Historical-Machinic Materialism
A Review of Politique et État chez Deleuze et Guattari by Guilleme Sibertin-Blanc

Jason Read
Philosophy Department, University of Southern Maine
Jason.Read@maine.edu
Abstract
Guilleme Sibertin-Blanc considers the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari not via a direct relation to Marx, either in terms of lineage or deviation, but in terms of their particular response to the question of politics and the state. In doing so his work not only reveals the affinity between Deleuze and Guattari’s thought and Marxist theories of the state, especially those considering the question of violence in light of primitive accumulation, but also the usefulness of the latter for the former. Sibertin-Blanc makes a case for the overdetermined reading of the concepts of Deleuze and Guattari, understanding them as simultaneously concepts of material conditions and their expression in ideas.
Keywords
Marx – Deleuze – primitive accumulation – Spinoza – capital – state
Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc, (2013) Politique et État chez Deleuze et Guattari. Essai sur le matérialisme historico-machinique, Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
That Marx and Marxism are central concerns of Sibertin-Blanc’s book should perhaps be obvious from the subtitle, ‘Historico-machinic Materialism’, but it is perhaps equally clear that this relation is oblique. This is not a study of influence, an examination of the way in which Marx’s conception of capital underlies Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of abstract machines and axiomatics, nor is it an examination of the extent to which the latter fits into some pre-existing idea of Marxist theory or politics, however unorthodox. Turning from the subtitle to the title we can see that the central concern of Sibertin-Blanc’s book is not capital, nor the mode of production, but the state and politics. The encounter between Deleuze & Guattari and Marx is framed by what is often seen as a constitutive lacuna in each. It approaches Marx from a sort of blindside; as much as Lenin, Gramsci, Poulantzas and others have offered a theory of the state, Marx’s own remarks are just that: remarks, a few metaphors about machines and the role of the state and of class, but not a fully-developed theory. In a different manner, for better or worse, Deleuze and Guattari are often read as offering very little to politics, at least as it is conventionally understood, constituting something like a minor or micro-politics. Sibertin-Blanc approaches the relation between Marx and the work of Deleuze and Guattari not directly, via influence or orthodoxy, but obliquely through a set of problems having to do with the state, violence and the economy. Thus it is possible to say, following Deleuze and Guattari, that they approach this relation in the middle, in the space between Marx and Deleuze & Guattari, which is also the space between politics and economics.
One last word on the title, or rather the subtitle: ‘Historico-machinic Materialism’ suggests an attempt not only to read Deleuze and Guattari as within, or at least heterodox to, the Marxist tradition, but also to read the former systematically and, more importantly, as a materialist philosophy. Historico-machinic materialism takes its place alongside dialectical and historical materialism. Sibertin-Blanc’s earlier publication Deleuze et L’anti-Œdipe: la production du désir pushed beyond the clichés ofAnti-Oedipus as a schizophrenic text, or, asPensée ’68, to see it as a materialist analysis of the constitution of desire and subjectivity. Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of psychoanalysis and the family is oriented towards situating the production of desire within conditions that exceed the family, seeing it as a product (and necessary reproduction) of the mode of production rather than as an expression of oedipal dynamics.[1] ‘Machinic’ in this sense becomes the matter of an understanding of the immanence of desire to the mode of production, its univocity – desire is neither a simple effect of the mode of production, nor is it a cause; it is always cause and effect, structured and structuring. Politique et État chez Deleuze et Guattari is focused on neitherAnti-Oedipus norA Thousand Plateaus, but upon both texts understood as simultaneously the development of a single philosophical perspective (historico-machinic materialism) and divided by eight long years of history, years in which French philosophy went from the conflicts over the events of May to the rise of the ‘new philosophers’. It was a decade of depoliticisation asPensée ’68 gave way to ethics, Christianity, and a retreat into philosophy. As much as the two volumes ofCapitalisme et Schizophrénie can be understood to traverse the decade of their conception, constituting something like a counter-history, or, as Deleuze and Guattari would probably prefer, a ‘becoming’ that passes beneath the shift from radicalism to conservatism, there is also something fundamentally anachronistic about the books (even before one gets to the nomads). The emphasis on fascism, on both its historical emergence and its micropolitical legacy, orients the books towards the interwar period even if they are often seen as exemplifying the intersection of political radicalism and ‘high theory’ that typified post-’68 thought. Sibertin-Blanc argues that it is precisely this anachronism at the time of their writing that makes the books relevant today (p. 12).
Sibertin-Blanc’s other major publication of this period, Philosophie politique XIXe–XXe siècles, is an examination of the various vicissitudes of the state, its foundation, justification and bureaucracy, etc., and thus it is possible to see Sibertin-Blanc’s work on Deleuze and Guattari as situated between a scholarly exegesis and a practical intervention. Such an itinerary characterises Sibertin-Blanc’s work in general. He is a member of the International Center for the Study of Contemporary French Philosophy as well as a contributor to Actuel Marx, writing on both the history of French philosophy, and the intersecting problems of race, violence and nationalism. Here it is possible to note the proximity of Sibertin-Blanc’s teachers, Pierre Macherey and Étienne Balibar, who seem to have imparted less a lesson in doctrinaire ‘Althusserianism’ than attentiveness to the difficulties of conceptualising the conjuncture. Sibertin-Blanc is not the first to note Deleuze and Guattari’s Marxism, but perhaps the first, or at least the most resolute, in drawing a connection between Deleuze and Guattari and the Marxist tradition that is less about cultural theory, ideology, the commodity and desire, than it is about political practice and intervention.
The common theme that Sibertin-Blanc isolates in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, the point of intersection of their work with political philosophy, is violence, or, more specifically, the intersecting themes of arché-violence, the formation of the state; exo-violence, the violence of the war-machine outside of the state; and endo-violence, the violence of capital and axiomatics. The focus on violence, especially in terms of violence as something that traverses the space between the state and capital, sets up points of comparison with Étienne Balibar’s work on violence, something which has become the explicit focus of Thibault Masset’s La violence chez Deleuze-Guattari et Balibar: mode de production, subjectivation, et politique. In each case it is a matter of understanding the different modalities of violence, from the violence of the state, exceptional and sovereign, to the regular violence of capital, or what Balibar calls ultra-subjective or ultra-objective violence.[2] Violence is understood not just in terms of its putatively exceptional character, as something that appears sporadically in moments of crisis and chaos, but in terms of the way in which it permeates the state and capital, constituting both the institution of violence and the violence of institutions. As Masset argues, the task of a critical political philosophy is making manifest the violence that is concealed in day-to-day existence.[3]
Starting from Marx on primitive accumulation, Deleuze and Guattari insist on not only the fundamentally violent nature of the state, but also its necessary role in constituting capitalism. As Deleuze and Guattari write, ‘It is not the state that presupposes a mode of production; quite the opposite, it is the state that makes production a mode.’[4] The state’s necessary role in constituting capital, in constituting social relations, is pushed farther and farther back in time, a historical displacement that begins with Anti-Oedipus and continues withA Thousand Plateaus. It is not just, as it was for Marx, that the state is the necessary midwife of colonisation, the destruction of the commons, and the overall separation of the emergent workers from the means of production, rather the state is the very condition of labour as such. Labour as an activity separated from other activities, and subject to its specific exploitation and organisation, presupposes the state as the necessary condition of the abstraction and separation of activity. This materialisation of the state then leads to its opposite, to its idealisation. The state is not just a material condition of exploitation, it is also an image of thought; it is an image that stresses interiority, identity and totality. It can only be one if it is the other; the state’s ability to secure and maintain the mode of production is predicated on its claim of totality and universality, and its totality and universality are in part based on its actual efficacy in the realm of forces (p. 29). Even Hegel would not have posited the state as the Idea in history if the state did not have effects in history. The state can be idealised, can become the very figure of the Idea, because it has functioned as a materialisation of power. As Sibertin-Blanc argues, this materialisation and idealisation of the state, its role as both condition of production and figure of thought, makes it hard to place in the history of philosophy. It becomes necessary to think in terms of the materiality of ideality. To think the manner in which the very image of the state, of totality, has material conditions and effects (p. 29).
The state must be thought of as a kind of antinomy, or as several antinomies; at once material and ideal, historical and outside of history, and it is only by grasping it as an antinomy, which is to say as overdetermined by the specific ways in which this tension is articulated, that one can understand its effects. This is why the writings on primitive accumulation are the most important texts of Marx’s for Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of the state. It is through the transitional dimension of the state that it is possible to grasp its constitutive antinomies. The central antinomy of primitive accumulation is that of the status of the state, as simultaneously legal and illegal, contingent and necessary. ‘Hence the very particular character of state violence: it is very difficult to pinpoint this violence because it always presents itself as preaccomplished.’[5] The state is simultaneously the limit of one system, the destruction of feudalism and multiple powers, and the beginning of another assemblage, one constituted by an apparatus of capture. As reorganisation, a new assemblage, it is still constituted of the violence that constituted the old system, the old power (p. 61). Its existence as something that stands outside of violence, constituting order, is only because it is a reorganisation of that violence. Monopolistic appropriation proceeds, and makes possible, a direct comparison of that which it appropriates. This is the ultimate antinomy of the state, the one that is the kernel of its definition, that the monopoly precedes and constitutes what it is a monopoly of. Hierarchy and asymmetry is not a deviation from an originary equal exchange, but rather the latter’s necessary condition.
Sibertin-Blanc’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari stands thus in sharp contrast with another Marxist reading, that of Fredric Jameson. For Jameson Anti-Oedipus can be considered properly materialist, or at any rate influenced by Marx, at least in terms of its historicisation of desire, butA Thousand Plateaus, in which the state, like many concepts and categories, becomes part of a conceptual opposition positing the nomad against the state, is increasingly idealist, even moralistic. Materialist analysis gives way to dualisms of moralising distinctions. As Jameson writes,
But this may furnish the occasion for saying why the emergence of this or that dualism should be a cause for complaint or critique in the first place. Dualism is, I believe, the strong form of ideology as such, which may of course disguise its dual structure under any number of complicated substitutions. This is so, I want to assert, because it is the ultimate form of the ethical binary, which is thus always secretly at work within ideology.[6]
Jameson’s critique is borne out by the various readers of Deleuze and Guattari that have turned concepts like the nomad, the rhizome, or even immanence itself into something to be unproblematically celebrated. In contrast to Jameson’s interpretation, Sibertin-Blanc not only reads the two volumes together, overcoming the dualism of original radical project and ethical deviation, but in doing so also sees its various dualisms not so much as reducible to an ethical binary, but as expanding into a series of displacements. Thus his reading in some sense echoes Deleuze and Guattari’s methodological approach to dualisms,
We invoke one dualism only in order to challenge another. We employ a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that challenges all models. … Arrive at the magic formula we all seek – pluralism=monism – via all the dualisms that are the enemy, an entirely necessary enemy, the furniture we are forever rearranging.[7]
Even primitive accumulation changes its fundamental antinomies in the two texts. It appears in the first as a figure of contingency, of universal history understood as contingency, while in the latter the antinomy is turned towards that of the particular nature of state violence, as simultaneously constituting right and violence. Thus it is possible to see the first as more materialist, concerning the effects on the economy, while the latter is more ideological, or conceptual, concerning the very constitution of the state as a figure of thought. Sibertin-Blanc makes it possible to see these two aspects as constituting a kind of addition, or transformation; it is not a matter of shifting from material effects to conceptual binaries, but of recognising that there are no conceptual binaries without material conditions, and vice versa. It is the same state, the same social relation, thought in terms of its material relations or its conceptual relations, as power and as concept.
The parallel yet distinct relation of the material force of the state and its idea is only one aspect of Sibertin-Blanc’s argument (p. 41). First, and foremost, there is its affirmative nature: social relations or social formations are defined not by their contradictions but by their creative movements of transformation. Gilles Deleuze’s earlier work on Spinoza argued that the relationship between bodies and ideas, the order and connection of ideas and things, is best characterised as parallelism, as the identical order of two different attributes, the order and connection of things and ideas. It is precisely this same process that defines Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of what constitutes social relations, or, in their terms, an assemblage. An assemblage is both a collective assemblage of enunciation and a machinic assemblage of bodies; it is both an intermingling of bodies and an organisation of acts or statements.[8] These two aspects, bodies and statements, actions and events, do not determine or affect each other, but are each affected or determined by their relative deterritorialisation or reterritorialisation, by their processes of abstraction and concretisation. It is this process of differentiation and transformation that constitutes the order and connection of bodies and ideas, actions and statements. Spinoza’s ontology, the ontology of substance grasped in terms of two different attributes, is marshalled in the service of the solution to a problem of political, economic and social theory, the Marxist problem of determinism, of the base and superstructure. Bodies and enunciations, forms of content and expression, must be seen as distinct, as having their own specific causalities and effects. They are connected not by a causal order, i.e. by their effects on each other, but by the general process of deterritorialisation, of abstraction and displacement. Between Spinoza’s substance and Deleuze and Guattari’s process of deterritorialisation is Marx’s mode of production; the latter makes it possible to think of the order and connection not as metaphysics but as a social relation. A mode of production must be thought simultaneously as an organisation of bodies and an order of statements.
Sibertin-Blanc’s reading stresses this innovation, but pushes it in a different direction, one influenced by a different reading of Spinoza. For Sibertin-Blanc it is not the parallelism but rather the overdetermination of the different assemblages, of the different conceptual oppositions, that defines Deleuze and Guattari’s account of social relations. In doing so, Sibertin-Blanc proliferates the various oppositions and dualisms rather than reducing them to a central ethical opposition. Instead of seeing everything reduced to a Manichean opposition between the war machine and the state, the state and its nomads, Sibertin-Blanc argues that it is necessary to grasp the way in which this opposition, an opposition over territory, necessarily intersects with the different strategies and assemblages, with the state as an apparatus of capture, and with the conflict of smooth and striated spaces (p. 102), all of which have their own tensions and oppositions. That the state both constitutes a spatial logic, a domination of space according to the striation of space, the subordination of space to lines, and an apparatus of capture, as well as being an image of thought means that any concrete state, any existing state, can only be thought as the overdetermination of different assemblages. Given that Sibertin-Blanc’s books on Deleuze and Guattari are the product of a thesis written under the direction of Pierre Macherey, it is possible to see this as a conflict of different Spinozisms. Deleuze’s parallelism versus Althusser’s overdetermination (even if overdetermination is a concept defined more through references to Freud and Marx than to Spinoza). In the first, what is stressed is the identity and difference of things and ideas, machinic assemblages of bodies and collective assemblages of enunciation, which must be grasped simultaneously as distinct and as two different perspectives on the same substance, or, in Deleuze and Guattari’s case, on the same process of deterritorialisation. Causal autonomy is maintained along with mutual implication. While in the second, what is stressed is the sheer multiplicity of different causal series, different assemblages; the state must be thought simultaneous as an apparatus of capture and as a phenomenon of overcoding, as both an organisation of political space and the constitution of an image of thought. These multiple assemblages, multiple strategies, must be thought of in terms of their specific articulation, their specific actualisation in a given historical situation (p. 106). Sibertin-Blanc stresses the conjunctural definition of the different assemblages, shifting their opposition from not only any ‘ethical’ opposition of good and bad, but also the residue of base and superstructure or its idealist inversion. There are not just bodies and enunciations, machines and discourses, two different orders, but multiple effects of different assemblages.
Reading Deleuze and Guattari as theorists of overdetermination poses a particular problem when it comes to capital. Capital, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is defined by the destruction of the various codes and apparatuses that have come before. It is defined by its decoding, by the way in which previous forms of social belonging, with their attendant customs, traditions and modes of belonging, are reduced to axioms, to the quantifiable exchange of money and labour-power. This, Sibertin-Blanc argues, is precisely the challenge, a challenge pertaining to any concept of capitalism, or the capitalist mode of production, that is non-teleological; it is a matter of thinking the way in which the capitalist mode of production must be thought of as both a destruction of what came before, of feudalism, and of its own particular transformation, of its continuing to hold itself together in its very destruction (p. 152). In other words, this is the classical problem of reproduction, social reproduction framed against the backdrop of a mode of production that is defined by its constant transformation. This problem could be traced back to Marx’s assertion that with capital, ‘all that is solid melts into air’, which, in an often-cited and memorable way, posed the problem of capitalism as defined by transformation. The capitalist mode of production is not just defined by transformation, but by reduction of the heterogeneity of different assemblages, a heterogeneity that could define the state, to the economy as one overarching axiomatic. Once again this problem is to be found in Marx, specifically in the passages on primitive accumulation. As Marx writes, ‘The silent compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker. Direct extra-economic force is still of course used, but only in exceptional cases.’[9] As is often the case, both of these propositions become intensified in Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Marx, less the quotable passages and specific arguments than the general ontology of social relations, an ontology defined by abstraction and transformation. Reproduction must be thought of as a particular organisation of this abstraction and transformation. As Deleuze and Guattari write,
There ensues a privatization of the family according to which the family ceases to give its social form to economic reproduction: it is as though disinvested, placed outside of the field; in the language of Aristotle, the family is now simply the form of human matter or material that finds itself subordinated to the autonomous social form of economic reproduction, and that comes to take the place assigned to it by the latter.[10]
The privatisation of the family does not mean that it is entirely outside of the field of social reproduction; rather it is precisely because it is outside, privatised, that it functions. Whereas previous modes of production, or social production, were defined by the directly political and economic, which is to say productive, dimension of the family. In capital, the family becomes simply reproductive; it can no longer determine or affect status in the relations of production; it can only represent them, which is to say reproduce these relations.
The dualisms that are the most irresolvable for Deleuze and Guattari are the ones that they inherit rather than invent; they concern the division between capitalism and precapitalism and between production and reproduction. These divisions, themselves integral to Marxism, are reconceptualised by Deleuze and Guattari to become the division between codes and axioms, in the first instance, and that between social production and desiring production, in the latter. In each case the neologisms express a fundamental transformation of Marx’s thought, shifting it more towards questions of subjectivity and desire. They are also divisions more strongly at work in Anti-Oedipus than inA Thousand Plateaus. While axioms continue to play a fundamental role in the latter text, it is less a matter of the distinction between axioms and codes, than the relation between axioms and the nondenumerable, the minority, that are not subject to axioms. The entire language of desiring production and social production also disappears from the second volume ofCapitalism and Schizophrenia, and with it any real focus on the family as a site of reproduction. In its place there is a return to the opposition of molecular and molar in which it is stressed that this opposition is not one of scale; there is a molecular politics of the state just as there is a molar politics of the family. Thus it is possible to see Deleuze and Guattari moving away from the limits of the categorial opposition between capitalism and non-capitalism.
The question remains, however: do the various forms of violence that Sibertin-Blanc charts, the originary or arché, exoviolence or nomad, and endoviolence or capital, make it possible to think beyond the opposition of capitalism and precapitalism, understanding their specific temporal heterogeneity, and the opposition between production and reproduction? The first is a theoretical question, one, it is worth noting, that was posed most rigorously by Louis Althusser in Lire le Capital, an important point of reference for Deleuze and Guattari (as well as Sibertin-Blanc). Althusser subjected to rigorous critique any temporal historicisation that saw the present as fully present to itself; insisting instead that historical time must be constructed from the specific mode of production, including its tensions, lags and anticipations. Deleuze and Guattari are not unaware of this aspect of Althusser’s thought;Anti-Oedipus engages with the phenomenon of recoding, of the way in which capital continually resuscitates the codes it decodes, revitalising past beliefs, to become ‘a motley painting of everything that has ever been believed’. However, this tendency to grasp the differential temporality of the present is subordinated to an overarching tendency or direction, hence the term ‘archaisms’. In contrast to this,A Thousand Plateaus offers a more complex temporal structure, especially in terms of the state, which is preceded by attempts to ward it off.[11]
The second question, however, is as much political and historical as it is theoretical; the opposition between production and reproduction framed entirely in terms of the psychoanalytic representation of desire overlooks a more-materialist understanding of the family, not as theatre of the unconscious, but as part of the social factory. At the same time that Deleuze and Guattari were arguing that ‘desire is part of the infrastructure’, Marxist-feminists associated with the wages-for-housework movement were arguing that the family, as a site of the production and reproduction of labour-power, must be understood as part of the infrastructure as well. Since the writing of their initial critique, the boundaries of production and reproduction have blurred, as care-work, emotional labour, and affective labour have become part of the functioning of capital. ‘Desire is part of the infrastructure’ sounds less like a radical critique of Marx and Freud than the slogan of a viral-marketing firm! These are the transformations that risk making Deleuze and Guattari themselves anachronistic; what is perhaps most untenable in their work is the opposition between codes – qualitative, embodied and indirect – and axioms – quantitative, abstract and direct. Sibertin-Blanc has done an excellent job of arguing for the overdetermination of their concept of the state, seeing it as made up of both material and ideal dimensions, of multiple assemblages constituting power, space and identity. What perhaps remains to be done is an overdetermination of their concept of capital, of the economy – the economy cannot be simply identified with production, nor with purely quantitative axioms of labour and money; it must be thought of in terms of its material and ideal aspects, its affective and subjective dimension. This seems like a strange criticism to bring before Deleuze and Guattari, whose entire project is one of thinking the immanence of desiring-production to social production, molecular relations to molar politics. However, much of the role of reproductive work, of the family, and desire, is theorised primarily as an ‘archaism with a current function’ in Anti-Oedipus, and despiteA Thousand Plateau’s emphasis on the minor and molecular, the centrality of the axiom continues this tendency towards abstraction. Thus it is possible to see the way in which two limits of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought intersect, their tendency to periodise history without residual tension or remainder, and their tendency to posit reproduction as archaic with respect to production, limit their efficacy in the present. What is needed is a more overdetermined and asynchronous account of capitalism, and an understanding of how its axioms and social relations, its ultra-objective violence, intersect with and are sustained by the codes of social reproduction, and their corresponding forms of ultra-subjective violence. In this task Sibertin-Blanc’s book provides an immense guide, showing how a rigorous reading of Deleuze and Guattari can produce not just new concepts, but new relations between concepts.
References
Balibar, Étienne 2010, Violence et civilité. Wellek Library Lectures et autres essais de philosophie politique, Paris: Éditions Galilée.
