and benefited a lot from it.” A few years ago, at a high school reunion, a classmate said to me: “It’s strange how you managed to stay alive until today.” Even if it wasn’t during the frenzy of the Cultural Revolution, daring to defend a book criticised by the party-organisation was troublesome enough, let alone during the Cultural Revolution, among nearly insane high school students. I myself feel that it’s a miracle I’ve survived safely to this day.
During the Cultural Revolution, I watched Lenin in 1918. Along with Lenin in October and Unforgettable 1919, these three films were seen as history by the people at that time. During Gorbachev’s reform period, he ordered these three films to be banned, saying they distorted history and served Stalin’s usurpation of power. This shows that, for a long time, these three films were also seen as history in the Soviet Union. I saw the distortion and falsification of history in them. For example, after Lenin spoke a few words with Bukharin at the Kremlin gate, he drove to a factory to give a speech. When his guard Vasily learned that someone was going to assassinate Lenin, he chased after him and saw Bukharin at the Kremlin gate, asking him where Lenin went. Bukharin pointed in the opposite direction and then turned his face to smile sinisterly. But I had already read Lenin’s wife’s Reminiscences of Lenin, where she clearly said that Bukharin disagreed with Lenin going to give a speech. I believe Krupskaya’s words are true. There are many obvious loopholes in this movie. If the commander of the Kremlin guard pretended to agree to be an inside man for the plotters of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, and heard the chairman of the meeting announce that Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, and others all supported them and were preparing to assassinate Lenin, he was surprised and exposed. After a mêlée, he jumped onto the windowsill, was shot, and jumped down. At this time, the building was surrounded by Cheka troops, Vasily came to him, and he told Vasily that they were going to assassinate Lenin and asked Vasily to protect Lenin. Vasily entrusted him to a Cheka officer and hurried away, telling the man that Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, and others were traitors. Unexpectedly, this person was a conspirator who had infiltrated the Cheka, immediately pulled out a gun, and killed him. At the same time, Cheka troops rushed into the meeting place and captured many conspirators. The plot of the movie wants to tell the audience that Trotsky and other later Opposition leaders were involved in or supported anti-Soviet uprisings and assassination attempts against Lenin as early as the beginning of 1918, but because the commander of the Kremlin guard was killed by the conspirators, they hid in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) for many years. My question is: although the commander was dead, there were many arrested conspirators. Were they all tight-lipped, and not a single one confessed? If so, where did the screenwriter get this information? There’s no basic logic here. In fact, it was Trotsky who commanded the suppression of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party’s uprising. When this movie was made, including Bukharin, the opposition leaders had already been overthrown. If lies are still needed to prove that those who have been completely overthrown and even physically eliminated were enemies of the revolution, it shows that this conclusion is untenable. A problem that even a seventeen or eighteen-year-old young person could see, couldn’t the scriptwriters, directors, and actors see it?
I also had another question at that time. A great politician, in addition to his talents and foresight, what’s more important is knowing people and assigning the right tasks. If, among Lenin’s closest comrades, almost all except Stalin were the most vicious enemies of the Party and the working class, then where is Lenin’s greatness reflected?
At that time, I also heard that Stalin made the mistake of expanding the anti-revolutionary campaign. Although Mao Zedong’s evaluation of him was three parts wrong, seven parts achievement. But I don’t agree with this conclusion. Wrongly killing hundreds of thousands of people, just lightly saying three parts wrong, that’s hundreds of thousands of living lives! And many of them made huge contributions to the Revolution. What made the rulers wield the knife against their former comrades and innocent masses? Was it for the needs of the Revolution, the needs of the proletariat, or the needs of the dictatorship of the proletariat? I don’t think so. Because I experienced the Cultural Revolution, I feel that these issues are not only problems in the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) but also real problems in China. But, at that time, I couldn’t independently research these issues or come to clear answers. However, these questions stayed in my heart.
I’ve never been a fan of the saint-like image of leaders. In my mind, revolutionary leaders shouldn’t be god-like figures. I think, if a god is necessary, then I’d rather have a dead idol than a living god. Because a lifeless idol leaves room for interpretation of its scriptures or sayings. In front of a living god, people can only worship, and life and death are entirely up to him. I thought at that time that one of the main reasons for many disasters in the Soviet Union was turning Stalin into a living god.
When I translated Trotsky’s My Life in 1988, I saw another kind of revolutionary leader, and this image fit more with the image of a revolutionary leader in my mind. He wasn’t an idol created by power and worship but a living, flesh-and-blood person. All the questions I had about Soviet history were answered. Although Trotsky was still a forbidden area in China at that time, the publication of my translation of Trotsky’s My Life by the International Culture Publishing Corporation was investigated by the State Administration of Press and Publication, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the United Front Work Department, but this did not hinder my value-judgement of Trotsky. I still consider him to be the greatest politician of the 20th century. He was a creator of history, capable of turning the tide and saving the situation from collapse. Since then, I have taken the translation and introduction of Trotsky as my career. Because translating and introducing Trotsky is not simply about vindicating a victim of a wrongful case and seeking justice, but also about letting the world understand the true socialist revolution and true revolutionaries through him. This is how I understand my work of translating and introducing Trotsky.
Since the autobiography only goes up to 1930 and is not a complete biography, I collaborated with Liu Hu and Zhang Bing to translate the third part of Isaac Deutscher’s The Prophet Trilogy, The Prophet Outcast. It just so happened that the Central Compilation and Translation Press commissioned me to proofread the The Prophet Trilogy translated by Mr. Zheng Chaolin in Shanghai. My wish to work on a complete biography of Trotsky finally became a reality. The proofreading work was quite arduous; my wife and I proofread it six times before the first edition, and I proofread it three more times before the reprint. But I felt it was worth it. Among the world’s translations of this trilogy, the Chinese translation was the last to be published. If it weren’t for political obstacles, such an outstanding biography of such an outstanding person would have been translated into Chinese long ago, and it wouldn’t have been our turn.