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari 1983 [1972], Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, translated by Robert Hurleyet al., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari 1987 [1980], A Thousand Plateaus, translated by Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Jameson, Fredric 2009, ‘Deleuze and Dualism’, in Valences of the Dialectic, London: Verso.
Marx, Karl 1977 [1867], Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume One, translated by Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Masset, Thibault 2013, La violence chez Deleuze-Guattari et Balibar: mode de production, subjectivation et politique, Kindle Edition, Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
Sibertin-Blanc, Guillaume 2010, Deleuze et L’anti-Œdipe: la production du désir, Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
[1] Sibertin-Blanc 2010, p. 98.
[2] Balibar 2010, p. 34.
[3] Masset 2013, location 2042.
[4] Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 429.
[5] Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 447.
[6] Jameson 2009, p. 198.
[7] Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 20.
[8] Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 88.
[9] Marx 1977, p. 899.
[10] Deleuze and Guattari 1983, p. 263.
[11] Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 431.
The Development of British Capitalist Society: A Marxist Debate
edited by Colin Barker and David Nicholls
CONTENTS
Editors’ Introduction – Colin Barker and David Nicholls
Shifting Trajectories: Perry Anderson’s Changing Account of the Pattern of English Historical Development – Robert Looker
Some Notes on Perry Anderson’s ‘Figures of Descent’ – John Saville
A Subordinate Bourgeoisie’? The Question of Hegemony in Modern British Capitalist Society – David Nicholls
In Pursuit of the Anderson Thesis – David Coates
Mao Redux?

A Review of China and the 21st Century Crisis by Minqi Li
Burak Gürel
Department of Sociology, Koç University, Istanbul
bgurel@ku.edu.tr
Abstract
This essay discusses Minqi Li’s 2016 book on China. Li’s study examines China’s transition to capitalism since the late 1970s, and class-struggles during and after that transition. By linking this transition with the crisis of the capitalist world economy in the second half of the 1970s, Li provides a solid analysis of China’s transformation as the main provider of a ‘spatial fix’ to world capitalism since the early 1980s. The analysis of the forthcoming end of the China-centred spatial fix and the resulting intensification of the crisis tendencies of world capitalism is an important contribution of Li’s study. This essay also points to several shortcomings of the book, among which the absence of deeper reflection on the problems of the theory of ‘socialism in one country’, an uncritical reading of the Maoist legacy, and failure to distinguish socialism from the rejection of neoliberalism appear the most important ones.
Keywords
China – capitalism – crisis – Maoism – spatial fix
Minqi Li, (2016) China and the 21st Century Crisis, London: Pluto Press.
Minqi Li is one of the most prominent figures of the contemporary Chinese left. Coming from a relatively privileged family background, Li received a strict neoliberal, ‘Chicago School’ type economics education at Beijing University between 1987 and 1990. Like many members of his generation, he participated in the ‘democracy movement’ of workers and students that culminated in the Tiananmen Square protests that lasted between 15 April and 4 June 1989. In contrast to the great majority of the movement’s participants, who fell prey to a depoliticisation process and a right turn following the suppression of the movement by the state, Li took the opposite path. Impressed by working-class militancy during the protests and disillusioned by the political inability of the liberal leadership of the student movement to unite with the workers effectively and seize the revolutionary momentum,[1] Li quickly abandoned liberalism and became a Marxist. Due to a speech he gave at the campus soon after the suppression of Tiananmen, Li was expelled from Beijing University and imprisoned between 1990 and 1992. In Li’s own words, during this process he ‘became a leftist, a socialist, a Marxist, and eventually, a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist’.[2]
Li views himself as part of the ‘Chinese New Left’, a loose term referring to a diverse group of intellectuals and activists with a critical stance towards China’s capitalist transformation that refuses to label the 1949–78 period simply as one of economic disaster and unproductive political extremism, and tries to articulate a left-wing alternative built through critical engagement with that experience. As Li notes, ‘today, it is virtually impossible for someone in China to be a leftist without also being some sort of a Maoist (with the only exception of some young Trotskyites).’[3] Although it is true that the majority of Chinese leftists defend certain aspects of Maoism, it seems more accurate to characterise their politics as social-democratic rather than Maoist. From their perspective, reclaiming and reinterpreting certain aspects of the Maoist legacy (such as national independence, land reform, egalitarianism, and ‘mass line’ politics) is necessary in order to reshape the current Chinese political economy along social-democratic lines. However, defending more radical interpretations of Maoism (as a politics of socialist revolution squarely opposed to the contemporary political regime) is out of the question.[4] Minqi Li diverges from this dominant tendency. Although Li seems inclined to give certain concessions to a social-democratic line, a position criticised below, he takes socialist revolution as a serious possibility for today’s China and the broader world and tries to develop Marxist theory in a way that contributes to this endeavour.
Li left China in 1994 and finished his PhD in Economics at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst in 2002. He is currently a faculty member at the Department of Economics at the University of Utah. Both institutions are among the (very) few economics departments in Western academia where neoclassical economics is not viewed as the unquestioned truth and Marxist political economy is part of the curriculum and informs research activities. During the last two decades, Li has researched a number of key questions through engaging with various strands of the historical-materialist tradition. He has investigated the tendency of the rate of profit to fall in the contemporary world from a classical-Marxist perspective; analysed long waves and shifting centres of capital accumulation, centre-periphery relations, and the rise and fall of hegemonic states from a world-systems perspective; and engaged with the question of ecological crisis and sustainability in a dialogue with the related literature. He has analysed China’s past and possible future paths with reference to these broader questions. For these reasons, Li’s work deserves close attention and scrutiny.
Li’s first book, titled The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World Economy, was published in 2008.[5] In 2016 he published his second book, titled China and the 21st Century Crisis, which is the main focus of this review essay. This new book provides a comprehensive historical-materialist analysis of the national, global, historical and contemporary aspects of the rise of China in the world-capitalist system since the 1980s. It starts with a brief discussion of the factors behind late-imperial and republican China’s century-long crisis and its resolution after the revolution of 1949. Li identifies the failure to mobilise the agrarian surplus for industrialisation and military modernisation as the fundamental reason for this decline and China’s subordinate incorporation into the world-capitalist system after its defeat in the First Opium War (1839–42). He stresses the fact that rapid industrialisation (through the effective mobilisation of the agrarian surplus) and human development (through the nationwide expansion of healthcare and education services by the state and rural collectives) during the Mao era prepared the material conditions for the spectacular rise of the Chinese economy since the 1980s (pp. 16–17).[6]
In addition to these Mao-era achievements, Li identifies two other factors behind the post-1980 boom of the Chinese economy. These are, first, the end of the post-WWII economic boom in the mid-1970s and, second, China’s transition to capitalism in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Declining profit rates forced the core and semi-peripheral countries to relocate a significant portion of their industries to peripheral countries where labour costs are low. In line with Giovanni Arrighi,[7] Li notes that cheap labour is a necessary but not sufficient condition of such massive relocation. Peripheral countries should also have decent infrastructure and a sufficiently skilled labour force in order to be able to absorb massive industrial investment. Due to the Mao-era achievements, by the early 1980s China was the only sizeable region in the periphery that could simultaneously provide quality infrastructure and cheap and semi-skilled labour to foreign capital. Referring to David Harvey’s concept of ‘spatial fix’, Li argues that China appeared as the best candidate to provide this type of solution to a world-capitalism in trouble (pp. 72–7, 176–9).
World capitalism was unable to benefit from this sort of spatial fix as long as China kept along its non-capitalist path. Hence, China’s transition to capitalism was the second factor that allowed it to receive large quantities of foreign capital, to become the workshop of the world, and to sustain high economic growth rates for the next three decades. The impasse of building socialism in one backward country and the related bureaucratisation of the party-state prepared the conditions that facilitated the transition to capitalism under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership after December 1978. Capitalist restoration started with the dismantling of the rural collectives, introduction of capitalist-style management practices in state-owned enterprises, and the opening up to foreign direct investment during the 1980s. The defeat of the protest movement of urban workers and students after the Tiananmen massacre on 4 June 1989 eliminated an important obstacle to the deepening of capitalist restoration. This made possible the privatisation of a substantial portion of state-owned enterprises and the elimination of the employment guarantee and other gains of the urban state-sector workers (known as the ‘iron rice bowl’) in the 1990s. The party-state bureaucracy transformed itself into a capitalist class in this process. State and collective assets (created before the 1980s) worth about US$5 trillion were transferred to this new bourgeoisie through privatisation. As a result, by 2006, about 2,900 of the 3,200 people with personal property worth over US$15 million in China were children of senior party-state officials (pp. 19–23, 32–4).
Li’s study empirically explains how China provided a ‘spatial fix’, and therefore a temporary breathing space, for the core and the semi-peripheral capitalist countries by undertaking greater amounts of low-wage manufacturing activities from the 1980s on. For Li, China’s transition from the periphery to the semi-periphery is not yet complete and it therefore continues to provide a ‘spatial fix’ to world capitalism (pp. 73–5). On the other hand, Li predicts that China will join the semi-periphery within a decade, which implies the end of the China-centred spatial fix for world capitalism. South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are unable to substitute for China as suppliers of an equally large economic surplus to the core and semi-periphery due to their problems of weak infrastructure, a comparatively-unskilled labour force, political instability, and ecological constraints (pp. 77, 179). According to Li, this implies that ‘“spatial fixes” as a historical strategy to revive the capitalist world system has reached its limit’ (p. 75). Deprived of significant surplus extraction from the periphery outside of China, the core regions would experience comparatively greater socio-political instability (p. 77).
China’s transition into the semi-peripheral zone constitutes only one aspect of the structural challenges confronting world capitalism. Li provides us with a detailed empirical analysis of the ongoing crisis tendencies of the world economy. He elaborates on several factors constraining the profit rate, such as the over-accumulation of capital (pp. 79–85), which is central in Marx’s theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall; wage increases won through workers’ struggles (pp. 6–7, 62, 68, 78, 183); and energy and environmental constraints (to which Li devotes Chapter 6 entirely). Based on the historical experience of British and American capitalisms, Li suggests that the leading capitalist economy has to sustain a profit rate that is significantly above 10% for the relatively stable operation of the world-capitalist system. He stresses as a fact the collapse of the profit rate in the US during the 1970s and 2007–9, which precipitated the advent of two major world-economic crises. Li then adds that China’s profit rate was 12% in 2012 and has been declining since then. According to Li’s projection, which he admits to being ‘too optimistic’, China’s profit rate will decline below 12% after 2022 and below 10% after 2028 (pp. 86–91). Given the fact that China accounted for almost one-third of global economic growth between 2003 and 2013 and has replaced the US as the greatest contributor to global economic growth since 2008 (p. 98), declining profitability of the Chinese economy signals the strengthening of crisis tendencies within the world economy as a whole. Although Li does not discuss it in explicit terms, this also suggests that it is very difficult, if not altogether impossible, for China to become the new hegemon of the world system. With a declining (US-centred) core and a (China-centred) semi-periphery unable to rise in limitless fashion, world capitalism would face formidable challenges to achieving long-term stability.
In these circumstances, the struggles of the subaltern classes tend to become more widespread and intense. Li starts his book by emphasising that since the start of the world-economic crisis in 2008, ‘mass protests and popular rebellions have transformed the political map throughout the world’ (p. 1). Although China has not witnessed a regime-threatening mass movement since 1989, Li suggests that the country’s transformation into the workshop of the world has eventually led to the rise of workers’ struggles. After more than two decades of labouring under hazardous conditions and repressive management to earn meagre wages, Chinese workers have been waging increasingly militant struggles against capital in recent years. In line with the recent labour-movement scholarship on China,[8] Li underlines the important role played by the new generation of migrant workers (who are registered as rural households but actually work in urban industries) in labour-struggles of today. This new generation is better educated, more determined to stay in the cities, and it therefore has higher consumption standards than the older generations and is more inclined to view class struggle as the main means of meeting its material needs. Demographic factors such as the depletion of rural surplus labour and the decline of the total labour force increase its bargaining power. The approaching end of the era of rapid economic growth under the pressure of the world crisis makes the capitalists of China increasingly incapable of meeting the demands of this new proletarian generation (pp. 28–9).
Li views the increase in the number of ‘mass incidents’ (from 8,700 in 1993 to 60,000 in 2003 and 120,000 in 2008) and various violations of ‘social order’ (from 3.2 million in 1995 to 11.7 million in 2009 and 13.9 million in 2012) as empirical proof of the increasing trend of proletarian and popular struggles in China (p. 182). He compares contemporary China with the experiences of several earlier industrialisers of the semi-periphery (including Brazil, Poland and South Korea) since the end of WWII. The conclusion of this comparison is clearly optimistic. Unlike these countries, which experienced economic crisis in the 1980s and 1990s, ‘when global revolution was in retreat and neoliberalism was advancing in every geographic area in the world’ (p. 40), Li asserts that ‘the coming economic and political crisis of Chinese capitalism will take place as the structural crisis of the global capitalist system is approaching’ (p. 41).
At the end of the book, Li puts forward three possible scenarios for the future of China. The first scenario is the revival of the socialist model of development by the CCP leadership under growing popular pressure but without a regime change and the upheavals involved under such circumstances. The second scenario is the collapse of the present regime and transition to a formal liberal democracy. The final scenario is a long-term and general socio-political collapse and a civil war in the worst case (similar to the pre-1949 period). In light of the purge of the relatively ‘left-wing’ faction of the CCP represented by Bo Xilai (the former Politburo member and party secretary of the Chongqing Municipality) in 2012, Li views the first scenario as highly unlikely. On the other hand, he draws a much more optimistic picture regarding the final outcome of the other two apparently chaotic and painful scenarios. Despite enormous challenges, Li expects a revolutionary re-organisation and unity of the subaltern classes, which would lead to the victory of socialism in China (pp. 183–5).
Li’s work deserves much appreciation for its broad scope, distance from dominant mainstream (non/anti-Marxist) approaches in the literature on the Chinese political economy, and empirically-grounded arguments. Having said this, some parts of the book deserve criticism. My criticism will proceed from relatively minor to major problems with the book.
First, although the explanation of the crisis of the capitalist economy is one of the main preoccupations of his book, Li’s crisis theory suffers from eclecticism. Li mentions three main crisis-theories, underconsumption theory, profit-squeeze theory, and Karl Marx’s theory of the ‘law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall’ (pp. 3, 43–4, 48–51), without saying which one provides the correct/best explanation. It is a well-established fact that these theories provide significantly different (and oftentimes opposite) explanations of the crisis. For instance, according to underconsumption theory, lack of effective demand for consumption goods is the main factor starting major crises. This is not the case for the theory based on the tendency of the profit-rate to fall, which argues that since the exploitation of labour is the only source of profit, increasing organic composition of capital through the substitution of capital for labour periodically leads to falls in the rate of profit and causes economic crisis. As the decline in the profit-rate would eventually lead to a decline in both capital investment and labour employment, the effective demand for capital and consumer goods would also decline and thereby aggravate the crisis. In short, whereas effective demand is the chief factor in initiating an economic crisis according to underconsumption theory, it is an intervening factor but not the chief cause of the crisis according to the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.[9] These are not simply theoretical differences. They have important implications for socialist politics. In contrast to underconsumption theory which ‘stresses the commonality of interests between capital and labour’, Marxism underscores that ‘labour’s gains are capital’s losses and thus contribute to the objective weakening of capitalism rather than to its strengthening.’[10] Therefore, the lack of a clear comparison of crisis-theories is apparent as a shortcoming of Li’s book.
Second, the neglect of the place of the peasantry in the class alliance behind the restoration of capitalism in China is another problem with the book. Li is right in stressing the significance of the urban middle class’ enthusiastic support for capitalist restoration (pp. 22–3). He suggests that, especially after the repression of Tiananmen in 1989, the urban middle class’ pro-capital stance helped the state to isolate the state-sector workers politically, which eventually rendered them defenceless against successive waves of privatisation in the 1990s (pp. 23, 32). Although these arguments sound valid, what is missing in Li’s account is a clear analysis of the position of the peasantry. Regarding the Chinese peasantry of the 1980s, Li suggests that ‘agriculture was the weakest link of the traditional socialist system. Agricultural privatization in the early 1980s was met with little resistance from the peasants (though the official propaganda that the peasants enthusiastically supported privatization was mostly unfounded)’ (p. 23). This point is also valid but insufficient. Official propaganda claiming that the decollectivisation of agriculture was a bottom-up movement initiated and supported by the peasantry is wrong, because it hides the top-down character of the reform in which the party-state leadership used harsh administrative measures against the (not so few) villagers and rural cadres resisting decollectivisation in many regions.[11]
However, recognising the problems of the official propaganda should not lead us to miss the central importance of rural support for the initial pro-capital reforms. The Chinese leadership was well aware that agricultural decollectivisation was not enough to establish pro-capital hegemony over the peasantry. Therefore, as soon as the decollectivisation reform started, the state increased the purchase price of all major agricultural products and decreased agricultural taxes significantly. In fact, agriculture’s terms of trade against industry (which were very unfavourable before 1978, for the purpose of effecting primitive socialist accumulation) improved significantly until the completion of decollectivisation in 1984.[12] Hence, although decollectivisation and price policy were virtually separate areas, the Chinese leadership presented them as components of a single reform package. Hence, huge increases in agricultural prices became a decisive factor behind winning the peasantry to the reform camp.[13] Although the initial spike in agricultural prices was not sustained to the same extent after 1984, the improvement of the peasants’ lot until then was significant enough to keep the peasantry away from any anti-regime mobilisation. This helped the Chinese state significantly when suppressing the workers and students in 1989.[14] In his previous book, Li suggests that in the early 1980s,
Peasants’ incomes also grew rapidly, in fact, more rapidly than the incomes of the urban households […] As the availability of food and other agricultural goods improved, the urban working class also enjoyed a rapid improvement in living standards and began to have access to various modern consumer durables. With these temporary concessions made to the workers and peasants, Deng Xiaoping and the ‘reformers’ were able to consolidate their political power.[15]
This is the only place where Li engages with the question of economic concessions provided by the state and the political orientation of the lower classes in the 1980s. However, he does not explain why urban workers and peasants had significantly different political dispositions in the late 1980s. In neither of his two books does Li provide a systematic analysis of the material basis of the diverse political orientations of the urban proletariat and the peasantry, which seriously impacted the outcome at the critical juncture of 1989. Lack of attention to this question is an important shortcoming of Li’s work.
Finally, Li’s analysis of the so-called socialist regimes of the twentieth century in general and the Maoist experience in particular suffers from a number of problems. After recognising their successes in ‘achieving both effective capital accumulation and improvement of people’s living standards’, he continues:
However, by the 1970s and the 1980s, socialist states were squeezed between rising labor and resources costs and their inability to compete with the core capitalist countries on the technology frontier. The Communist Party’s ruling elites took advantage of the economic crisis to dismantle the socialist social contract and complete the capitalist transition (p. 185).
Here Li is basically referring to the failure of the practice of ‘socialism in one country’ from Eastern Europe to East Asia. Li makes his point more explicit elsewhere:
The only conceivable alternative would require the Chinese Party and state elites to give up a substantial portion of their material privileges. By sharing material hardships with the working class and continuing to provide workers and peasants with basic social security, the Communist Party leadership might be able to convince the great majority of the population to live within a relatively closed socialist system for a prolonged period of time. If China were to follow this alternative path, it might create a relatively favorable political environment for a new wave of global revolution when neoliberalism enters its own major crisis. The Cuban experience after 1990 has demonstrated that it is possible for a socialist state surrounded by neoliberal capitalism to maintain the basic socialist framework for several decades, provided that the Communist Party leadership was willing to sacrifice its own material interests. But in the absence of a major socialist revolution in a big country, even Cuba has been under growing pressure to undertake neoliberal-style ‘economic reform.’ In China, with the end of the Cultural Revolution, the majority of the Party and state bureaucrats had abandoned their original revolutionary ideals. Any development strategy that demanded the sacrifices of the ruling elites became politically unfeasible (pp. 35–6).
The similarity between Li’s point and Leon Trotsky’s pioneering analysis of the Soviet Union (the only ‘socialist state’ of the time) in his The Revolution Betrayed (1936) is striking.[16] Trotsky was the first Marxist thinker who provided a systematic analysis of the structural limitations and inevitable collapse of the model of ‘socialism in one country’. He also pointed to the possibility of this model’s transition back to capitalism through a metamorphosis of the ruling bureaucracy into a bourgeoisie. According to Trotsky, socioeconomic privileges and the political power of the Stalinist bureaucracy were closely related to the relative isolation and economic backwardness of the Soviet Union. He predicted that as long as it remained isolated, the Soviet Union would come under increasing economic and military pressure from the advanced capitalist countries. After an initial investment-driven economic boom, the country would sooner or later suffer from economic stagnation and crises. Trotsky argued that should the working class fail to overthrow the bureaucracy through a ‘political revolution’ and combine socialist construction in the country with a clearly internationalist policy to accomplish world revolution (for which the reconstruction of the Communist International was absolutely necessary), the ruling bureaucracy might view capitalist restoration as a way to overcome the impasse of ‘socialism in one country’.[17] Although Li’s analysis has idealistic tones (especially when he talks about the bureaucrats’ ‘abandoning [of] their original revolutionary ideals’), he clearly attempts to underline this causal relationship between economic backwardness and isolation and capitalist restoration. Interestingly, there is not a single reference to Trotsky’s work in Li’s book.
This omission seems to be related to a deeper problem in Li’s analysis of the past and present of Chinese socialism. Li glosses over Mao Zedong’s responsibility in the degeneration of Chinese socialism and places the blame exclusively at the door of Deng Xiaoping and his fellow capitalist-roaders. This approach is clearly visible in his remarks regarding the Cultural Revolution. For Li, in the early years of the Cultural Revolution, large sections of the population enjoyed de facto freedom of speech and association. Mass organizations took over power in many cities. Many were inspired by the aspiration for a truly democratic and egalitarian socialist society (p. 30).
He then goes on to explain its failure:
Unable to win the support from the majority of the Party and state bureaucrats, Mao Zedong made one last attempt to save the revolution by directly calling upon the workers and the young students to rebel against the bureaucracy. But the workers and the student rebels were politically inexperienced and divided. The Party and state bureaucrats survived the initial panic and organized counter-attacks. In many cities, the army intervened to support the established bureaucrats. Radical workers and student rebels were brutally repressed. By 1969, the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution came to an end (p. 18).
Li then stresses the unsustainability of China’s hostility to both the US and the USSR during the 1960s. He adds that China started to import technology from the West and Japan and normalised its diplomatic relations with the US during the 1970s, before Mao’s death (pp. 18–19).
The problem with Li’s narrative is his exoneration of Mao(ism) from any responsibility for these events. As Yiching Wu’s careful research on rebel politics during the Cultural Revolution demonstrates, these organisations indeed represented a genuine attempt to counter the growing problem of bureaucratisation and establish a truly democratic socialism. In a political context where explicitly non-Maoist discourse was not allowed and all political organisations (including those waging bloody fights against each other) had to formally present themselves as Maoist, rebel organisations also used a specific interpretation of Maoism to enlist the working masses for anti-bureaucratic mobilisation. As Wu shows, by using an increasingly critical tone against the party-state and insisting upon continuing mass mobilisation until the establishment of a genuine socialist democracy through direct representation of the workers and peasants (with frequent references to the example of the Paris Commune), rebel politics soon trespassed the boundaries set by Mao himself. That is why, instead of countering it, the Maoist leadership actually supported the army’s bloody repression of these rebels.[18] Wu carefully demonstrates the causal links between the suppression of the rebels in 1968–9, the ensuing de-radicalisation/degeneration in the 1970s, and capitalist restoration after 1978.[19] In addition to suppressing the anti-bureaucratic socialist mobilisation, Mao and his allies also insisted on the unscientific description of the USSR as an imperialist and fascist country[20] and gradually established an anti-Soviet axis with the US in the 1970s, which helped the eventual victory of capitalist restoration in China.[21] Neglecting these factors is an important shortcoming of Li’s book.
The political significance of this shortcoming regarding the Maoist experience becomes clear in Li’s discussion of left-politics in contemporary China. Li concludes his book by stating that, ‘as capitalism ceases to be a viable economic and social system, humanity will have to ask if there is any economic and social alternative to socialism, however socialism will come to be defined in the twenty-first century’ (p. 192). Li’s emphasis on the actuality of socialism is laudable. However, his expression ‘however socialism will come to be defined’ requires some caution since he apparently has quite a broad definition of socialism. Li notes that the CCP faction led by Bo Xilai ‘advocated greater state control of the economy and some redistribution of wealth from the capitalist class to the working class’ (p. 36). Other observers similarly defined Bo Xilai’s so-called ‘Chongqing model’ as one based on the mixed economy aiming to pursue complementary growth of the state sector and (national and foreign) private capital.[22] A mixed economy with some redistribution is hardly socialism! Hence, Li’s praise of the ‘Chongqing model’ throughout the book (pp. 1, 15, 36–8, 192) is hardly compatible with his view of socialism as the only viable alternative to capitalism. It gives the impression that he confuses the rejection of neoliberalism with socialism.
In the light of the failures of Stalinism, social democracy, and left-populism, which have led to the disillusionment of the masses with socialist politics in the past and today, distinguishing socialism from other left-projects by stressing its strictly anti-capitalist, egalitarian, democratic and internationalist character is immensely important. Doing otherwise would risk the workers in China and elsewhere undergoing similar tribulations yet again, which would sooner or later help capitalism to recover from its crises. Hence, reading Li’s valuable work critically will help us to think deeply about socialist politics in contemporary China and elsewhere.
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Arrighi, Giovanni 2007, Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the 21st Century,London: Verso.
Bramall, Chris 1995, ‘Origins of the Agricultural “Miracle”: Some Evidence from Sichuan’, The China Quarterly, 143: 731–55.
Bramall, Chris 2004, ‘Chinese Land Reform in Long‐Run Perspective and in the Wider East Asian Context’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 4, 1/2: 107–41.
Carchedi, Guglielmo 2011, ‘Behind and Beyond the Crisis’, International Socialism, 132, available at: <http://isj.org.uk/behind-and-beyond-the-crisis/>.
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Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao,Hongqi andJiefangjun Bao 1970, ‘Leninism or Social-Imperialism? – In Commemoration of the Centenary of the Birth of the Great Lenin’,Peking Review, 17: 5–15.
Gray, Jack 1990, Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to the 1980s, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Huang, Philip C.C. 1990, The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350–1988, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Huang, Philip C.C. 2011, ‘Chongqing: Equitable Development Driven by a “Third Hand”?’, Modern China, 37, 6: 569–622.
Hung, Ho-fung 2016, The China Boom: Why China Will Not Rule the World, New York: Columbia University Press.
Li, Huaiyin 2009, Village China under Socialism and Reform: A Micro History, 1948–2008, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Li, Minqi 2008, The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World Economy, London: Pluto Press.
Meisner, Maurice 2007, Mao Zedong: A Political and Intellectual Portrait, Cambridge: Polity Press.
O’Brien, Kevin J. and Lianjiang Li 2006, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pun, Ngai and Huilin Lu 2010, ‘Unfinished Proletarianization: Self, Anger and Class Action of the Second Generation of Peasant-Workers in Reform China’, Modern China, 36, 5: 493–519.
Roberts, Michael 2016, The Long Depression: How It Happened, Why It Happened, and What Happens Next, Chicago: Haymarket Books.
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Shaikh, Anwar 1978, ‘An Introduction to the History of Crisis Theories’, in US Capitalism in Crisis, New York: The Union for Radical Political Economics.
Sicular, Terry 1993, ‘Ten Years of Reform: Progress and Setbacks in Agricultural Planning and Pricing’, in Economic Trends in Chinese Agriculture: The Impact of Post-Mao Reforms, edited by Robert F. Ash and Y.Y. Kueh, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Silver, Beverly and Lu Zhang 2009, ‘China as an Emerging Epicenter of World Labour Unrest’, in China and the Transformation of Global Capitalism, edited by Ho-fung Hung, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Trotsky, Leon 1983 [1936], The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union and Where Is it Going?, translated by Max Eastman, New York: Pathfinder Press.
Vukovich, Daniel F. 2018, Illiberal China: The Ideological Challenge of the People’s Republic of China, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
Walker, Kathy Le Mons 2006, ‘“Gangster Capitalism” and Peasant Protest in China: The Last Twenty Years’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 33, 1: 1–33.
Wang, Hui 2009, The End of the Revolution: China and the Limits of Modernity, London: Verso.
Wang, Hui 2016, China’s Twentieth Century: Revolution, Retreat and the Road to Equality, edited by Saul Thomas, London: Verso.
Wu, Yiching 2014, The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Xu, Zhun 2012, ‘The Chinese Agriculture Miracle Revisited’, Economic and Political Weekly, 47, 14: 51–8.
Xu, Zhun 2013, ‘The Political Economy of Decollectivisation in China’, Monthly Review, 65, 1: 17–36.
Zhao, Yuezhi 2012, ‘The Struggle for Socialism in China: The Bo Xilai Saga and Beyond’, Monthly Review, 1 October, available at: <http://monthlyreview.org/2012/10/01/the-struggle-for-socialism-in-china/>.
[1]Lisuggeststhat ‘thestudentmovementhadthesupportofthegreatmajorityofurbanresidentsthroughoutthecountry. Topursuethisoption, however, theliberalintellectualsandstudentshadtobewillingandabletomobilizethefullsupportoftheurbanworkingclass. ThiswasaroutethattheChineseliberalintellectualssimplywouldnotconsider’ (Li 2008, p. xiii). WangHuimakesasimilardiagnosis,albeitwithaless-blamingtone: ‘Thefailureofthemovementisdirectlyattributabletoitsviolentsuppressionbythestate. Yet, indirectly, itisalsoattributabletothemovement’sinabilitytoestablishbridgesbetweendemandsfordemocraticpoliticsanddemandsforequality, aswellasitsinabilitytoformastablesocialforce. Thismadeitimpossibletolinkthemovement’sdirectgoalswithitsmaterialconditions’ (Wang 2009, p. 35).
[2]Li 2008, p. xiv.
[3]Li 2008, pp. xvi–xvii.
[4]TheworksofWangHui, probablythemostprominentfigureofthe ‘ChineseNewLeft’, arethebestexamplesofthissocial-democraticperspectiveanditsparticularreadingofMaoism (Wu 2009; Wu 2016). On the socio-political context of contemporary Chinese social democracy, see Vukovich 2018, pp. 54–6.
[5]Li 2008.
[6]AverysimilaranalysisofthehistoricalbackgroundofChina’srisesincethe 1980scanbefoundinHung 2016, pp. 34–51.
[7]Arrighi 2007, p. 351.
[8]SilverandZhang 2009; PunandLu 2010.
[9]Shaikh 1978.
[10]Carchedi 2011. ForagoodcomparisonofMarx’slawofthetendencyoftherateofprofittofallwithothercrisis-theories, seeRoberts 2016, pp. 9–30. OnthepoliticaldifferencebetweenMarxistandunderconsumptionisttheoriesofcrisis,seeSavran 2013, p. 168.
[11]Li 2009, pp. 267–8; Xu 2013.
[12]TerrySicularprovidesthebestempiricalaccountofthisruralpopulistturninChinabetween 1978 andthemid-1980s (Sicular 1993).
[13]ContrarytothestandardmainstreamaccountclaimingthatdecollectivisationplayedakeyroleinincreasingagriculturalproductivityinChinabetween 1978 and 1984, theavailableempiricalevidenceshowsnosignificantrelationshipbetweenthetwo (Bramall 1995; Huang 1990, pp. 222–51; Xu 2012). ItisthereforehardtodisagreewithChrisBramall’scontentionthat ‘theprimarymotivationbehindtheimpositionofdecollectivizationin 1982–3 wasundoubtedlypolitical. Deng’snewregimewaseagertobuildsupportinthecountryside, anddecollectivizationservedthatpurposebycreatinganewclassofcultivatorswhohadalargestakeinthenewsystem’ (Bramall 2004, p. 125). ItseemsclearthattheChinesegovernment’srapidincreaseoftheprocurementpricesoffarmproductsandsignificantcutsinagriculturaltaxessimultaneouslywiththedecollectivisationreformsignificantlyhelpedtolegitimisethelatterintheeyesofthevillagers.
[14]Ontheabsenceofthepeasantryfromtheprotestmovementsofthe 1980s,seeWang 2009, pp. 23, 28. Ontheemergenceoftheruralcrisisandtherisingtideofruralprotestinthe 1990s,seeDay 2013, p. 940; O’BrienandLi 2006; Walker 2006.
[15] Li 2008, p. 60.
[16]Trotsky 1983.
[17] ‘Thejuridicalandpoliticalstandardssetupbytherevolutionexercisedaprogressiveactionuponthebackwardeconomy, but upontheotherhandtheythemselvesfelttheloweringinfluenceofthatbackwardness. ThelongertheSovietUnionremainsinacapitalistenvironment, thedeeperrunsthedegenerationofthesocialfabric. A prolongedisolationwouldinevitablyendnotinnationalcommunism, butinarestorationofcapitalism (Trotsky 1983, pp. 300–1).
[18]ForsimilaraccountsdemonstratingMao’spersonalresponsibilityintherepressionoftherebelmovementin 1967 and 1968, seeGray 1990, pp. 353–65; Meisner 2007, pp. 178–86.
[19]Wu 2014. The major problem in Wu’s (otherwise very insightful) account is the absence of systematic analysis of the relationship between the PRC’s international isolation, economic backwardness (despite the strong growth performance during the Mao era), and the problem of bureaucratisation.
[20] Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao,Hongqi andJiefangjun Bao 1970, p. 7.
[21] For a detailed analysis of the geopolitical dimensions and consequences of the Sino-American alliance against the Soviet Union, see Ali 2005. With its patronising and nationalistic attitude towards the PRC, Soviet bureaucracy (from Stalin to Brezhnev) played a significant role in the aggravation of Sino-Soviet relations. Ali’s book shows that both sides of the Sino-Soviet conflict sought the cooperation of the USA against the other and the PRC won that competition (Ali 2005, pp. 63–72). The Sino-Soviet conflict was one of the most shameful episodes of the history of the international left and played a significant role in the transition to capitalism from Eastern Europe to East Asia in the 1980s and 1990s. A Marxist analysis of it that goes beyond geopolitics is still lacking. We also lack a historical-materialist account of the relationship between the relatively backward, isolated and bureaucratic character of the PRC, the defeat of the anti-bureaucratic movements in the late 1960s, the Sino-American alliance of the 1970s and the PRC’s gradual transition to capitalism from the late 1970s onward.
[22]Huang 2011; Zhao 2012.
Soviet Archaeology in Theory and Practice

A Review of Ancient Irrigation Systems of the Aral Sea Area: The History, Origin, and Development of Irrigated Agriculture by Boris V. Andrianov, andSoviet Archaeology: Schools, Trends, and History by Leo S. Klejn
Marcus Bajema
Independent Researcher, The Hague, Netherlands
mjbajema@hotmail.com
Abstract
In this review-article, I discuss one aspect of the history of Soviet science, that of archaeology. This subject has not received much attention, but nevertheless should be of interest to Marxists today, both for its successes and its failures. The two books under review are complementary, in that one gives a general picture of the initial development and mature existence of Soviet archaeology, while the other presents the fruits of a specific research project in Central Asia. Further thoughts are added on what the findings of Soviet archaeologists have to offer contemporary Marxism, especially with regard to comparative studies of early class societies.
Keywords
Marxism – archaeology – Soviet Union – Khorezm
Boris V. Andrianov, (2016) Ancient Irrigation Systems of the Aral Sea Area: The History, Origin, and Development of Irrigated Agriculture, edited by Simone Mantellini with the collaboration of C.C. Lamberg-Karlovsky and Maurizio Tosi, Oxford: Oxbow Books,
Leo S. Klejn, (2012) Soviet Archaeology: Schools, Trends, and History, translated by Rosh Ireland and Kevin Windle, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
As noted by Leo Klejn in his book, Soviet archaeology has by and large remained what he terms a ‘Great Unknown’ in the West.[1] Examples to back up this statement are not hard to find in the literature. One book that explores the relationship between archaeology and Marxism in general ignores the USSR, without providing any explanation for this.[2] Similarly, a review-article on the same topic holds Soviet archaeology to be intrinsically uninteresting because of the dogmatism that results from state interference.[3] Even a more sympathetic account of the archaeology of the USSR remains oblique.[4] In general, despite a few exceptions, in-depth engagements with one of the main forces of twentieth-century archaeology are simply lacking.[5]
This is unfortunate, as the October Revolution provided the impetus for the encounter of Marxism and archaeology. Marxism had not seen any significant engagement with archaeology at a methodological level before 1917. Some of the early Soviet work in the 1930s was pioneering for the discipline as a whole, such as the sociological interpretation of artefacts or the use of scientific techniques to study the history of tools.[6] The impact of this encounter was felt beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, either through its impact on a Western archaeologist such as Gordon Childe,[7] or directly through the scientific ties between socialist nations.[8] The pivotal role of Soviet archaeology demands an understanding of its characteristics, whether or not one agrees with its positions. Furthermore, there existed considerable diversity in the Marxist approaches of different Soviet archaeologists, and their work should not be conflated with Stalinist dogma.
The two books reviewed here therefore provide a much-needed service, even if they are translations of works published much earlier.[9] New chapters have been added to Klejn’s book, however, and the Andrianov volume benefits from the helpful explanatory essays that have been added to it. Both men began their career in archaeology in the last years of Stalin and can be seen as insider figures of Soviet archaeology. Klejn’s book discusses the schools and ideas of Soviet archaeology as a whole, as well as its personalities and debates. By contrast the work of Andrianov is very specific in providing an account of ancient irrigation systems in the Aral Sea area, one that is explicitly guided by Marxism-Leninism. The two books complement each other in that one discusses general ideas, while the other outlines the application of specific ideas within the setting of a major Soviet research project.
Soviet Archaeology and its Phases
Before turning to Soviet archaeology proper, it is necessary to establish the preconditions for the encounter between Marxism and archaeology. Interestingly, both evinced important parallels in their initial development in the nineteenth century. Both derived from the Enlightenment, yet in separate ways they each also initiated significant breaks with it. In the case of archaeology, in the nineteenth century it developed the Three Age system of stone, bronze, and iron ages. This build upon earlier ideas put forward by Mercati and others in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which were themselves partially derived from the Epicurean work De rerum natura by the Roman poet Lucretius.[10] In the Renaissance and Enlightenment, the ideas of Lucretius were extended beyond archaeology to broader, philosophical discourse on the development of society, as reflected in various schemes of stadialism.[11] These schemes indicated a new approach to history, but there was no scientific procedure to establish their validity.
It was the method of ‘closed finds’ developed by Scandinavian archaeologists, starting with Thomsen, in the early nineteenth century that allowed for the scientific demonstration of the validity of the Three Age system.[12] ‘Closed finds’ refers to objects found together in archaeological contexts certain to be roughly contemporary, such as graves and hoards. Based on the copious archaeological material in the Danish national museum, Thomsen was able to determine that finds occurring together in closed contexts could be grouped into distinct sets. These distinct sets formed the basis for a sequence of stone, bronze, and iron ages, the absolute dates for which were set first by connections with historically-known cultures and later, in the twentieth century, by dating methods based on the physical sciences. Furthermore, through archaeological and other sources such as environmental studies, the characteristics of each of the three ages could be analysed in a more refined and reliable way than in the Greco-Roman and Enlightenment speculations on the contents of these stages.
The subsequent demonstration of the enormous time-depth of the geological history of the earth, together with the establishment of the phases of the Old Stone Age (Palaeolithic), led to the emergence of archaeology as a rigorous scientific discipline. Another new development was that Marx and Engels went beyond stadialism in theoretical terms, by outlining with precision what lay behind the historical process: the fundamental role of social labour for the reproduction of humankind. By starting with the forces and relations of production, modes of production could be recognised. These modes of production in turn formed the economic basis for the political and ideological patterns of a variety of social formations. In a well-known passage from Capital, Marx outlined what this means for the reconstruction of history:
Relics of bygone instruments of labour possess the same importance for the investigation of extinct economic formations of society as do fossil bones for the determination of extinct species of animals. It is not what is made but how, and by what instruments of labour, that distinguishes different economic epochs. Instruments of labour not only supply a standard of the degree of development which human labour has attained, but they also indicate the social relations within which men work.[13]
This passage of Marx is pregnant with implications for archaeology, and the usefulness of that discipline for Marxist understandings of history. However, while Marx and Engels clearly saw the need for knowledge about the pre-capitalist past, archaeology as a discipline remained firmly within the institutional clutches of nation states. Changing intellectual trends in the later nineteenth century resulted in archaeology becoming dominated by cultural-historical approaches, including in imperial Russia.[14] At a technical level the methods developed by Scandinavian archaeologists were used to delineate regional variations in a much more refined way, by distinguishing sets of finds not just by age but also by their cultural distinctiveness from contemporary neighbours. The cultural-historical approach, though far from uniform, favoured highly particularistic accounts of cultures and explained change by reference to ethnic migrations. The October Revolution provided a break with this pattern in creating a new kind of state animated by Soviet power, which in turn led to a new kind of archaeology. Klejn looks at Soviet archaeology from different perspectives: generations, personalities, and research trends and debates. There is a clear advantage in this, as it allows him to give an intimate and multi-faceted account of the field in which he made his scholarly career.
Yet despite the clarity of his language, the book remains hard to grasp for outsiders, mainly because of the diffusion of discussion on what were distinct phases in the development of Soviet archaeology between different chapters on debates, personalities, and so on. This diffusion can be seen very well for the initial development of archaeology along Marxist guidelines in the late 1920s and 1930s. This topic is treated directly in seven different chapters on trends, debates and key personalities. Yet for the reader not well-versed in the period it is a challenge to piece together these different fragments into a coherent whole. For example, the crucial early role of RANION in the late 1920s and early 1930s is not discussed in depth, or even explained, but mentioned only in passing in the biographies of key figures.[15] Furthermore, Klejn notes how one of these individuals, the archaeologist A.V. Artsikhovsky, was later accused of following the ideas of Bukharin,[16] but no mention is made of the important role Bukharin played in RANION. In this way, the account given by Klejn remains oblique at points, owing to the diffusion of crucial episodes between a large number of chapters. A more conventional chronological account would have brought the different strands together, though at the cost of sacrificing some of the diversity highlighted by Klejn.
The history of Soviet archaeology begins with the signing by Lenin of the decree establishing the Russian Academy of the History of Material Culture (RAIMK, later renamed GAIMK) on 18 April 1919. Yet the engagement between Marxism and archaeology in the post-revolutionary period started slowly, owing to the material realities of the civil war and its aftermath. From Klejn’s book it becomes apparent that there are three features basic for an understanding of Soviet archaeology. The first of these factors is the continuous expansion of research in terms of the number and scale of expeditions and investment in field techniques and laboratory facilities, reflecting the priority given to science by the state. Second, archaeology in the USSR was defined and integrated institutionally as part of history departments. The ultimate aim of archaeological research was to contribute to resolving the great questions of history, rather than those of the natural sciences (as for many pre-revolutionary Russian archaeologists) or those of anthropology (as in the USA).
Finally, Klejn notes the pervasive atmosphere and language of struggle in Soviet praxis, both for socialism and against the forces opposing it.[17] Although he does not explicitly mention the term, it is hard to separate Klejn’s account of struggle from Lenin’s notion of partiinost, implying the necessity to take a position supporting the party and foregoing misguided pretensions of non-partisanship. This notion of struggle persisted throughout the life of the USSR, but was most pronounced, and carried the most serious consequences, during the years of Stalin, who adapted it for carrying out his Purges. The notion ofpartiinost and the Stalinist persecutions should not be conflated, however, as the latter precisely involved the establishment of the power of the bureaucracy that Lenin feared.[18]
Dialectically, the struggle for a Marxist archaeology also implied a struggle against something else, this something else being the pre-revolutionary cultural-historical archaeology that was focused on using archaeological materials to trace ethnically-based cultures and their migrations. This approach was now referred to pejoratively as ‘artefactology’, to be replaced by an approach that seeks to trace productive forces and social relations in different periods through archaeological finds. The photograph of an exhibition at GAIMK in 1933 in Klejn’s book visualises this shift in emphasis, which goes to the core of what archaeology is about as a discipline.[19] Instead of tracing ethnic groups, Soviet archaeologists would now pioneer new methods for analysing tools for use-wear, for reconstructing Palaeolithic settlements, and for inferring social relations from burials. These things would not be treated on a similar scale in Western archaeology until the 1960s.[20] Yet the adoption of such methods in Soviet archaeology was not simply a struggle to replace older ideas by new ones, it also involved intense struggles between individuals and institutions that in the end served to undermine the fruitful application of the new methods.
Initially the struggle for a sociological approach to archaeological remains, and, in parallel, the struggle against artefactology, was relatively clear-cut and limited to rhetorical attacks. However, in the 1930s the praxis of struggle in combination with Stalin’s purges led Soviet archaeology to go off the rails. The initial phase in this can be seen in the campaign against a group of Moscow archaeologists associated with RANION. In 1929 this group had put forward a set of ideas for a Marxist archaeology based on what they called the ‘ascending method’. In their vision archaeology could move from the reconstruction of productive forces (the base) through the remains of tools toward relations of production, political systems, and ideology (the superstructure). These ideas came under attack from Leningrad, where GAIMK researchers faulted the Moscow group for isolating archaeology from history. In their view, archaeology should concern itself solely with describing the remains it uncovers, and leave interpretation to history as an overarching discipline. The institute in which the Moscow group was working was disbanded, and its members forced to recant their ideas in order to join the new Moscow branch of GAIMK.
The Communist Party leadership of GAIMK favoured stadialism, grouping the archaeological remains together with other sources in a succession of modes of production. Their approach is different from the philosophical stadialism of the Enlightenment, while also adding what may be seen as a sociological approach to the technical stadialism of the Three Age system used in archaeology. These additions consisted of sophisticated causal explanations of historical change, as opposed to cultural-historical references to ethnicity, and the outline of modes of production. Yet the stadialism of the USSR in the 1930s is peculiar, and should be distinguished from other Marxist versions of stadialism. This is because the initial Soviet perspective on stadialism was shaped by the linguistic theories of N.I. Marr, who was one of the few prominent members of the Russian Academy of Sciences to welcome the Bolshevik revolution. Klejn describes Marr as being strong in literary philology but prone to flights of fancy in linguistics, focusing on doubtful reconstructions of phonetic correspondences between otherwise highly-distinct languages. These ideas were rejected by linguists in Russia and the West alike.
Marr’s initial ideas on the class character of works of literature were extended later to include language itself, thus not just linguistic expressions of ideology but phonetics itself had to be grasped through the lens of social relations. Hence the development of language can be included within a stadialist scheme of development, as noted by Klejn:
The Japhetic and Indo-European language families turned out to be not local formations, not groups of related languages (languages interconnected through their descent from a common ancestor), but ubiquitous stages in the development of speech. The foundation of this development was not a segmentation of ethnic groups and languages, not a division, but on the contrary hybridization and merging: from a multitude of tribal dialects, through a number of stages, to a future common language of humanity. Not only an identical pattern of thought, but allied to it a unified grammatical structure for languages at one and the same stage, was determined by economic and social similarity.[21]
Because of his support for Soviet power and his pre-revolutionary credentials, Marr’s star rose rapidly and he was to add leadership of GAIMK to that of the Oriental faculty. From this position of power, he employed the language of partiinost to establish his linguistic theories as the paramount ones in Soviet scholarship. The critics of his ideas were said to belong to the enemy camps of the West and of those stuck in pre-revolutionary mentalities, while Soviet science supposedly made breakthroughs in linguistics not limited by the old dogmas. Furthermore, in this phase of the history of the USSR the theories of Marr were in line with the Communist Party’s policies on nationalities, since, as Klejn notes, Stalin himself endorsed the future merging of all languages into a single one for all humankind.[22] The struggle in scholarly discourse mirrored that of power, and this would have ramifications beyond the propagation of erroneous theories like that of Marr. From the early 1930s archaeologists had been arrested for various reasons, especially in the Ukraine, but in 1937 with the coming of the Great Purge the GAIMK itself was liquidated and its Party leadership and their associates were executed. Archaeology was put back into the more conventional setting of the universities and the Academy.
The war then led to the loss of many more archaeologists. In its aftermath smaller purges picked off yet more people, now including the followers of Marr’s version of stadialism who were being accused of ‘cosmopolitanism’. The result of all this was that after its initial promising start, Soviet archaeology was severely hampered in its engagement with Marxism by the impact of ideological struggles for and against. Nowhere can this be seen better than for Stalin’s version of stadialism of the Short Course of 1938, with its succession of primitive-communal, slave-holding, feudal, capitalist, and socialist modes of production.[23] As an organising principle for a book on Soviet archaeology published in 1955 and translated into English in 1959, it presents a disjointed picture of the history of the lands that make up the USSR. Slices of the archaeological record are treated as exemplars of certain modes of production, such as the slave-holding states of the Greco-Roman northern Black Sea coast,[24] but no coherent thread emerges to connect the different parts. Here stadialism is upheld theoretically, but fails to persuade in practice. This was the result not just of ideology, for the materials of Soviet archaeology proved insufficient for a synthesis by the very sympathetic Marxist archaeologist Gordon Childe, as noted by Klejn.[25]
One interested outsider has noted that the key problem of Soviet archaeology was the inability to properly allow data to modify and rework its theories, owing to the constraining political factors.[26] Yet this neglects that in a socialist state, politics and scholarship are not readily separable, as the goals of understanding, criticising, and changing the world depend on each other. What matters, rather, are the specifics of the political programme being pursued. Klejn’s discussion of the post-Stalin developments in Soviet archaeology makes this clear. Especially after Khrushchev’s thaw the intensity of partiinost lessened, although it certainly did not disappear. For archaeology this meant the co-existence of multiple trends. As noted by Klejn,[27] the so-called ‘autochthonists’, who emphasised the long-term continuity of peoples, were the most powerful group in archaeology from the middle of the 1950s to the end of the USSR.
Based on the chauvinism of the late Stalin era and the rejection of Marr and ‘cosmopolitanism’, their work sought to boost patriotism by proving the autochthony of the Slavs and other important ethnic groups in the Union. Their work essentially retraced the methods of cultural history and its association with nationalism, albeit in the different context of Soviet power and its policy on nationalities. It was in this domain that struggle still played an important role, as can be seen in Klejn’s overview of the debate on the influence of the migrants from Scandinavia (the Varangians) on the medieval kingdom of Kievan Rus’.[28] Acknowledging the important role of these Varangians, an idea actually closer to Marxism than its opposite, carried with it the threat of persecution for its supposed anti-Soviet and unpatriotic stance.[29] Yet the focus on ethnicity was far from exempt from critical discussion, and never dominant in the sense of crowding out other approaches.
As discussed by Klejn,[30] new research trends emerged that improved methodology in the description of archaeological remains, the study of the technologies behind these remains, and in studying their ecological context. Marxism was not neglected either, its emphasis on a materialist account of history coexisting with the cultural-historical focus on ethnicity. Apart from a short-lived attempt under Khrushchev to try to reinstate Marr and his ideas, the main current through which Soviet archaeology engaged with Marxism was through a form of sociology, which had been banned by Stalin. Klejn calls this ‘archaeological sociology’, and criticises the trend for its separation of the archaeological remains and theoretical models, while also noting the willingness of its participants to engage with Western authors.[31] As the book by Andrianov is part of this trend, this criticism of Klejn will be addressed as part of the review of that book.
Ancient Khorezm and the Comparative Study of Irrigation-based Productive Forces
One shortcoming of Klejn’s book is that the major archaeological projects of Soviet archaeology are mentioned only in passing, as part of the careers of individuals or to illustrate a scholarly debate. The result is that his book sometimes seems quite abstract, rather than being rooted in what the trowel and the brush brought to light. It is here that the book by Andrianov on the irrigation systems of the Aral Sea area can be useful for providing a good example of Soviet archaeology getting to work on its materials. Andrianov’s work was part of the Khorezm Archaeological-Ethnographic Expedition (KhAEE), established under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1937. The term ‘Khorezm’, also known under its Greek rendering ‘Chorasmia’, refers to a large oasis region in the delta of the Amu-Darya (Oxus) river, presently divided between Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In antiquity and medieval times Khorezm was home to an urban civilisation with a distinct state and intellectual tradition, forming part of a broader Iranian cultural sphere through linguistic affinity. The task of the KhAEE was to study the historical trajectory of this area from prehistory to the present, using a combination of large-scale excavation, aerial and field surveys, as well as ethnographic and environmental studies. To contrast this region with a nearby one, research was also carried out in the delta of the Syr-Darya (Jaxartes) river. The scale of research and the combination of different field methods were then without parallel in world archaeology, as noted by US scholar Lamberg-Karlovsky in one of the introductory articles to Andrianov’s book.[32]
Although initiated and led in its first decades by S.P. Tolstov, the KhAEE outlived him and work in the field continued until 1997. Its collective ethos of purpose, honed in the often-difficult conditions of fieldwork, allowed other individuals to develop their own research skills and interests within the signposts of the overall project. Andrianov’s work on irrigation is a good example of this, carried out in the field with Tolstov and guided by the priorities of Soviet science, but with the synthesis and conclusions formulated as befits a formidable scholar in his own right. It is important to emphasise that major field projects would serve to enable and direct individuals to pursue research topics, something left largely unaddressed in Klejn’s emphasis on personalities and ideas. Of course, the need to fund large-scale projects also raised their societal relevance. The prominent role for the study of irrigation by the KhAEE is connected by Andrianov to the drive to revitalise the lands of Central Asia after the revolution, based on a directive by Lenin.[33] In a ‘combined approach’ the historical component is indispensable for modern irrigation efforts, and in his conclusions Andrianov directly connects his research to Soviet policy.[34] The past is in this sense inseparable from the present, and it includes not just an understanding of the physical geography of the Khorezm region, but also the long-term societal development that took place there.
The key advantage of a project such as KhAEE is that it can allow for the development of a causal framework relating the natural environment to the development of the forces and relations of modes of production, as well as the political and ideological patterns of social formations. Andrianov’s perspective on this needs to be grasped in the context of 1960s Soviet geography. Whereas Stalin had initiated a struggle against ‘geographical determinism’ in the late 1930s, in the 1960s his view was explicitly rejected by the Party and, as a consequence, understanding the role of the natural environment in the development of society could be pursued anew.[35] Again, this shows the presence of living and creative versions of Marxism that were able to challenge Stalinist dogma. Key influences on Andrianov in this regard were the pre-revolutionary Russian geographers D.N. Anuchin and L.I. Mechnikov, the work on plant domestication by N.I. Vavilov, as well as the work of Marx and Engels (in particular the Dialectics of Nature and theAnti-Dühring). Contemporary scholars, both from the West and the USSR, also receive much attention.
Andrianov’s perspective clearly acknowledges the role of nature in shaping the development of society, yet he also explicitly rejects a mono-causal role for nature in social changes such as the collapse of states and urban civilisations.[36] He seeks to understand the interplay between the environment, technology, and ideological and political structures within a dialectical causal framework. Furthermore, this dialectical understanding of the relation between humans and nature is not something applied to the evidence after it has been gathered, but is intrinsic to the combined use of the methods of the natural and the social sciences. As much becomes clear in Andrianov’s conceptualisation of the landscape as an archaeological feature in itself:
The cultural landscape is a complex natural-historical formation, in which the effects of influences of different historical periods are gradually accumulated. In every historical period the influence of society on the environment has been limited by the degree of knowledge of natural laws and the level of technological development, which in turn was determined by the laws of social development. Under the influence of different forces, continuous changes take place in the environment, the result of which have an impact on the earth’s surface, space and time. Landscapes have their own history.[37]
Grasping the history of the landscapes of Khorezm and the Syr-Darya delta was made possible by the combined methods of aerial and field survey, environmental and ethnographic studies, and large-scale excavations. The strategy of research is inseparable from the theoretical perspective that informs it, calling into question the applicability to Andrianov’s work of Klejn’s notion that ‘sociological archaeology’ used models from outside archaeology in a cosmetic way. Clearly, the close interface between theory and practice of the ‘combined approach’ raises the question of how the findings are to be evaluated. Assuming a reasonable correspondence between the archaeological remains and the reconstructions of the KhAEE,[38] the criterion hinges on the coherence of the interpretation of the long-term historical development of the Khorezm and Syr-Darya delta areas. In this regard the book is a great success. While the terminology is that of ‘orthodox’ Marxism, the evidence from the field prevents its concepts from going stale. Like the desert soils being rejuvenated after receiving water from irrigation works, Andrianov’s conceptual apparatus gains a sharp, critical edge upon engaging with the archaeological evidence for the development of irrigation. This evidence entails not just Khorezm, but also similar cases from Eurasia, Africa and the Americas.
For the development of irrigation in general, Andrianov argues that it was coeval with the emergence of agriculture itself.[39] He follows Vavilov in recognising a number of distinct regions for the origin of plant cultivation, as illuminatingly illustrated in figure twelve.[40] In the initial development of irrigation, humans adapt their technological schemes to what nature has shown them to work. The themes of learning from natural examples and adapting ‘nature’s techniques’ recur at several points in Andrianov’s book, not least in the development of irrigation in Khorezm.[41] A distinction is made here between irrigation schemes adapting themselves to nature and those able to control the flow of water,[42] the latter being associated with the emergence of class society and the development of the Khorezmian state. Based on the archaeological research, Andrianov is able to recognise a succession of different irrigation techniques, each successively more complex.[43] These advances in the forces of production can be related to three different kinds of relations of production, which in succession are the prehistoric communal, the antique slave-owning, and the medieval feudal modes of production.
The evidence for the prehistoric period is limited, though some irrigation systems have been dated to the later second millennium BC and the first centuries of the first millennium BC. These were relatively small-scale systems adapted to natural features. Based on estimates of the length, width, and depth of the canals, Andrianov is able to estimate the amount of labour that would have been required to both construct them and to keep them from silting up. These estimates are based on the evidence from Sumerian texts that a working man with a metal shovel can move three cubic metres per day, lowered by Andrianov to two cubic metres per day for pre-metal periods. The amount of labour estimated for the best-known prehistoric irrigation system is estimated at around one hundred workers, congruent with the size of the excavated village next to it.[44] In very generic terms, Andrianov notes that the subsistence strategies of prehistory seem to resemble those of recent communities in the area such as the Karakalpaks.[45] He refrains, however, from using the ethnographic materials to infer relations of production for the prehistoric period. In general, Andrianov applies commendable caution when adequate sources are not available, noting the diverse possibilities offered by the limited evidence.
The next major period is that of antiquity (in Russian: antichnost),[46] which covers the sixth century BC through the fourth century AD. This period marks the emergence of cities, advanced craft-work, Zoroastrianism and sciences associated with it, and of course the state and class-society. Although at times forming part of the Achaemenid and Sassanid Persian empires, the Khorezmian state was mostly independent, and notably its capital Toprak-kala was excavated by KhAEE.[47] With the development of cities, there also emerged a countryside with farmsteads for the cultivation of grains and vines. The water that these plants required was supplied by new kinds of irrigation works that could draw water directly from the river, and which extended for tens or even hundreds of kilometres. The labour that went into constructing and maintaining different irrigation works was estimated by Andrianov at thousands of workers, in some areas more than the estimated population.[48] For him this implied the coordinating force of the state, the ability to compel that he had already inferred for ancient Egypt,[49] though others had earlier noted the possibility of communities working together to create a larger irrigation system.[50]
A number of arguments help to bolster Andrianov’s case, albeit indirectly as direct textual evidence for the organisation of labour is lacking. Not only were the labour requirements outstripping the demographic base of localities, the initial returns of labour were also meagre as inefficient systems limited the amount of land that could receive water from irrigation works.[51] Furthermore, he contrasts the elaboration of irrigation systems in Khorezm with the enduring simplicity of irrigation in the Syr-Darya area, also studied by KhAEE, where a central state organisation never emerged.[52] For Andrianov these factors point to a pattern of compulsion for huge labour mobilisations to construct and maintain the irrigation works, while cultivation still took place within a communal framework.[53] As time passed, irrigation systems and cultivation became more efficient, with the chingir water-lifting device of the medieval period making possible a much more refined system for supplying fields with the much-needed moisture.
After the collapse of antique society between the fourth and sixth centuries AD, the later medieval period saw the reconstruction of the Khorezmian state along feudal lines. The irrigation works were rebuilt too, now so efficient that the labour demands could be met by the higher population densities enabled by the higher agricultural productivity.[54] Overall, Andrianov succeeds in tracing the long-term development of the forces and relations of production together, taking into account the structuring role of the land yet also noting that cycles of growth and collapse cannot be understood apart from social relations.[55] His dialectical method is also integral to the field techniques of the KhAEE, as the notion of the cultural landscape mediates between the combination of techniques used for studying it archaeologically and the interpretation of the historical interplay between the forces and relations of production in the Khorezm region. As such, the book by Andrianov mitigates Klejn’s conclusion of the separation between the Marxist models of the ‘sociological school’ of Soviet archaeology and the archaeological sources it investigated.
Conclusion
The KhAEE and Andrianov’s book detailing its study of past irrigation reflect the paradoxes of Soviet archaeology well. Its founder S.P. Tolstov created a cosmopolitan and egalitarian safe-haven within its confines, including for many people of Jewish backgrounds, yet he was also a co-author, in 1937, of an article on methods of sabotage in archaeology and ethnography.[56] Another paradox is that Andrianov’s work, so well-supported and apparently congruent with state policy, had very little impact. A new cultural landscape appeared after the 1960s in the form of the dried-up Aral Sea bed, illustrating how the relations of production can be more destructive than many a force of nature. Being distinguished neither for its ethics nor for its effectiveness, there is little to glorify in Soviet archaeology in the way Klejn notes was common, especially in the Brezhnev period.[57] Yet the phenomenon of Soviet archaeology should not be dismissed out of hand, and its more creative attempts to connect Marxism to the archaeological sources ought not be obscured by Stalinism.
Rather, the reader of Andrianov and Klejn might ask what was particularly distinctive about it, what distinguished it from Western archaeology. According to Klejn there is little to distinguish Soviet archaeology as Marxist,[58] but a comparison with Western approaches shows that this is not the case, especially considering the role of the productive forces. Andrianov showed that an emphasis on the role of productive forces could produce good work. His model of humans first learning irrigation from natural examples and then creating techniques to control rivers applies ideas that go back to the works of Greco-Roman philosophers, such as Epicurus’s Letter to Herodotus.[59] Marx’s contention that the labour of animals is one-sided, determined by their physical and mental abilities, but that humans produce universally,[60] allowed him to extend these Classical insights to capitalism and its antecedents. Soviet archaeologists further used Marx’s ideas to provide a theoretical basis for comparing the historical trajectories of different world regions.
A good example of this is the work by V.M. Masson to develop a scheme of early civilisations (or early class society) in the New and Old Worlds based on distinct kinds of agriculture.[61] Some of his conclusions have to be modified based on new evidence.[62] Yet the notion that differences in the basic agricultural techniques, which constituted the main productive forces in early civilisations, are the key to understanding their development remains plausible for Western researchers too.[63] Soviet scholars also solved the problem of the broader social-geographical contexts, noting the importance of broader interaction spheres for the development of early civilisations and other kinds of societies.[64] Of particular note has been the idea of ‘metallurgical provinces’ characterised by distinct ways of metal-working, with vast spatial extensions across Eurasia.[65] These provinces have attracted considerable interest from Western scholars as a way to grasp the long-term historical trajectories of larger areas, unconstrained by the confines of the conventional division into culture-based areas.[66]
Taken together, these studies can be used to investigate the differences between world regions in terms of agriculture and technology. For example, the different crops in Eurasia and Mesoamerica, together with the initial lack of metallurgy in the latter, explain important differences in the forms of urbanism and historical trajectories of these two regions.[67] In this regard the Soviet emphasis on productive forces allowed it to break new ground, both methodologically in the introduction of new methods for studying artefacts and theoretically in its approach to cross-cultural comparison. These Soviet studies are of particular relevance in light of recent calls to engage again with the ecological dimension of Marxism,[68] especially considering recent discussions on the so-called Anthropocene.[69] Some authors in this trend have shown an interest in and an appreciation for certain aspects of ecological work in the USSR,[70] and the archaeological strand of this work should be considered as well.
Regardless of such achievements, a major outstanding problem in Soviet archaeology was relating the productive forces, accorded a primary role, to political systems and cultural phenomena. Here shortcomings can be noted in particular in the historical understanding of culture, as can be seen in the discussion of Zoroastrianism in Andrianov’s book.[71] It is not plausible to suppose that the essence of this great religion, which endures today, is really to be seen as the outcome of a struggle between nomadic and settled herders. It is not that there were no good approaches to culture in Soviet archaeology, as an extensive 1970s debate on the origin of art makes clear,[72] but the problem remained of relating them to the productive forces. It is here that Western Marxism made greater strides, in its recognition of the key role of the relations of production as an intermediary for political and cultural phenomena.[73] Using new models, the emphasis on the relations of production enabled Western Marxist archaeologists to understand and compare the various social formations across the world.[74] Furthermore, it also enabled them to develop more refined models on the social role of cultural phenomena.[75]
The different understanding of the balance between the forces and relations of production may be one of the reasons why there has been so little engagement with Soviet archaeological studies by Western Marxists. Yet the Soviet failure to adequately grasp the sequence of relations from the forces to the relations of production, and further to politics and culture, is interesting in itself. The problem was certainly recognised. For example, a philosophically-inclined Soviet historian such as Eero Loone argued for a model that explores the relations between economic, administrative, and mental forms of activity in a non-deterministic way, though still within a coherent framework that begins with the productive forces.[76] Social science can then investigate the variation between different societies through a programme of comparative research, ascertaining global differences in connections between economies, political systems, and cultural phenomena.[77] It may be that this form of Marxism does not explain everything about society, but it would be enough to sustain a Marxist political praxis that can understand the world and is internally pluralist and democratic.[78]
Western Marxists have argued that comparative studies of past social formations have an important part to play in bringing about a form of socialism than is democratic and pluralist, by showing how the past has impacted contemporary society and what alternatives existed.[79] The focus on the relations of production and a neglect of the forces of production make it more difficult, however, to adequately grasp the ecological challenges facing humankind today. Therefore, the challenge still seems to be to develop a framework that can allow the productive forces a significant role alongside the relations of production. The Lucretian notion of aleatory materialism developed by Althusser can be helpful in this regard, because despite its emphasis on the relations of production it also recognises the independence of elements that have combined after their encounter.[80] The recognition of the plurality of different temporalities allows for understanding the relations between different elements historically,[81] eradicating lingering effects of stadialist approaches. In developing this framework, it can be useful to learn from the experiences and findings of Soviet archaeology as related in the books of Andrianov and Klejn.[82] Hopefully in the future more translations of some of the major Soviet archaeological works will appear.
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Andrianov, Boris Vasil’evich and L.F. Monogarova 1976, ‘Lenin’s Doctrine of Concurrent Socioeconomic Systems and its Significance for Ethnography’, Soviet Anthropology and Archaeology, 14, 4: 3–26.
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[1] Klejn 2012, p. 3.
[2] Patterson 2003.
[3] Tantaleán 2014, pp. 4683–4.
[4] Trigger 2006a, pp. 326–44.
[5] A clear exception is the unpublished PhD dissertation by Jovan Howe on Soviet theories of the development of humankind and the first phase of history shaped by the communal mode of production (Howe 1980).
[6] Semenov 1964.
[7] See the chapter on Childe in Klejn’s book and Trigger 1980 for an overview of his intellectual development. Childe’s Marxist views are succinctly outlined in Childe 1954.
[8] For example, Soviet archaeology powerfully shaped that of China in the 1950s, establishing long-lasting patterns; see Zhang 2011.
[9] Klejn’s book was originally published in Russian in 1993, that of Andrianov in 1969.
[10] Clarke 1968, pp. 4–8.
[11] Wilson 2016.
[12] Trigger 2006a, pp. 121–38.
[13] Marx 1976, p. 286.
[14] Trigger 2006a, pp. 248–61.
[15] Klejn 2012, pp. 237, 243, 289, 291. An initialism of ‘Russian Association of Social Science Institutes’, RANION brought together established but non-Marxist academics with the new Bolshevik generation. As an influential lecturer there, Bukharin advocated a view of historical materialism that put forward an internal relation between society and nature, rather than that these were part of two distinct realms. As noted by Howe in his 1980 dissertation, these views were specifically targeted by another perspective, one that emphasised the internal development of society as external to nature (Howe 1980, pp. 115–20).
[16] Klejn 2012, p. 242.
[17] Klejn 2012, pp. 86–8.
[18] Lewin 2005, pp. 80–3.
[19] Klejn 2012, p. 29, figure 2.10.
[20] Trigger 2006a, p. 344.
[21] Klejn 2012, p. 203.
[22] Klejn 2012, p. 209.
[23] Stalin 1939, p. 103.
[24] Mongait 1959, pp. 185–217.
[25] Klejn 2012, pp. 168–73.
[26] Trigger 2006a, p. 344.
[27] Klejn 2012, pp. 53–4.
[28] Klejn 2012, pp. 115–20.
[29] As noted by Klejn, the role of the Varangians was acknowledged by Marx and the prominent early Soviet historian M.N. Pokrovsky, but this became unacceptable in the chauvinistic atmosphere of the later Stalin period (Klejn 2012, pp. 115–17).
[30] Klejn 2012, pp. 73–9.
[31] Klejn 2012, pp. 69–72.
[32] Andrianov 2016, pp. 37–9.
[33] Andrianov 2016, p. 65.
[34] Andrianov 2016, p. 254.
[35] Stalin justified his position on the peculiar basis that changes in geography take place over much longer periods than changes in the development of society; see Stalin 1939, p. 118. Here the natural environment and human history are walled-off from each other as if they were separate spheres. For a good contemporaneous account of the 1960s debate, see Matley 1966.
[36] Andrianov 2016, pp. 253–4.
[37] Andrianov 2016, p. 78.
[38] The technical volumes of the data used in Andrianov’s book are not readily available, yet the book itself does contain technical descriptions that are accompanied by photographs and illustrations revealing much detail of the archaeological findings.
[39] Andrianov 2016, p. 98.
[40] Andrianov 2016, pp. 266–7.
[41] Andrianov 2016, p. 69.
[42] Andrianov 2016, p. 146.
[43] Andrianov 2016, p. 250.
[44] Andrianov 2016, pp. 150–3.
[45] Andrianov 2016, pp. 143–4.
[46] The term antichnost refers to the ‘Classical’ cultures of the first millennia BC and AD, and unlike as in Western archaeology it refers to the broad geographical sphere of the Classical world oroikoumene and not specifically to Greece and Rome. Hence, it also includes the Achaemenid Persian empire. See Khatchadourian 2008 for Soviet studies ofantichnost in the Caucasus.
[47] Mongait 1959, pp. 270–2.
[48] Andrianov 2016, pp. 158, 167, 189.
[49] Andrianov 2016, p. 115.
[50] Mongait 1959, p. 265. The potential for self-organising communities to create larger-scale irrigation works is emphasised in recent Western studies; see, for example, Stride, Rondelli and Mantellini 2009.
[51] Andrianov 2016, p. 160.
[52] Andrianov 2016, pp. 248–9.
[53] Andrianov 2016, p. 250.
[54] Andrianov 2016, p. 179.
[55] Andrianov 2016, pp. 253–4.
[56] Arzhantseva 2015.
[57] Klejn 2012, pp. 41–2.
[58] Klejn 2012, p. 145.
[59] Where he posits that the human development of technology was initially driven by imitation and adaptation of natural features, see Inwood and Gerson (eds.) 1994, p. 16.
[60] Marx 1976, pp. 283–4.
[61] Masson 1988, p. 129.
[62] The idea that Mayan civilisation was sustained by slash-and-burn agriculture has since been refuted by new archaeological research. See Houston and Inomata 2009, pp. 233–9.
[63] Blanton 2004; Scarborough 2003.
[64] Masson 1988, pp. 111–22.
[65] Chernykh 1991.
[66] Goody 2012; Wilkinson 2014.
[67] Kohl and Chernykh 2003; see also Chernykh 2011. Andrianov in his book also noted these Old and New World differences, based on the original formulation of Engels (Andrianov 2016, pp. 133–4).
[68] Foster and Burkett 2016.
[69] Kunkel 2017.
[70] Foster 2015.
[71] Andrianov 2016, pp. 153–4.
[72] Running for several years in the journal Soviet Anthropology and Archaeology, starting with Stoliar 1977.
[73] See Patterson 2003, chapters four and five, for an extended discussion of Western Marxist approaches to archaeology, which focus almost exclusively on delineating forms of society and their transformations.
[74] Trigger 2003. See McGuire 2006 for the relationship between Trigger’s work and that of Childe.
[75] Routledge 2014.
[76] Loone 1992, pp. 159–65.
[77] Bashilov and Gulyaev 1990, p. 13.
[78] Pluralism would arguably have been possible in Bukharin’s approach to Marxism and science, but it can be most clearly recognised in the writings of the later 1960s. As noted by Howe in his 1980 dissertation, a comprehensive effort took place to reinvigorate Marxist views of world history through the internationalist series The Laws of History and the Concrete Forms of the World-historical process (Howe 1980, pp. 290–301). Only the first volume on prehistory appeared in 1968, with the overall effort meeting the same dismal fate as the contemporaneous Prague Spring.
[79] Trigger 2006b.
[80] Especially significant in this regard is his discussion of the mode of production in the light of aleatory materialism; see Althusser 2006, pp. 197–203.
[81] Morfino 2014, pp. 152–64. Note here the difference with Stalin’s contention, discussed in Footnote 35, that history and the environment cannot be discussed together, as their distinct temporalities prevent interaction.
[82] Andrianov’s work on the KhAEE, in particular the contrasts drawn between Khorezm and the Syr-Darya, seems quite compatible with the perspective in aleatory materialism of history as a sequence of encounters and non-encounters. In this regard, it is also important to note the existence of different modes of production existing side by side in broader geographical areas; see Andrianov and Monogarova 1976. The potential connection of aleatory materialism to the notion of combined and uneven development, as outlined by Van der Linden 2007, needs to be further explored.
Half-Buried Books: The Forgotten Anti-Imperialism of Popular-Front Modernism

A Review of Anti-Imperialist Modernism: Race and Transnational Radical Culture from the Great Depression to the Cold War by Benjamin Balthaser
Františka Zezuláková Schormová
Department of Anglophone Literatures and Cultures, Charles University, Prague
schormof@ff.cuni.cz
Abstract
The text is a review of Benjamin Balthaser’s Anti-Imperialist Modernism: Race and Transnational Culture from the Great Depression to the Cold War (University of Michigan Press, 2016).
Keywords
Benjamin Balthaser – anti-imperialist modernism – transnationalism – Popular Front – 1930s
Benjamin Balthaser, (2016) Anti-Imperialist Modernism: Race and Transnational Radical Culture from the Great Depression to the Cold War, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
In his poetry collection entitled Dedication, Benjamin Balthaser writes about American Communists’ experience in the 1950s of burying incriminating books. The cultural artefacts of the Popular Front that he discusses in his bookAnti-Imperialist Modernism: Race and Transnational Culture from the Great Depression to the Cold War did not literally have to be buried, but nevertheless they were suppressed and refashioned and their original message was forgotten inwhat Alan Filreis calls the ‘ruthless campaign to deradicalize modernism’.[1] Filreis, one of the pioneers of the reconsideration of the period, suggests that this campaign still resonates in criticism. Balthaser’s book adds new perspectives to this thesis and enriches the field by exploring the international allegiances of the Popular Front, challenging the Cold War version of the movement.
There have been several reconsiderations of 1930s culture and its image since the end of the Cold War, most notably by Barbara Foley, Alan Wald, Alan Filreis, Cary Nelson, and others (Balthaser also frequently refers to the cultural historian Michael Denning and the literary scholar Laura Doyle). Balthaser broadens his critique by drawing attention to transnational allegiances of the time. Cuba, Haiti, the Soviet Union and Mexico do not only serve as destinations, they actively participate in creating anti-imperialist modernism.
The first chapter, ‘This Land Is My Land: Cuba and the Anti-Imperialist Critique of a National-Popular Culture in the United States’, deals with the journeys of Clifford Odets, Langston Hughes, Josephine Herbst and Ernest Hemingway to Cuba. Balthaser analyses different ways in which they represent the island in their writings, and how they, through Cuba, perceive the interconnections between empire, race and class. According to Balthaser, the cultural memory of the Popular Front is dominated by its nationalist wing: these text and stories provide a counter-narrative.
In the second chapter, ‘Travels of an American Indian into the Hinterlands of Soviet Russia: Native American Modernity and the Popular Front’, Balthaser introduces yet another aspect omitted from the usual narrative of the 1930s. Here, it is transnational socialism and the internationalist vision of Native American identity. He focuses on the journey of a Nez Percé anthropologist Archie Phinney to the Soviet Union, in order to underline the Native community’s involvement with the far left and its transnational allegiances. This journey is discussed in relation to Native American fiction, especially D’Arcy McNickle’s novel The Surrounded (1936). The literary modes of Native American self-determination and self-expression do not, in Balthaser’s view, clash with modernism: on the contrary, they become an expression of it.
Modernist aesthetics and its reorientation is the topic of the third chapter, ‘The Other Revolution: Haiti and the Aesthetics of Anti-Imperialist Modernism’. Two examples of this reorientation are Orson Welles’s screenplay for an adaptation of Heart of Darkness (1939) and C.L.R. James’sThe Black Jacobins (1938). Both use Haiti as the site from which to reconsider modernism. According to Balthaser, both Welles’s script and James’s book locate modernism not outside of, but rather at the very heart of the colonial project. Furthermore, the chapter links these works to the Hands-Off Haiti campaign, illuminating the complex relationship of anti-fascism and anti-imperialism, a topic that recurs throughout the book.
After Cuba, Haiti and the Soviet Union, Balthaser turns his attention to California. In the fourth chapter, ‘The Strike and the Terror: The Transnational Critique of the New Deal in the California Popular Front’, he introduces representations of New-Deal California that are vastly different from the representations familiar from John Steinbeck’s novels or Dorothea Lange’s Farm Security Administration photographs. These present, he argues, a patriarchal, conservative and racially bounded narrative. He provides a counter-narrative of the US working-class left by exploring contemporaneous labour journals. The journals (often written in Spanish) link violence against workers in the US to US imperial violence abroad. Here, Balthaser also focuses on visual representation, examining photographs of bodies of workers: the wounded, broken bodies of colour are juxtaposed with Lange’s white families.
In the next chapter, ‘An Inland Empire: Fascism, Farm Labor, and the Memory of 1848’, attention is drawn to the way in which Emma Tenayuca, Carey McWilliams and Carlos Bulosan used the memory of the contestation of Mexico to address the present crisis in their writing. Balthaser reads them together with Mexican-American and Filipino journals in order to demonstrate how the memory of 1848 served as a link between the discourse of anti-fascism and the critique of imperialism. By showing that the anti-imperialist and anti-fascist campaigns had a common vocabulary and agenda, he presents another counter-discourse to the memory of the Popular Front as legitimising imperialist nations in its anti-fascist efforts.
‘Cold War Re-Visions: Red Scare Nationalism and the Unmade Salt of the Earth’ is the title of the final chapter. Here, Balthaser provides background to one of the main claims that underlie the book: that our vision of the Popular Front and its place in cultural memory was significantly shaped by the Cold War. This is explored through his discussion of the 1954 motion pictureSalt of the Earth, which depicts the Mine-Mill Local 890 strike. Balthaser compares the original script, which was the result of collaboration between the Old Hollywood Left and the Mine-Mill labour union, with the final motion picture. While the unpublished original script drew connections between the systematised violence against women, people of colour, and the workers in the US and US foreign policy, in the actual motion picture, the internationalist critique was suppressed. The tension between the original script and the motion picture reveals new perspectives on contemporaneous cultural production, its aims and limits: the internationalist vision of the labour and Civil Rights movement, inherited from the prewar years, was no longer held to be practicable.
The story of Salt of the Earth, the last gasp of Popular Front modernism, closes the narrative of the book. The Popular Front is traditionally associated with anti-avant-garde cultural production aimed at a wide audience: through his critical attention to Popular Front modernism, Balthaser joins Nelson, Filreis and others who explored the range of relations between radical engagement and modernist literature. Balthaser locates modernism in the Global South, in the former colonies, in bodies of colour, in popular stories. He does not attempt to construct an alternative canon of modernism. He argues that modernism was the first global art form, and that anti-imperialism runs in its blood. The changing social and cultural imagery challenged the notion of empire, national identity, race, class, and also gender.
In Anti-Imperialist Modernism, the Popular Front is seen as a movement with international allegiances and an international cultural conscience, a movement that was able to link the violent domestic politics of the US and its imperialism abroad in a new way, and in the process accommodate various forms, genres, and sites of resistance. However, Balthaser does not deny the deep ambiguities of the period of thisalliance between radicals, socialists and liberal Democrats. His aim is not only to recuperate forgotten texts but alsoto ‘restore an entire web of connections’.[2] By presenting authors, texts and cultural artefacts that draw from these connection, Balthaser challenges the simplistic narrative of a notionally cosmopolitan 1920s and nationalistic 1930s. In his attempts to stress the continuous history of the American left, Balthaser’s project ties in with that of the main chronicler of the US ‘Literary Left’, Alan M. Wald. Often, Balthaser challenges Wald’s understanding of the Popular Front. Wald has dealt with the subject repeatedly, exploring the forms of the Popular Front’s patriotism and also its cultural production. As he writes in one of his early essays, ‘radicalism’s traditional ties with the avant-garde were definitely broken during the Popular Front’.[3] Wald explored the exclusions made in the name of the anti-fascist mission in the second book of his American Literary Left trilogy, Trinity of Passion: The Literary Left and the Antifascist Crusade: ‘The Popular Front strategy would leave unaffected the homegrown racists, fascists, and other reactionary forces, who would make no comparable sacrifice of their own.’[4] Despite his more critical attitude towards both the cultural production and the politics of the Popular Front, Wald has always attempted to challenge the homogenised version of the past. Balthaser’s project therefore does not appear as contradictory to, but rather a logical continuation of this process. Balthaser’s thesis also complements current reconsideration of the 1950s. The Cold War influenced not only the cultural production of its time, but also how New Deal culture was seen: the result was, as Filreis puts it, ‘the version of the “thirties” constructed in the “fifties”’.[5] Cary Nelson shows how this version was universally accepted: academia, himself included, was ‘trapped within that ideology and that impoverished memory for more than thirty years. But we ceased to see it as an ideology and instead lived it as one, as a self-evident fact of nature.’[6] Political decisions determined by historical situations and framed as purely aesthetic became an integral part of later narratives concerning the 1930s. Here, Balthaser harmonises with Nelson, who claims that the depoliticised canon of modernism is the ‘discipline’s testimony before HUAC’.[7]
Among other things, an international perspective was lost in this testimony. As Balthaser stresses in the last chapter, the Popular Front was gradually forced to defend its Americanness, and prewar allegiances were forgotten. The fighters for Civil Rights had to give up their international perspective in order to push through domestic changes: in this respect Balthaser’s text resonates with reconsiderations of the Civil Rights movement, as triggered by Mary L. Dudziak’s Cold War Civil Rights (2000).
In order to complicate a ‘sanitized, nationalist 1930s nostalgia’,[8] Balthaser combines literary and discursive analysis with meticulous archival research. The scope of his materials is admirable: pamphlets, newspapers, novels, poetry, scripts, motion pictures, photographs. The scope further strengthens his view of modernism as a broad movement that did not limit itself only to apocalyptic poems and experimental prose. He applies various theoretical approaches without stating one dominant method or theory: in his analysis, he relies on Transnationalism, Foucauldian power analysis, postcolonial theory (most significantly, there is an unacknowledged debt to Edward Said’s 1993 book Cultureand Imperialism), and others. Also, the bilingual scope of the chapters on California is noteworthy: in presenting Spanish-language materials, he implicitly detracts from the notion of anti-imperialist modernism as an exclusively anglophone project.
The range and scope of the materials is sometimes overwhelming. However, Balthaser organises them well, and his line of argument remains clear. One the other hand, the chapters often read like separate articles (two chapters, the second and the sixth, had been published previously). The book suffers somewhat from the lack of a Conclusion: the final chapter, which deals with Cold War revisionism, does not draw together the issues discussed throughout the text. Occasionally, one can spot errors, such as Franz Werfel’s unfortunate loss of a syllable when he is described as ‘Austrian-Jewish [author] Franz Werf’![9]
The book is dedicated to Balthaser’s grandfather, Hyman Mozenter, ‘who as a union organizer, victim of the Cold War blacklist, and unrepentant revolutionary set an example for the entire family and is the reason I write what I write.’[10] The ways past leftist engagement can contribute to the present are stressed in the book: Balthaser often links the prewar movements to more-recent events, such as the Occupy Wall Street movement or the opposition to the Iraq War (the Black Lives Matter movement is not mentioned, but its complicated relationship to the US leftist scene also ties in with Balthaser’s argument). He claims that the leftist movements of today could profit from the forgotten transnational perspectives of the 1930s: in his view, latent anticommunism from the 1950s onwards is the reason why social movements lost not only these perspectives, but also international solidarity. As he writes, ‘rather than looking at the Popular Front for seeds of its own failure, activists and intellectuals today can learn much from the multiple entry points thismovement has left available to us.’[11] Or, as Wald puts it in his article ‘Marxism in Noir’,
The way we remember our past governs our own dreams for the future. […] Sooner or later, we look to the past for shared, or at least recognizable, political experiences that might be retrofitted and rebooted; tactics and strategies that have succeeded or failed; causes and explanations for economic and social trends that have persisted or morphed; and even role models, candidly reported, for how to live our chosen lives as Marxists. Marxism doesn’t embalm history; it seeks to join a living past to present changes.[12]
Anti-Imperialist Modernism is an important contribution in the struggle to revive the legacy of the 1930s left. It recovers the cultural production of a whole generation and draws attention to the anti-imperialist modernist vision of these creators. In doing so, it forces us to reconsider modernism, to reconstruct forgotten transnational allegiances, and to see the Popular Front anew. Because of the range of sources it relies on, it is not only useful for historians and scholars of literature, but also brings new perspectives to studies of race and ethnicity, Indigenous Studies, Working Class Studies, Film and Media Studies, and others, and should be read by activists and the general public interested in social change.
References
Balthaser, Benjamin 2016, Anti-Imperialist Modernism: Race and Transnational Radical Culture from the Great Depression to the Cold War, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Filreis, Alan 2008, Counter-revolution of the Word: The Conservative Attack on Modern Poetry, 1945–1960, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Nelson, Cary 2003, Revolutionary Memory: Recovering the Poetry of the American Left, London: Routledge.
Wald, Alan M. 1992, The Responsibility of Intellectuals: Selected Essays on Marxist Traditions in Cultural Commitment, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
Wald, Alan M. 2007, Trinity of Passion: The Literary Left and the Antifascist Crusade, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Wald, Alan M. 2016, ‘Marxism in Noir’, International Socialist Review, 101, available at: <https://isreview.org/issue/101/marxism-noir>, accessed 26 November 2017.
[1] Filreis 2008, p. 20.
[2]Balthaser 2016, p. 31.
[3]Wald 1992, p. 93.
[4]Wald 2007, p. 49.
[5] Filreis 2008, p. xi.
[6] Nelson2003, p. 68.
[7]Ibid.
[8]Balthaser 2016, p. 36.
[9]Balthaser 2016, p. 204.
[10]Balthaser 2016, p. vii.
[11]Balthaser 2016, p. 223.
[12]Wald 2016.
Dutch capitalism and slavery
Pepijn Brandon
In 1944, the Caribbean anti-colonial thinker Eric Williams wrote his classical work Capitalism and Slavery. The book argued that the enormous wealth that Britain pumped out of the slave-plantations in the West-Indies in the eighteenth century contributed significantly to the Industrial Revolution, and thereby to the birth of modern capitalism. For 75 years now, historians have debated the merits of the “Williams’ Thesis”. But in this discussion, the Netherlands and its colonial empire have been largely ignored. Often quite conservative imperial historians in the Netherlands saw the question of slavery’s contribution to capitalism as irrelevant because the Netherlands was so much later than Britain in going through its industrial revolution. This argument conveniently ignored the great importance of Dutch commercial capital to the wider breakthrough of European capitalism. In general, these historians usually argued that the contribution of slavery in the Dutch West Indies was small. They also tended to treat the history of colonisation, violence and slavery in the Americas as completely separate from the history of Dutch colonialism in Asia, as if the two had nothing to do with each other. However, on all three counts, the narrative is now shifting, even among historians working in the Netherlands. This can help to provide a basis for rewriting the history of the global involvement of the Dutch empire in slavery, that brings together the Atlantic and Indian Ocean world and that shows how the wealth amassed in both hemispheres fed into European capital accumulation, with Dutch capital in the role of initiator, enforcer, organiser, and intermediary.
Dutch merchants were involved in global slavery from the sixteenth century onwards. They remained so until the first half of the 1860s, when the Dutch were the last European nation to formally abolish slavery in its colonies. Even then, the Dutch stipulated further forced labour from their formerly enslaved subjects. In the East Indies, this was organised in the form of the “cultivation system”, which had already replaced slavery by other types of coerced labour in the preceding period. In Suriname and other Dutch Caribbean colonies, the emancipation decree of 1863 demanded another ten years of “apprenticeship” on the plantations, in which the African population was obligated to keep on working for their former masters. The role of the Dutch Empire in global slavery was extensive, including the transportation and sale of hundreds of thousands of captives in both the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean region, and the operation of slave labour in colonies that at various points of time included Northern Brazil, New Amsterdam (now New York), Suriname, South Africa, today’s Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and many other parts of Asia. The first large-scale “experiment” with plantation slavery by the Dutch did not take place in the West, but on the nutmeg-producing Banda Islands in the Southern Moluccas, after VOC-governor Jan Pieterszoon Coen organized a genocidal campaign against the indigenous population. In most areas under VOC-control, however, the Dutch combined slavery with many other forms of forced labour. This was different in Atlantic colonies such as Suriname, that became organised completely around the institution of largely African plantation slavery and in which other forms of coerced labour like white indentured labour or forms of enslavement of the indigenous population were pushed to the margins.
As for Britain and France, the largest surge of this “classical” form of commercial slavery that was central to Eric Williams’ argument in the Dutch Empire took place in the course of the eighteenth century, when Atlantic circuits of commerce and finance exploded on a massive scale. And, as Williams himself suggested many decades ago, the main revenues were not drawn from the slave-trade per se, but from the goods produced on the plantations by the back-breaking labour of the enslaved: sugar, coffee, tobacco, indigo, cacao and other products for European markets. My colleague Ulbe Bosma and have publishd a long article in the main Dutch journal for social and economic history that challenges the notion that the Dutch only drew marginal economic benefits from this eighteenth-century plantation slavery in the Atlantic world. The article sums up the results of the work of a team of researchers that for the past five years looked into the importance of slavery in the West-Indies for the Dutch economy. Taking as our starting point the year 1770, which was an average year for the second half of the eighteenth century, we show that 5.2 percent of the Dutch GDP was based directly on plantation slavery. That figure alone already shows that we are talking about a sizeable sector. Recently, a study executed by US economists working for the federal government concluded that the weight of the entire “digital economy” – Silicon valley, e-commerce, the digital infrastructure up to and including the cable companies – is around 6.5 percent of the US GDP today. However, a mere percentage of GDP only gives us one part of the story of the economic weight of slavery. It is also important to know where in the economy the revenues drawn from slavery landed up. In the case of the Netherlands, this was largely in the massive commercial sector located in the western part of the country, the Netherland’s richest province Holland. There, according to our calculation, by 1770 a massive 10.36 percent of GDP was based on Atlantic slavery. That this percentage was so high was a direct result of the importance of slave-produced goods in the Dutch trading sector, which still dominated the economy at the time. Of all goods that went through Dutch harbours, expressed in value, 19 percent was produced directly by slaves. Another 4 to 5 percent were goods to provision the plantations and the slave-ships.
Dutch capital profited not only from the exploitation of the slave-colonies controlled by the Dutch colonial companies and the state. From the time of the Dutch Revolt in the late sixteenth century onwards, Amsterdam had functioned as a crucial hub of wider European trade and finance. In the seventeenth century this distributing role had prominently included the trade in colonial goods, but in absolute terms European bulk carrying trade dominated the circuits of capital investment. This gradually changed in the eighteenth century, when the Dutch were outcompeted in other areas, but were able to compensate for this by the increasing weight of the trade in colonial goods from both the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean region. By the second half of the eighteenth century, the Dutch not only imported coffee and sugar from Suriname, but also handled millions of pounds of coffee and sugar produced on France’s main plantation colony St. Domingue. This relationship between the Dutch economy and St. Domingue persisted, until a revolution by the enslaved in 1791 led to emancipation and the forming of independent Haiti. Meanwhile, a tight network of bankers, merchants, mortgagers and financiers tied the still thriving Amsterdam financial market to planters in the Spanish colonies, the small Danish Caribbean colonies, and the US South.
These arguments for the Dutch Atlantic economy show that the question of the relationship between capitalism and slavery posed by Eric Williams should be approached in a much broader framework than just the connections between the British Industrial Revolution and Britain’s sugar complex in the West Indies. It also challenges the idea of some Dutch historians, that Atlantic slavery was only of marginal importance to the Dutch economy. But much more than that can be done, if the history of slavery is truly approached on a global scale. This does not necessarily mean a simple copying of the methods used to calculate the economic significance of Atlantic slavery and applying it to the VOC Empire. While, in the Atlantic world, plantation slavery became the point towards which all commercial activities gravitated, in Asia the colonial empires mostly combined many different forms of coerced labour at the same time, so that it becomes hard to estimate what constitutes profits from slavery per se. Also, by and large, plantations in the Atlantic world were owned directly by Europeans, while in Asia the VOC often relied on intermediaries such as kings, landed aristocracies, or Chinese merchants and tenant farmers. Perhaps more important at this stage than overcoming these difficulties for making precisely comparable calculations, however, is to face the challenge of bringing the underlying histories of colonial slavery into a common framework. The connections between slavery in the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean World did not end with the Dutch experiences with plantation slavery on the Banda Islands, that were carried over by VOC and WIC personnel across the oceans to the Atlantic world. They continued up to the era of the formal abolition of slavery, when Johannes van den Bosch oversaw the ‘modernisation’ of plantation slavery in Suriname before he became the organiser of the cultivation system on Java, and when indentured labourers from India and Indonesia were transported to Suriname to build the new coerced labour force after the 1863 Emancipation decree. Rewriting the history of Dutch colonial slavery in such a connected way would be greatly strengthened by cooperation between researchers working on these topics in Indonesia, the Caribbean, and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands itself, historians are gradually starting to come to terms with this more global story of slavery’s importance for Dutch capitalism. At long last.
The article was originally published on indoprogress.com on 27 June 2019, under the title Kapitalisme Belanda dan Perbudakan, https://indoprogress.com/2019/06/kapitalisme-belanda-dan-perbudakan/
Organised By Crisis

A Review of Fear City: New York’s Fiscal Crisis and The Rise of Austerity Politics by Kim Phillips-Fein
Michelle Esther O’Brien
Department of Sociology, New York University
michelleobrien@nyu.edu
Abstract
This article reviews the Marxist literature on the New York City fiscal crisis of 1975, putting into context the recent narrative history Fear City: New York’s Fiscal Crisis and the Rise of Austerity Politics by Kim Phillips-Fein. I argue the most influential account of the fiscal crisis, that provided by David Harvey’sA Brief History of Neoliberalism, can obscure the causes driving the generalisation of austerity politics. Instead, I turn to Robert Brenner’s account of the crisis as rooted in a global overcapacity in manufacturing. Phillips-Fein makes a valuable contribution in detailing how crisis organises elites, and how austerity can come to be seen as inevitable by social democrats.
Keywords
neoliberalism – austerity – New York City – fiscal crisis – social democracy – Kim Phillips-Fein – Robert Brenner – David Harvey
Kim Phillips-Fein, (2017) Fear City: New York’s Fiscal Crisis and the Rise of Austerity Politics, New York, NY: Metropolitan Books.
On 25 March 1976, student and faculty protestors occupied Hostos Community College of the City University of New York (CUNY) in the Bronx, New York. The working-class Puerto Rican activists, representative of the demographic of the school, were attempting to halt the school’s closure. They seized the custodial keys, wrapped chains and deadbolts around the building’s entrances, and barricaded doors with furniture. On the roof, student-government officers set up look-outs for police. In the President’s office, students set up a child-care centre. They hosted radical film screenings and teach-ins at the occupied school, and held discussions on a more dramatic revisioning of the school’s administration. On April 4, they were evicted by police, but by that summer the state legislature was to pass a measure that provided funding specifically ear-marked for Hostos. The same bill that saved Hostos, however, introduced tuition fees for the first time at New York City’s public university system.
Eugenio María de Hostos Community College had been opened in an abandoned tyre factory only six years previously, explicitly oriented towards Puerto Rican and other Spanish-speaking youth of New York. Hostos’s opening was part of a broader series of progressive changes which CUNY had implemented in response to mobilisations by Black and Puerto Rican students. Since its founding in 1847, CUNY had been free, designed to be accessible to working-class immigrants. Free higher education was one of the outstanding features of New York City, but prior to the 1960s its benefits were only readily accessible to white students. Inspired and shaped by the Civil Rights, Black Power, and Puerto Rican nationalist movements, student protests through the late 1960s successfully opened up the city’s schools to larger numbers of students of colour. Among the victories of anti-racist student mobilisations was the establishment of Medgar Evers College in Brooklyn, oriented to African-American students, and Hostos in the Bronx.
The occupation at Hostos was one of many protests against cuts to city-funded programmes throughout the city in 1975 and 1976, forced by events that came to be known as the New York City fiscal crisis. Six months prior to the occupation of Hostos, in October 1975, an alternative response to this fiscal crisis was evidenced in the teachers’ union president Albert Shanker’s capitulation in using union pension funds to purchase bonds issued by the city, their employer. At the end of 1974, the New York City government was running out of money. Financial executives cast increasing suspicion on the city’s years of heavy borrowing to fund its array of programmes on a dwindling tax base. With the global economic downturn of 1974, the financial firms that had long facilitated city borrowing now balked. Neither the New York State nor the Federal government was willing to lend the city bailout funds. Encouraged by the NYS Governor and the US President, a group of financial executives stepped forward to offer a solution: New York City needed to abandon its longstanding liberal, social-democratic legacy, to drastically cut its employees and programmes, and to adopt genuinely balanced budgets. Once the city had made dramatic enough changes, they argued, this would restore investor confidence in purchasing city bonds, and put the city on a sounder fiscal footing. The first configuration of financial intervention in the city was the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC), an entity composed of concerned financial executives that would play a determining role in city budgets, and in turn sell new, more reliable, bonds to investors. Initially, however, too few investors in the bond market were willing to purchasing MAC’s bonds.
Instead, MAC turned to the unions of the city’s own employees. Public-sector union presidents became convinced that bankruptcy of the city could mean an annulment of their collective bargaining agreements, and be a potential disaster for their members. (Their assessment of the dangers of bankruptcy in this political context were never tested or clear.) Beginning with AFSCME District Council 37, the unions devoted their own pension funds to purchasing MAC bonds at a moment when no other government entity or private-sector assistance was forthcoming. Through the autumn of 1975, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), representing all teaching employees of the city’s Department of Education, was in contentious contract negotiations with the city, battling massive teacher lay-offs and dramatic increases in classroom size. UFT president Albert Shanker balked at joining AFSCME in purchasing the city’s bonds.
On the evening of October 16, the executive board of the UFT voted not to purchase the bonds, citing concern about the wisdom of investing a massive sum of member pensions in unstable, fiscally-unsound city bonds. They left unstated the potential conflict of interests arising from the UFT having a considerable fiscal stake in their employer, or how this might be an abandonment of potential leverage over the contract-negotiation process. With the UFT pulling out, it seemed certain to all that the city was entering fully into default.
City-government officials spent all night planning how to proceed with default and steps towards filing for formal bankruptcy. That morning, the city stopped exchanging bonds that had become due. The city’s default was world news, horrifying officials across the US and Europe, and sending markets reeling. The night before, the Governor called Shanker’s personal friend, real-estate developer Richard Ravitch, to convince Shanker to change his mind. A police car had rushed Ravitch to Shanker’s apartment late that night. They talked through the night, and again the next day. In her 2017 book Fear City: New York’s Fiscal Crisis and the Rise of Austerity Politics, Kim Phillips-Fein writes:
Shanker went back to the governor’s office to meet the press around two in the afternoon. As he spoke to the reporters, looking worn and exhausted, he made it clear he was under pressure far more intense than he had ever anticipated. He still thought the mayor and the governor had been ‘extremely destructive’ to the school system and the entire frame of collective bargaining through their unilateral cuts. His union, he insisted, had been the victim of ‘blackmail.’ But it was an unusual sort of coercion, for no single individual could be blamed. ‘Look,’ Shanker told the crowd, ‘the pressure is not from the Governor, and it’s not from the Mayor. The pressure is from the situation.’ (p. 175.)
Ultimately, public-sector city unions would purchase $2.5 billion in MAC bonds, more than any other buyer. Bailing out the city led city unions to largely abandon an unwavering opposition to austerity cuts, and brought the interests of union presidents in line with those of financial executives in insisting on fiscal restraint.
Following World War II, New York City had the most comprehensive public goods available anywhere in the US: public hospitals and accessible health insurance, public housing and rent control, a cheap subway system, free high-culture public entertainment, comprehensive public libraries, and an unusually generous welfare system. All these programmes were accessible to the city’s poor and working-class people, including the city’s large immigrant and Jewish populations. These programmes were made possible by the political strength of the city’s working class, highly organised in unusually militant labour unions. Various policies limited access to these benefits for the city’s growing Black and Puerto Rican populations. In the 1960s, these communities successfully organised to gain access to the city’s social goods – to CUNY, to public-sector jobs, to trade-union power, and to welfare support. Yet the fiscal crisis put these programmes under unprecedented attack.
Through the 1960s, the city’s budgets had come under increasing strain. While Phillips-Fein only briefly outlines the prior causes of the fiscal crisis, other sources have identified them in more detail.[1] New York, the largest manufacturing centre in the country following the war, had deindustrialised much earlier and more rapidly than other cities. Industrial firms and many workers moved to the suburbs through the 1950s and 1960s. The financial industries and corporate headquarters of firms left in Manhattan used their political leverage to decrease their own tax burden. Through the late 1960s and early 1970s, the city had managed the decrease in the tax base through a significant growth in short-term loans and creative accounting. Through their refusal to purchase further debt at the end of 1974, the city’s banks had precipitated the crisis.
What followed was a year of high drama, and one of the most written-about and debated events in what came to be called the advent of neoliberalism. Financial executives and political elites began to see the crisis as an opportunity to forge a new political path for New York, and ultimately the country. Introducing tuition fees at CUNY was just one instance of a massive realignment of city policy away from meeting the needs of the city’s poor and working classes, and towards prioritising the interests of financial-services firms and professional elites. It was a turning point for American capitalism, and the political orientation of capitalist elites.
The narrative details of these two anecdotes – the Hostos occupation on the one hand, Shanker being pressured into purchasing city bonds on the other – are examples of the significant contributions offered by Fear City. The book’s name is taken from a campaign by the New York Police Department against lay-offs: flyers were distributed to tourists warning them they should take care in visiting ‘Fear City’, given the city government’s lack of commitment to public safety. In the myriad published accounts of the crisis, none have previously offered the rich description and riveting intrigue of Phillips-Fein’s writing. Addressing what could have been taken to be an already over-saturated topic, Phillips-Fein manages to make it refreshing and lively.
Phillips-Fein’s account is centred on a narrative of city-government political decision-making between 1974 and 1977. The book effectively depicts the changing temperament and expectations of actors as the crisis unfolded. What had seemed impossible at one point would abruptly shift, and suddenly felt inevitable. The Mayor, union presidents, the Comptroller, key financial executives – all were constantly revising their political calculus, their hopes and fears, and the range of what they believed they could accomplish. The first two-thirds of the book centres on the dramatic interplay between the city’s elites. The last section of the book centres on popular-resistance struggles in the face of the crisis, ranging from the protest at Hostos (dominating the chapter on CUNY) to an entire chapter on the 16-month occupation of a firehouse in Greenpoint-Williamsburg to stop its closure. Phillips-Fein demonstrates throughout a political sympathy for the city’s working-class movements, an appreciation of the city’s remarkable social-democratic programmes, and a recognition that events were the result of political decisions that could have been made differently.
Phillips-Fein’s extensive narrative does not include any major new theoretical arguments as to the causes of the crisis, nor as to its relevance for understanding the emergence of austerity politics. She features several highlights from the extensive resistance to budget cuts, but does not offer a systematic mapping of the city’s progressive movements, nor any speculation regarding what might have enabled these movements to be successful in halting austerity. The book traces Mayor Abraham Beame’s changing understanding of what the city was facing – from what he saw as a mean-spirited and unnecessary capital strike to an inevitable and necessary reckoning – without offering a fleshed-out independent assessment of these structural conditions. Instead, the new material is focused on the actors themselves: their biographical backgrounds, their personal networks, their changing motivations and worldviews, their concrete actions and the consequences. These actors she follows include a few social-movement leaders, mid-level financial executives, labour-union presidents and city-government officers. At this level of abstraction, her work is remarkable and successful.
If Phillips-Fein had chosen to make a new contribution to a structural understanding of the crisis, she would have had to contend with an already-crowded landscape of four decades of Marxist literature. For a time, New York’s fiscal crisis was a favourite topic of Marxist analysis, and has repeatedly surfaced as a concern to Marxist scholars.
In the midst of the city’s financial crunch, many critical and thoughtful accounts tried to make sense of its dramatic political implications. Published in 1977, immediately after the crisis, The Fiscal Crisis of American Cities collects many of the era’s social-democratic commentators’ analyses of the causes and implications of the crisis.[2] Some of these writers built dynamic careers critically responding to the political events the crisis engendered, including Francis Fox Piven, Kirkpatrick Sale, Robert Fitch, John H. Mollenkopf and William K. Tabb. Though written before the full political implications of the crisis became clear, this collection correctly assessed that city government was no longer an economically viable vehicle for progressive social-welfare initiatives. Suburbanisation and sunbelt migration of both firms and the middle class meant social welfare could only be sustained through taxation that extended beyond the borders of cities. Phillips-Fein echoes these conclusions when she briefly sketches one of her only counterfactual scenarios: ‘One can even imagine that the fiscal crisis could have prompted some effort to redraw the boundaries between cities and their suburbs in ways that might make more resources available for city governments’ (p. 314).
Two of the book-length accounts subsequently written by the contributors to The Fiscal Crisis of American Cities are worth highlighting. William K. Tabb published the most thorough Marxist account of the crisis in 1982 withThe Long Default.[3] Tabb offers clear evidence challenging the growing conservative narratives of the crisis, rejecting accounts that blame greedy labour unions, lazy poor people of colour, or liberal indulgence. He traces the circulation of accounts of New York’s experience on the national political stage. Tabb makes the strongest claims for an alternative to the political conditions created by the crisis, concluding that locally-controlled institutions, a liberal–labour coalition infused with other social movements, and a ‘much wider concept of economic democracy’ could pursue national economic redistributive policies (p. 127).
Robert Fitch’s account of the fiscal crisis took a new tack, explicitly blaming the financial executives who had helped shaped city planning in the 1950s and 1960s, provocatively titling his book The Assassination of New York.[4] The book’s sensational cover featured Chase Bank president David Rockefeller driving a bulldozer through the city, figuratively representing his considerable role in forcing the city’s rapid deindustrialisation. My own independent research in the Rockefeller archives has corroborated Fitch’s accusations: In the two decades prior to the fiscal crisis, Rockefeller and others set out to remake New York by actively displacing manufacturing, wholesale and shipping firms from the city, and driving a massive office-building construction boom. Rockefeller envisioned a city that would someday serve as the financial headquarters for a world increasingly dependent on global trade. Fitch, writing at the beginning of the 1990s, could not yet easily have seen how remarkably successful this vision would become through the city’s boom in the 1990s and 2000s, no matter how grossly unequal the rewards of that growth would prove.
The 2000s saw another new wave of research and commentary. Joshua Freeman’s Working Class New York, clearly a major influence on Phillips-Fein, put the crisis in the remarkable context of New York’s postwar ‘social-democratic polity’.[5] Phillips-Fein broadly shares Freeman’s political framework and analytical lens, and her work could be seen as a much more detailed elaboration of the one chapter of Working Class New York wherein Freeman describes the years of the crisis itself.
In 2007, labour scholar and activist Kim Moody published another history with New Press, this time fiercely criticising the complicity of organised labour in the crisis, analysing the subsequent rightward turn of the city’s Democratic Party elites.[6] Like Moody, Phillips-Fein discusses the move of the municipal labour-union leadership to invest $2.5 billion of their union’s own pension funds in bailing out their employer, the city. This was a considerable amount in terms of the budget figures of the time, and literally saved the city from bankruptcy. Moody is particularly horrified by union presidents such as Shanker using pension funds to bail out the city, and how thoroughly this compromised their ability to effectively oppose austerity. For Moody, affiliated with the union-dissident journal Labor Notes, this was an almost inevitable betrayal by union bureaucrats of their members. Phillips-Fein, deploying a different political lens, emphasises the immediate events and psychology of these figures, as evidenced by Shanker’s case.
The most influential Marxist account of the New York City fiscal crisis, however, was made in four short pages. David Harvey’s 2005 A Brief History of Neoliberalism has been much more widely read and cited than any other book discussing the topic.[7]Harvey repeats much of what has already widely been said about the crisis: the causal importance of deindustrialisation, suburbanisation and the onset of the 1974 recession, and citing Freeman in calling it a ‘counterrevolution from above’.[8] It ‘amounted to a coup by the financial institutions’[9] that left working-class life in New York in a shambles. While many commentators saw the events in New York as a precursor to the turn against social services on the part of Thatcher and Reagan, Harvey’s account most dramatically locates New York as the world-historic turning point of a new, neoliberal era.
Harvey memorably calls the fiscal crisis an effort to ‘restore class power’, his recurring definition of neoliberalism. Harvey’s influential book understands neoliberalism as a political project of capitalist elites. Business firms and their ideological and political allies advanced a successful political project through the 1970s and 1980s to roll back social democracy, concentrate political power, and institute policies to redistribute wealth upwards. New York City’s fiscal crisis easily matches this narrative, given the obvious and visible collusion of financial executives and political elites in transforming the city’s political future. Harvey is correct in drawing a link from the ‘coup’ of New York’s fiscal crisis to the role of business mobilisation in backing Thatcher and Reagan’s attack on organised labour, and the new political common sense of inescapable austerity. This was a helpful lens for a generation of anti-capitalist activists, influential in the rise of Occupy Wall Street and in contemporary European popular mobilisation against austerity.
Phillips-Fein certainly provides ample material to substantiate such a framework. The decision-making of specific investment firms clearly precipitated the crisis. By all accounts, the Ford administration held off from bailing out the city as a calculated political decision to indicate a new, more lean future for the Federal government, other regional and city governments, and America’s working class. Phillips-Fein focuses on the members of the Ford administration who actively pushed the policy approach of punishing New York City for its liberal excesses. Three subsequently played major roles in Washington politics: Alan Greenspan, Donald Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheney. Ford could have chosen to bail out New York with no immediate consequences; that he chose not to was motivated by a class-based political project. Present-day Americans live in a country remade by the political rule of the very people who facilitated that decision.
Unfortunately, however, the centrality of New York to Harvey’s narrative of neoliberalism obscures as much as it elucidates. Both New York’s deindustrialisation and its turn towards fiscal austerity were pursued by powerful political elites, and it is easy to trace similar movements of the capitalist class in pursuing austerity elsewhere. But today, four decades later, the politics of austerity have become more broadly generalised, suggesting much deeper structural roots. Though the turn away from social democracy, regulated labour markets, and expansive welfare programmes came slowly to some countries, and more rapidly to others, it came inevitably in one form or another. Nearly the only countries remaining that have successfully expanded their welfare-state programmes in the last twenty years are those with access to considerable oil revenue: Venezuela, Iran, Norway and, in a very different sense, the gulf states. In those countries that have maintained some measure of social democracy, such as Sweden, governments have developed other polices to pursue the same goals of labour-market activation and flexibilisation that characterise anglophone neoliberalism. By emphasising a coup by ‘a powerful cabal of investment bankers’,[10] Harvey’s account, and in other ways the entire literature on New York’s fiscal crisis, can give rise to an inadequate understanding of what drives neoliberal policy.
Since the mid-1970s, across a wide range of very different political conditions, in country after country, state officials occupying positions of national power have nearly all drawn the same conclusion: social-democratic programmes and sustained wage increases can no longer fuel a virtuous cycle of Keynesian economic growth. Neoliberal think-tanks, supply-side monetarist economists, and business coalitions did not stage a coup in every nation; but they did consistently offer a novel solution to a genuine, unresolved structural crisis faced by capitalist states. The expression, ‘There is no alternative’, popularised by Margaret Thatcher, had previously been declared by the Manhattan Borough President in 1975 at the inception of MAC (p. 126). Before their defeat, the contemporaneous insurgency and resistance of working-class movements insisted that there was an alternative. Now, with the world transformed, we are confronted by the question of why we in fact see so very few alternatives in capitalist state policy. How can we understand and explain the near-ubiquity of neoliberalism and austerity?
Phillips-Fein does not deal with such questions. But interestingly the narrative, psychologically-grounded details of her account do contribute an important component to the enrichment of our understanding. It is here her work makes its most unexpected and significant theoretical contribution. Phillips-Fein, by tracing the changing expectations of the actors themselves, sharply illustrates that they were facing considerable structural pressures. Shanker citing ‘the pressure from the situation’ described the experience of every government and union official as they faced an escalating hopelessness they could see no other way out of. This situation was not simply engineered by capitalist financiers. Those financial executives directly involved in the restructuring of the city were clearly acting from a class-based worldview, one that saw elite participation and elite interests as the appropriate future for the city. But they also faced their own structural conditions in the form of market pressures, particularly an increasingly-global capitalist credit market. The Municipal Assistance Corporation, the initial board of corporate executives who had taken on the task of saving the city, was at first unable to sell bonds to anyone but the labour unions. The extent of the requisite austerity measures implemented by the city was not determined by any one political actor, but by signalling to a much vaster and anonymous world of investors that the city was on a sounder financial footing.
In responding to the markets, finance executives and other elites of the city were able to act politically in novel and bold ways, ways most of them had not previously foreseen. Capitalist elites did not simply engineer the crisis; their interests and strategies were organised by it. Phillips-Fein writes:
There was no premeditated plan to seize and transform New York’s government, nor were the actors who gained power during the crisis simply acting upon an ideology constructed in the abstract. But the scare of the near-bankruptcy brought together the elite groups within the city, and enabled them to act in concert in ways that otherwise would have proved difficult to attain. (p. 306.)
This isn’t simply an offhanded claim; it is demonstrated in the blow-by-blow account of events she traces throughout the book.
Marxist accounts of the world economy are divided on whether capitalism enjoyed a full recovery following the mid-1970s recession. Some, most notably the ongoing work of Robert Brenner, argue it did not. For Brenner, overcapacity in manufacturing through the entry of Japan, Germany and later successive waves of other exporting nations has created a persistent suppression of the average rate of profit. The apparent economic recoveries since then have been successively weaker, driven by commodity and investment bubbles, and do not reflect capitalism’s escape from a basic structural weakness. In 1999,[11]Historical Materialism featured a lively debate on aNew Left Review essay from the previous year outlining Brenner’s argument. This later became the most extensive account of this framework,The Economics of Global Turbulence.[12] If Brenner is correct, and the underlying structure of the world capitalist economy has been in four decades of tumultuous and worsening crisis, it is less surprising that nation after nation has had to adopt measures that shift the cost of the crisis onto workers and the poor. Phillips-Fein adds to this an illuminating case study on how actors otherwise sympathetic to social-democratic policies might face objective conditions in which they can see no alternative, and how capitalist actors may be galvanised, politicised and structurally organised by the conditions of crisis.
This is not to say, of course, that the claims of neoliberal economists should be taken seriously at face-value, nor that the representatives of the working class should continue to capitulate to neoliberalism at every turn. Nor would I argue that social democrats in New York and elsewhere could not have pursued a far more left-wing, militant way out of the crisis through an encroachment on private investment. It is to suggest, however, that a certain form of the social-democratic state, resting on an expanding and profitable industrial economy, is no longer as politically viable as some may hope. The occupying students of Hostos in 1976, and the others fighting cuts throughout the city, saved many programmes in the course of their struggle. Yet they faced underlying structural, economic conditions that posed considerable obstacles to preserving the full range of social goods New Yorkers had enjoyed. Phillips-Fein, in offering a thoroughly political and interpersonal account of one of the major events of American capitalism, unexpectedly offers us a necessary understanding of how such conditions come to be seen as insurmountable to some, and as a new opportunity to others.
References
Alcaly, Roger and David Mermelstein (eds.) 1977, The Fiscal Crisis of American Cities, New York, NY: Vintage.
Brenner, Robert 1998, ‘The Economics of Global Turbulence (Special Issue)’, New Left Review, I, 229, available at: <https://newleftreview.org/issues/I229/articles/robert-brenner-the-economics-of-global-turbulence-special-issue>.
Brenner, Robert 2002, The Boom and the Bubble: The US in the World Economy, London: Verso.
Brenner, Robert 2006, The Economics of Global Turbulence: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Long Boom to Long Downturn, 1945–2005, London: Verso.
Brenner, Robert 2009, ‘What Is Good for Goldman Sachs Is Good for America: The Origins of the Present Crisis’, 2 October, Los Angeles, CA: UCLA Center for Social Theory and Comparative History, available at: <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0sg0782h>.
Fitch, Robert 1993, The Assassination of New York, London: Verso.
Freeman, Joshua B. 2000, Working Class New York: Life and Labor Since World War II, New York, NY: The New Press.
Harvey, David 2005, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Moody, Kim 2007, From Welfare State to Real Estate: Regime Change in New York City, 1974 to the Present, New York, NY: The New Press.
Phillips-Fein, Kim 2017, Fear City: New York’s Fiscal Crisis and the Rise of Austerity Politics, New York, NY: Metropolitan Books.
Tabb, William 1982, The Long Default: New York City and the Urban Fiscal Crisis, New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.
[1] See, for instance, Freeman 2000; Moody 2007; Tabb 1982.
[2]Alcaly and Mermelstein (eds.) 1977.
[3]Tabb 1982.
[4]Fitch 1993.
[5]Freeman 2000.
[6]Moody 2007.
[7] Harvey 2005. At the time of writing, Google Scholar gives it 17,730 citations; Freeman gets 258, Fitch 198, Tabb 166, Alcaly and Mermelstein 110, and Moody 88. At the time of writing, Phillips-Fein has received only one.
[8]Harvey 2005, p. 46.
[9]Harvey 2005, p. 45.
[10]Harvey 2005, p. 45.
[11] See Historical Materialism, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp. 9–180.
[12]Brenner 1998; See also Brenner 2002, 2006 and 2009.
The Challenges of Understanding Digital Labour: Questions of Exploitation and Resistance

A Review of Cyber-Proletariat: Global Labour in the Digital Vortex by Nick Dyer-Witheford, andMarx in the Age of Digital Capitalism, edited by Christian Fuchs and Vincent Mosco
Jamie Woodcock
Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford
jamie.woodcock@googlemail.com
Abstract
The two books, Cyber-Proletariat by Nick Dyer-Witheford andMarx in the Age of Digital Capitalism, edited by Christian Fuchs and Vincent Mosco, both attempt to address the changes wrought by digital labour. Dyer-Witheford combines insights from the Marxist theories of autonomism and communisation in a rich, if somewhat dense, analysis. This is compared to Fuchs and Mosco’s book, focusing on Fuchs’s arguments and Brown and Quan-Hasse’s attempt at a social-media users’ inquiry. The problematic analysis of unpaid labour and the audience commodity is subjected to critique in the review. However, both are considered as making important contributions to ongoing debates in Marxism. In particular, the review argues that these debates are most useful when considered in relation to practice, whether organisational or empirical. These questions of worker resistance, the reorganisation of capital, and the implications for contemporary Marxism, can potentially be explored further through an updated method of the workers’ inquiry.
Keywords
Marxism – digital labour – Autonomism – social media
Nick Dyer-Witheford, (2015) Cyber-Proletariat: Global Labour in the Digital Vortex, London: Pluto Press.
Christian Fuchs and Vincent Mosco (eds.), (2015) Marx in the Age of Digital Capitalism, Leiden: Brill.
The concept of digital labour presents three interrelated questions. The first is how workers are resisting and organising in new conditions, which also involves a debate about who now fits into this category. The second is the need to develop a new understanding of how capital is organised. The third is how critical theorists in general, and Marxists in particular, can apply and develop their analysis in relation to both of these changes. These two books, Cyber-Proletariat by Nick Dyer-Witheford andMarx in the Age of Digital Capitalism, edited by Christian Fuchs and Vincent Mosco, both attempt to address the changes wrought by digital labour/capitalism. Nick Dyer-Witheford is an Associate Professor at the University of Western Ontario. Christian Fuchs is a Professor of Social Media at the University of Westminster and also the editor oftripleC, an open-access journal, while Vincent Mosco is an Emeritus Professor at Queen’s University in Canada. Although they share common research interests in media, the focus of each book is different, and there are important arguments to draw out that have a significance for the project of revitalising a critical Marxism.
Cyber-Proletariat
Dyer-Witheford’s Cyber-Proletariat is a detailed and wide-ranging analysis. The book is focused on two concepts: cybernetics and the proletariat, the combination of which forms the title, similar to ‘cybertariat’, as used by Ursula Huws.[1] The choice of focusing on these two specific terms confers the book a distinctive analysis. Cybernetics is explained as having two meanings: the first is that rooted in military research that began during the Second World War, with the second relating to computer systems. These two definitions are considered together, ‘taking the ideas of cybernetic thinkers as a guide to how computers in general have altered the technological processes of capital’. This entails seeing machines ‘as entities governed by information control’.[2] The choice of the term ‘proletariat’ – as opposed to workers, working class, and so on – may initially bring to mind the rose-tinted nostalgia of productivist Marxism, yet Dyer-Witheford deploys it to much greater effect. By drawing on Marx’s notion of workers as ‘free in the double sense’,[3] and the etymological roots of the term in ancient Rome to describe the urban poor possessing nothing but the ability to reproduce themselves, the analytical scope is broadened. Building on Marcel van der Linden’s recent work,[4] there is a reminder that globally ‘a large proportion of the working class is workless’.[5] While the book covers electronics workers, call-centre operators, and peasants drawn into the factories, there is also a recognition that ‘now, as in Marx’s era, proletariat denotes the incessant phasing in and out of work and workless-ness, the inherent precarity, of the class that must live by labour, a condition raised to a new peak by global cybernetics.’
The argument unfolds through the meteorological metaphor of a vortex, emphasising the turbulence of changes taking place across the world. Marx and Engels’s evocation of ‘all that is solid melts into air’[6] is brought to life in a way that reflects the chaos that this involves. For Dyer-Witheford, this is comprised of three processes: ‘production, circulation and financialization’. The dynamics of these are explored through the composition of two factors: capital and the proletariat. This focus on composition signals the influence of autonomist Marxism on the book, with attention paid to ‘the relation between the technical conditions of the work (or worklessness) and the forms of political organization to which it gives rise’.[7] This composition is considered globally, taking in the ruins of Detroit, Silicon Valley, rare-mineral mines in the global South, and the high-tech factories of China, to name but a few. Yet what is notable is the focus on the financial crash of 2008 and the wave of uprisings dating from 2011, which takes the form of a ‘post-post-operaismo’ analysis.[8] This somewhat-awkward term signals a departure from Dyer-Witheford’s previous perspectives in Cyber-Marx[9] and Games of Empire,[10] entailing a more critical autonomist position. As he has argued recently, this is a result of involvement in the alter-globalisation movement and the post-2008 struggles. It therefore starts with ‘the “Facebook revolution” trope’ before moving on to the analysis of ‘the deeper effect of cybernetics on the restructuring of labor within advanced capitalism’.[11] The latest book also takes a less optimistic view of technology, involving a rejection of Hardt and Negri’s[12] later work by starting not with ‘multitude’ as before, but rather the ‘proletariat’.[13]
This ‘post-post-operaismo’ perspective found in Dyer-Witheford’s latest book involves a conversation between autonomism and communisation theory. While autonomism ‘emphasizes workers’ antagonism to capital’, communisation theory ‘insists that we must understand that workers are also part of capital’. The latter, for example, is found in the work of Cunningham[14] and Noys.[15] The combination of the two, Dyer-Witheford argues, stems from the ‘characteristic problems’ of each: autonomism ‘is chronically optimistic’, while communisation theory ‘has a very studied melancholia’.[16] This promises the possibility of finding a theoretically-productive meeting point. The question of linking this debate to some kind of practice is far from straightforward. Both in the book and elsewhere, he explains that he is ‘sympathetic’ to groups like Plan C in the UK, ‘who recognize that we do need to collectively as a movement think about issues of transition’.[17] This orientation towards practice comes first from the use of inquiries by Wildcat, Kolinko, and Asia Monitor Resource Centre.[18] It is then reinforced with the reminder that ‘Cybernetics was from its start the creation of war’ and ‘future proletarian struggles should adequate themselves to wartime’.[19]
The book is an exciting reapplication of Marxism to the pressing questions of digital labour. It is at its sharpest when these questions are considered in relation to concrete examples. Although these examples are not based on primary research, they often involve a new and nuanced take. At other points the dense nature of the text can become challenging, potentially limiting the readership to those engaged in academia. This would be a shame, as there is much that can be taken from the book. In particular, the discussion of workers’ inquiries[20] – a point that will be returned to later in the review – is important, but it also signals that many of these new attempts at analysing digital capitalism could benefit from pushing the questions into empirical or organisational projects.
Marx in the Age of Digital Capitalism
This book is the first of a two-part collection, which also includes Marx and the Political Economy of the Media.[21] As Fuchs and Mosco explain, the aim of both ‘is to contribute to overcoming’ what they see as a ‘lack of [a] systematic reading of Marx on communication and media’.[22] This is an admirable aim, although more limited in scope than Dyer-Witheford’s. The relevance of the topic is reiterated with a reminder of the importance of media for Marx, particularly given that ‘in addition to his work as a theorist and activist’ he ‘was a practicing journalist throughout his career’.[23] While there is not the space to discuss each of the chapters separately in the review, it is worth noting that Miriyam Aouragh’s chapter on ‘Social Media, Mediation and the Arab Revolutions’[24] is particularly useful, considering the discussion of the topic in Dyer-Witheford’s book. This section of the review will instead focus on the Introduction, Fuchs’s chapter,[25] and the study taking inspiration from this approach by Brown and Quan-Haase.[26]
The first chapter begins with the declaration from the head of a Berlin publishing house that ‘Marx is fashionable again’,[27] something echoed by the Labour shadow-chancellor.[28] Although moments like this are no doubt exciting for Marxists – particularly when thinking back to how unlikely it would have been to hear such things before the 2008 crisis – it is also necessary to be sober about how reflective they are of broader changes. The Introduction articulates how a Marxist theory of communication should, drawing on Mosco’s earlier work, ‘foreground the analysis of capitalism, including the development of the forces and relations of production, commodification and the production of surplus value, social class divisions and struggles, contradictions and oppositional movements’.[29] This is an exciting prospect, but one held back by their use of Dallas Smythe’s concept of the audience commodity.[30] Fuchs and Mosco describe this as the way in which ‘capital is accumulated by selling the audience, at a rate determined by its demographic characteristics, as a commodity to advertising clients’.[31]
The position on the audience commodity is restated and developed in Fuchs’s chapter, along with a survey of the literature in media studies.[32] This involves a schematic application of ‘Marxian categories’ that ‘Critical Internet Studies to a certain degree already makes use of … and should therefore acknowledge its own Marxian roots’.[33] While the eleven items listed are all things that Marxists should be concerned with, simply encountering the use of these concepts does not prove the utility of Marxism by default. Unfortunately there are no short-cuts for overcoming the theoretical, practical, and organisational challenges that face Marxists today. The chapter continues with Fuchs’s argument for a ‘digital labour theory of value’ that stems from ‘the value of a commodity measured as the average number of hours it takes to produce it’.[34] This update of the labour theory of value hinges on what Fuchs’s claims is a ‘crucial question’, whether ‘the users of commercial social media are generating value and are exploited’.[35]
This conceptual problem is also found in Fuchs’s earlier book Digital Labour and Karl Marx.[36] It is an argument that starts with the blurring of work and play in contemporary capitalism, but takes it to the extreme by arguing that users are actually working for companies like Google and Facebook. The first, and perhaps most obvious, critique of this position is that Facebook users are not ‘free in the double sense’ Marx described.[37] Fuchs’s response is that it involves ‘a social form of coercion that threatens the user with isolation and social disadvantages’.[38] The audience-commodity claim is justified by Fuchs’s position that ‘profit … is the outcome of unpaid labour time’,[39] whether from the part of the working day when the worker is producing a surplus above their wage, or outside of paid employment. This is justified with reference to the debates over unpaid domestic labour, for example in Dalla Costa and James.[40] However, As Chris Land has pointed out, ‘in one sense Fuchs is correct and provides quotes from Marx to back up his claims about unpaid labour being the source of value, but he also performs a theoretical sleight of hand.’ In doing so, Fuchs ‘misrepresents Marx’s main point about exploitation and waged labour’.[41] In Capital, Marx notes how the exchange of the commodity labour-power between the buyer (the capitalist) and the seller (the worker) appears straightforward. Yet, once this transaction is followed ‘into the hidden abode of production’, it is here that ‘the secret of profit-making’ can be found.[42] The transaction that has taken place is different to that of other commodities because the buyer purchases a potential that can only be realised once it is put to work. This indeterminacy of labour-power is crucial for understanding the workplace and value. Once a capitalist has ‘purchased a given quantity of labour power’, they ‘must now “stride ahead” and strive to extract actual labour from the labour power’ they ‘now legally own’.[43]
This indeterminacy of labour-power is the secret found in the ‘hidden abode of production’, in contrast to the claim that it is only unpaid labour that creates value. The argument that ‘there is not an equivalence between the value produced by labour and its remuneration is not the same as saying that unpaid labour is the source of all surplus value.’[44] This provides the basis for Fuchs’s argument regarding social-media users, leading to a calculation like the following:
What is the value of the single ad presented to a user? It is the average labour=usage time needed for the production of the ad presentation. Let’s assume these 27 172 420 million users are on average 60 minutes per day on Facebook and in these 60 minutes 60 ads are presented to them on average. All the time they spend online is used for generating targeted ads. It is labour time that generates targeted ad presentations. We can therefore say that the value of a single ad presented to a user is in the presented example 1 minute of labour/usage/prosumption time.[45]
On this basis, Fuchs declares Facebook usage to be labour, and even productive labour (so long as ad-blockers are not used, and presumably the user also watches or pays attention to the adverts). Thus users browsing on Facebook are the ‘21st century equivalents of what Marx considered as transport workers in classical industry’. The process of looking at funny pictures of cats, for example, becomes one of the activities ‘necessary for “transporting” use-value promises from companies to potential customers’.[46] As Michael A. Lebowitz has pointed out, ‘however much Marxian verbiage may subsequently enter into the discussion’ of the audience commodity, ‘it cannot alter the fact that what is produced is an entirely un-Marxian argument with un-Marxian conclusions which follow from the initial premise.’[47]
Fuchs’s theorisation entails the wholesale rejection of any alternative ways to understand this. It means failing to engage with the idea of rent: ‘if we want to understand the expropriation of value from forms of unpaid labour like Facebook, then an updated, but still Marxist, conception of rent seems to fit very well.’[48] Companies like Facebook could be understood as acting like a landlord, as the users’ ‘“labour” makes the site more productive, and they can charge advertisers a rent to access this digital territory.’[49] This would still involve the claim that users are exploited, but in a different way to that detailed by Marx. While the broadening out of the analysis from traditional wage-work is important – and indeed is dealt with by Dyer-Witheford, as discussed above – the consequences of not agreeing with Fuchs’s analysis do not necessarily mean ‘Facebook users are seen as unproductive and unexploited’, nor do they have ‘patriarchal and racist implications’.[50] If anything, the attempt to attribute equivalency between social-media users and other forms of unpaid work – housework or slavery, for example – is itself deeply problematic.
A Workers’ Inquiry 2.0?
The problematic analysis of the audience commodity overshadows what could have been an interesting chapter on an updated workers’ inquiry. Brown and Quan-Hasse[51] take Fuchs’s analysis and Bruns’s notion of ‘produsage’[52] to study the users of Flickr, an online picture gallery incorporating social networking. They argue that ‘users’ is, in fact, a ‘complete misnomer’, because these are ‘produsers … willing to produce content at no cost to the owners of these domains at the same time as these sites generate massive profits’.[53] The ‘Workers’ Inquiry 2.0’ is therefore positioned as a study of these ‘produsers’, ostensibly updating both Marx and the ‘methods of the Italian autonomists’.[54] This comes after a recent burst of interest in the workers’ inquiry as a method and practice, seen in the special issues of Ephemera andViewpoint,[55] neither of which are discussed in this chapter. There has also been a range of interesting attempts to update the workers’ inquiry method, seen, for example, with the Kolinko call-centre inquiry[56] discussed by Dyer-Witheford.
The analysis involves a comparison of industrial-factory labour to social-media ‘produsage’, and finds both similarities and differences. Drawing on Fuchs’s digital labour theory of value, Brown and Quan-Hasse argue that ‘the mode of produsage should be considered hyper-exploitative because it does not even offer its legions of workers a wage in exchange for their labour power and time’.[57] While it is true that no wage is offered to the ‘produser’, neither are they coerced into working on the platform, nor do they rely on the activity to reproduce their own labour-power. Despite this, the prospect of finding struggle on the Flickr platform is interesting, even if it is in user communities. In an optimistic part of the chapter, Brown and Quan-Hasse argue that there is ‘nascent evidence that this hyper-exploitative relationship is causing produsers to organize struggles against it’.[58] Unfortunately this is focused around what they call the ‘frequent uproars occurring on social networking sites regarding the violation of one’s privacy [which] have time and again resulted in controversy’. They continue to argue that ‘the near-exclusive focus on the violation of one’s privacy as the cause of these uproars is a mischaracterization and a mistake’, and quote Brown’s earlier research.[59] However, given the recent revelations about privacy and surveillance – particularly as related to WikiLeaks and discussed by Dyer-Witheford – it does seem to retain some importance.
There is a defence of the analysis of super-exploitation of ‘produsers’, taking a similar line to Fuchs, that again attempts to connect it with the struggle of domestic labour.[60] However, Dyer-Witheford addressed this in a much more nuanced way, rejecting
a direct equivalence between the experience of, say, the dagongmei and Facebook users. But vampire bites come in many ways. Facebook posting is a form of exploitation, which, without explicit violence, is nonetheless parasitic. It does not replace the ‘normal’ structures of daily class exploitation at work and home, but is added to and superimposed upon them, to constitute a regime in which the user is habituated, on pain of exclusion from social worlds, to surrendering the elements of their personality – identity, creativity, sociality – to enhance the circulation of capital. This submission is not the same as the brutal bodily discipline inflicted on thedagongmei, but it is a form of subjectification that is both infiltrative and extroversive in the abject submission to the commodity form it elicits.[61]
This analytical position does not require a rejection of all non-waged labour and it allows for an understanding of how these activities fit together with existing forms of paid and unpaid labour.
The idea of Web 2.0 entailed the rise of websites involving user-generated content. These questions have been complicated with the growth of crowdsourcing or so-called sharing-economy platforms, whether that be the astronomic valuations of Uber (a cab company that owns no cars) or Airbnb (an accommodation company that owns no beds). In the case of crowdsourcing in particular, the mixture of paid and unpaid labour is an interesting phenomenon. For example, the Zooniverse – a crowdsourcing platform for citizen science that has involved over 1.3 million users – allows individual users to contribute to the categorisation of large-scale scientific data. In this case the tensions between citizen scientists, professional scientists, and paid software developers highlight the complexity of understanding the processes involved.[62]
In the context of academic work, writing articles is a good example of the complexities involved. The wage paid to academics does not necessarily cover specific times, with many contracts now stipulating that the employment has no fixed hours and there is an expectation to work the hours necessary to complete the necessary duties. The journal articles that are the result of research (leaving aside the questions of teaching and marking) often end up behind paywalls, with publishers charging for individual or institutional access. Many academics now share articles on websites that are organised along the Web 2.0 model. Across these three cases there is a mixture of exploitative relationships taking place. To use Dyer-Witheford’s phrase, the ‘vampire bites come in many ways’,[63] but is the relationship more or less exploitative when it is not connected to the wage? This fixation draws a false separation between the overlapping processes taking place, the correction to focusing solely on waged-work resulting in the opposite, rather than engaging with the contradictions and complexities.
It is clear that in order to answer these questions – or indeed to ensure that the right questions are being posed – further empirical work should be undertaken both online and offline. As Trebor Scholz has argued, many of these platforms involve ‘digital black box labor’,[64] obfuscating the processes taking place behind the front page of the website. However, it is important to clarify what Marx originally intended with the workers’ inquiry and how this was elaborated in further attempts. Brown and Quan-Hasse argue that the ‘method was to provide workers with the intellectual and emotional tools required to struggle against their own exploitation’.[65] However, for Marx, the ‘practice of disseminating the inquiry also represented a step towards organizing this project, by establishing direct links with workers’.[66] In the context of online activity, Irani and Silberman’s ‘Turkopticon’ project points towards how this could be achieved. They launched an inquiry through the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform to reach people engaging on that paid micro-work platform. Following this, an activist system was created that combined a forum and a browser plug-in. This allowed workers to collect and share information on the requesters, something which is particularly important given that the ownership of completed tasks switches over immediately, while payment can be refused with no justification. This formed the beginning of an organisational project on a platform where workers are at a significant structural disadvantage.[67]
The Implications of the Arguments
Both of these books make important interventions in the debates on digital labour and capitalism. Dyer-Witheford’s book opens up a number of important questions and combines insights from two contemporary critical strains of Marxism. Fuchs and Mosco’s book is more limited in its focus on communication and media, although that would also likely make the book appealing to those studying or researching in that discipline. The topics involved have the potential to lead to a number of fruitful debates, many of which are crucial for updating and reinvigorating Marxism. Arguably, Dyer-Witheford’s contribution is more of a conversation with the left, while Fuchs and Mosco’s is broader – to the right of this, rather than with the right. The questions posed by both are best considered in relation to practice, both in terms of organising and empirical interventions. This is highlighted by Dyer-Witheford, who explains, as part of an argument against the accelerationists, that ‘there is a failure to acknowledge that the passage from the potential to the actualization of such communist possibilities involves crossing what William Morris describes as a “river of fire.”’[68] The debate about the audience commodity and the unpaid labour of social-media users would be much more interesting if the implications were considered in these terms. The key is to open up the three questions discussed at the beginning: how are workers (and who would this include?) resisting and organising, how has capital reorganised, and what does this mean for contemporary Marxism? The method of workers’ inquiry, which emerges in different forms across the two books, has the potential to be one important way to do this.
References
Aouragh, Miriyam 2015, ‘Social Media, Mediation and the Arab Revolutions’, in Fuchs and Mosco (eds.) 2015a, pp. 482–515.
Brown, Brian A. 2013, ‘Primitive Digital Accumulation: Privacy, Social Networks & Biopolitical Exploitation’, Rethinking Marxism, 25, 3: 385–403.
Brown, Brian A. and Anabel Quan-Haase 2015, ‘“A Workers’ Inquiry 2.0”: An Ethnographic Method for the Study of Produsage in Social Media Contexts’, in Fuchs and Mosco (eds.) 2015a, pp. 447–81.
Bruns, Axel 2008, Blogs, Wikipedia, Second Life, and Beyond: From Production to Produsage, New York, NY: Peter Lang.
Cunningham, John 2009, ‘Invisible Politics – An Introduction to Contemporary Communisation’, Mute, 14, available at: <http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/invisible-politics-introduction-to-contemporary-communisation>.
Dalla Costa, Mariarosa and Selma James 1973, The Power of Women and the Subversion of Community, Bristol: Falling Wall Press.
Dathan, Matt 2015, ‘Karl Marx Is “Back in Fashion,” Claims Labour Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell’, The Independent, 18 September, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/karl-marx-is-back-in-fashion-claims-labour-shadow-chancellor-john-mcdonnell-a6670211.html>.
Dyer-Witheford, Nick 1999, Cyber-Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism, Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Dyer-Witheford, Nick 2015a, Cyber-Proletariat: Global Labour in the Digital Vortex, London: Pluto Press.
Dyer-Witheford, Nick 2015b, ‘Cyber-Proletariat: An Interview with Nick Dyer-Witheford’, Viewpoint Magazine, 8 September, available at: <https://www.viewpointmag.com/2015/09/08/cyber-proletariat-an-interview-with-nick-dyer-witheford/>.
Dyer-Witheford, Nick and Greig de Peuter 2009, Games of Empire: Global Capitalism and Videogames, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Edwards, Richard 1979, Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century, New York, NY: Basic Books.
Fuchs, Christian 2014, Digital Labour and Karl Marx, New York: Routledge.
Fuchs, Christian 2015, ‘Towards Marxian Internet Studies’, in Fuchs and Mosco (eds.) 2015a, pp. 22–67.
Fuchs, Christian and Vincent Mosco 2015, ‘Introduction: Marx is Back – The Importance of Marxist Theory and Research for Critical Communication Studies Today’, in Fuchs and Mosco (eds.) 2015a, pp. 1–21.
Fuchs, Christian and Vincent Mosco (eds.) 2015a, Marx in the Age of Digital Capitalism, Leiden: Brill.
Fuchs, Christian and Vincent Mosco (eds.) 2015b, Marx and the Political Economy of the Media, Leiden: Brill.
Haider, Asad and Salar Mohandesi 2013, ‘Workers’ Inquiry: A Genealogy’, Viewpoint Magazine, 27 September, available at: <https://www.viewpointmag.com/2013/09/27/workers-inquiry-a-genealogy/>.
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri 2001, Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Huws, Ursula 2003, The Making of the Cybertariat: Virtual Work in a Real World, London: Merlin Press.
Irani, Lilly C. and M. Six Silberman 2013, ‘Turkopticon: Interrupting Worker Invisibility in Amazon Mechanical Turk’, in CHI ’13: Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp. 661–20, New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery.
Kolinko 2002, ‘Hotlines – call centre | inquiry | communism’, available at: <https://libcom.org/library/hotlines-call-centre-inquiry-communism>.
Land, Chris 2015, ‘From Mineral Mining to Data Mining: Understanding the Global Commodity Chain of Internet Communications. Review of Digital Labour and Karl Marx by Christian Fuchs’,Ephemera, 15, 4: 875–87.
Lebowitz, Michael A. 2009, Following Marx: Method, Critique, and Crisis,Historical Materialism Book Series, Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.
Linden, Marcel van der 2008, Workers of the World: Essays towards a Global Labor History, Leiden: Brill.
Marx, Karl 1976 [1867], Capital:A Critique of Political Economy. Volume One, translated by Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels 2015 [1848], The Communist Manifesto, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Mosco, Vincent 2009, The Political Economy of Communication, Second Edition, London: SAGE Publications.
Noys, Benjamin (ed.) 2011, Communization and its Discontents: Contestation, Critique, and Contemporary Struggles, New York, NY: Autonomedia.
Scholz, Trebor 2015, ‘Think Outside the Boss’, Public Seminar, 5 April, available at: <http://www.publicseminar.org/2015/04/think-outside-the-boss/>.
Smythe, Dallas W. 1977, ‘Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism’, Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 1, 3: 1–27.
Woodcock, Jamie 2013, ‘Smile Down the Phone: An Attempt at a Workers’ Inquiry in a Call Center’, Viewpoint Magazine, 3, available at: <http://viewpointmag.com/2013/09/25/smile-down-the-phone-an-attempt-at-a-workers-inquiry-in-a-call-center/>.
Woodcock, Jamie 2014, ‘The Workers’ Inquiry from Trotskyism to Operaismo: A Political Methodology for Investigating the Workplace’, Ephemera, 14, 3: 493–513, available at: <http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/workers%E2%80%99-inquiry-trotskyism-operaismo-political-methodology-investigating-workplace>.
Woodcock, Jamie, Anita Greenhill, Kate Holmes, Gary Graham, Joe Cox, Eun Young Oh and Karen Masters 2017, ‘Crowdsourcing Citizen Science: Exploring the Tensions between Paid Professionals and Users’, Journal of Peer Production, 7 June, available at: <https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/portal/files/8039057/COXj_2017_cright_JPP_Crowdsourcing_citizen_science_exploring_the_tensions_between_paid_professionals.pdf>.
[1] Huws 2003.
[2] Dyer-Witheford 2015a, p. 42.
[3] Marx 1976, p. 272.
[4] Linden 2008.
[5] Dyer-Witheford 2015a, p. 13.
[6] Marx and Engels 2015, p. 3.
[7] Dyer-Witheford 2015a, p. 15.
[8] Dyer-Witheford 2015a, p. 12.
[9] Dyer-Witheford 1999.
[10] Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 2009.
[11] Dyer-Witheford 2015b.
[12] Hardt and Negri 2001.
[13] Dyer-Witheford 2015a, p. 12.
[14] Cunningham 2009.
[15] Noys (ed.) 2011.
[16] Dyer-Witheford 2015b.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Dyer-Witheford 2015a, p. 15.
[19] Dyer-Witheford 2015a, p. 204.
[20] Dyer-Witheford 2015a, p. 15.
[21] Fuchs and Mosco (eds.) 2015b.
[22] Fuchs and Mosco 2015, p. 5.
[23] Fuchs and Mosco 2015, p. 6.
[24] Aouragh 2015.
[25] Fuchs 2015.
[26] Brown and Quan-Haase 2015.
[27] Fuchs and Mosco 2015, p. 1.
[28] Dathan 2015.
[29] Mosco 2009, p. 94.
[30] Smythe 1977.
[31] Fuchs and Mosco 2015, p. 11.
[32] Fuchs 2015.
[33] Fuchs 2015, p. 36.
[34] Fuchs 2015, p. 44.
[35] Fuchs 2015, p. 45.
[36] Fuchs 2014.
[37] Marx 1976, p. 272.
[38] Fuchs 2014, p. 255.
[39] Fuchs 2014, p. 6.
[40] Dalla Costa and James 1973.
[41] Land 2015, p. 881.
[42] Marx 1976, pp. 279–80.
[43] Edwards 1979, p. 12.
[44] Land 2015, p. 881.
[45] Fuchs 2015, p. 53.
[46] Fuchs 2015, p. 54.
[47] Lebowitz 2009, p. 222.
[48] Land 2015, p. 882.
[49] Land 2015, p. 883.
[50] Fuchs 2015, p. 46.
[51] Brown and Quan-Hasse 2015.
[52] Bruns 2008.
[53] Brown and Quan-Hasse 2015, p. 447.
[54] Brown and Quan-Hasse 2015, p. 449.
[55] See, for example, Woodcock 2013; 2014.
[56] Kolinko 2002.
[57] Brown and Quan-Hasse 2015, p. 457.
[58] Brown and Quan-Hasse 2015, p. 458.
[59] Brown 2013.
[60] Brown and Quan-Hasse 2015, p. 459.
[61] Dyer-Witheford 2015a, p. 93.
[62] Woodcock, Greenhill, Holmes, Graham, Cox, Oh and Masters 2017.
[63] Dyer-Witheford 2015a, p. 93.
[64] Scholz 2015.
[65] Brown and Quan-Hasse 2015, p. 475.
[66] Haider and Mohandesi 2013.
[67] Irani and Silberman 2013.
[68] Dyer-Witheford 2015b.
Hegemony, People, Multitude: Contemporary Movements and Radical Theory

A Review of Radical Democracy and Collective Movements Today: The Biopolitics of the Multitude versus the Hegemony of the People, edited by Alexandros Kioupkiolis and Giorgos Katsambekis
Panagiotis Sotiris
Independent Researcher
panagiotis.sotiris@gmail.com
Abstract
Radical Democracy and Collective Movements Today, edited by Alexandros Kioupkiolis and Giorgos Katsambekis, is an important volume bringing together contributions that offer a variety of readings of contemporary social movements. The opposition between those writers who insist on the biopolitics of the Multitude and those who emphasise the hegemony of the people, and the debate between neo-anarchist and neo-populist positions, offer an insight not only into contemporary readings of mass politics but also into the very complex dynamics of contemporary movements and their radical democratic demands.
Keywords
Hegemony – Multitude – social movements – radical democracy – post-hegemony – Laclau – Mouffe – Negri
Alexandros Kioupkiolis and Giorgos Katsambekis (eds.), (2014) Radical Democracy and Collective Movements Today: The Biopolitics of the Multitude versus the Hegemony of the People, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.
Introduction
Recent social and political developments and, in particular, the impressive global cycle of protest and contestation from the beginning of the 2010s onward, have brought the question of collective subjects and their politics to the forefront. In particular, we have seen massive movements claiming that they represent the ‘people’ in the sense of the vast majority of society (exemplified in the ‘we are the 99%’ slogan), in contrast to movements organised around specific social groups and their demands. These forms of mass politics along with their new practices of equal voicing, democratic decision-making and self-organisation pose a very important challenge for radical social theory and also for radical and socialist politics. In particular, they call on us to question the various attempts at theorising collective action and radical politics today, and especially the debate around the notions of the Multitude, suggested by writers in the post-workerist tradition and the various attempts to redefine the notion of thepeople as part of an attempt to rethink the material, practical, antagonistic and performative character of politics.
The Multitude versus the People
Regarding the theorisation of the Multitude we have the positions suggested by Hardt and Negri in a series of books and interventions since 2000 and the publication of Empire.[1] In Hardt and Negri’s reading, the modern biopolitical multitude is not just a political concept: it is based on the ontology of the post-industrial, ‘biopolitical’ labour process and the creativity of labour that the ‘Empire’ attempts to subsume. The Multitude must be theorised in terms of immanence, of an immanent social potentiality, since the dominant aspect of the capitalist productive process is the creativity and the productivity of labour upon which the power of capital is imposed as a parasite. However, the only available path for a politics of the Multitude is that of nomadic lines of flight, not of the construction of collective subjects and hegemonic projects. Only later in the ‘Empire’ project, and in particular the 2009 workCommonwealth, do Hardt and Negri choose to talk about the necessity of the ‘becoming-Prince of the Multitude’.[2]
On the other hand, we have those theorists that insist on the centrality of the concept of the people, in their attempt to theorise the political consequences of social antagonism and radical difference in contemporary class societies, either in the sense of a reclaiming of politics for those that remain unaccounted-for in the dominant political configuration, the choice made mainly by Jacques Rancière in his attempts to see how subalternity can be transformed into a radical democratic demand,[3] or in the sense of the possibility of an endless relational discursive reconstitution of the people as the moment of a singular universality, the choice mainly associated with the work of the late Ernesto Laclau,[4] but also with Chantal Mouffe’s proposal for an agonistic democracy.[5]
It is in particular the work of Laclau that plays an important role as a reference point (and as a point of debate) in this collection, especially since both editors of the volume, Alexandros Kioupkiolis and Giorgos Katsambekis, are associated with the Populismus research project at the Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki and are collaborating with Yannis Stavrakakis,[6] an academic well known for his attempt to use the conceptual framework of Laclau’s theory of populism and populist reason in the study of social and political movements today.
For Laclau, populism is not a particular political movement but a ‘political logic’.[7] According to Laclau, ‘the emergence of the “people” requires the passage – via equivalences – from isolated, heterogeneous demands to a “global” demand which involves the formation of political frontiers and the discursive construction of power as an antagonistic force.’[8] This is also related to Laclau’s well-known insistence on a particular relational conception of ‘discourse’ and on his idiosyncratic use of the notion of hegemony as precisely the moment and aspect that enables the emergence of political projects, along with his rejection of traditional class analysis as the basis of political practices and political blocs. However, it is interesting to note that while in the 1980s, especially after the publication of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy,[9] Laclau was accused of a post-Marxist and post-socialist political turn, in fact there have also been more radical uses of his conceptual framework, and this collective volume stands as such an example. Moreover, it is important to note that Laclau himself in a certain way initiated this debate via his critique of Hardt and Negri’s conception of immanence. For Laclau, the problem is precisely this conception of the Multitude in terms of a homogeneous collective entity which leads to the position that ‘full realization of the multitude’s immanence would be the elimination of all transcendence’.[10] Moreover, for Laclau, Hardt and Negri’s identification of any notion of sovereignty with repression and their nomadic conception of a plurality of struggles in fact leave no room for the conceptualisation of the political action that could turn political demands into reality.
It is obvious that what we are seeing here are two opposing logics of political action, one that attempts to ground it in the contemporary ontology of labour and capitalist production, and one that attempts to think it in terms of a certain reclaiming of political space but also of central political notions. The first one projects the dynamics of a certain image of production, the other the transformation of democratic vocabulary into a contested signifying terrain. In a certain manner, it also represents the very evolution of political contestation during recent years, from the nomadic and/or anti-political character of the first wave of anti-globalist/anti-capitalist protests to the reclaiming of politics by those movements aiming at ‘real democracy’.
A Presentation of the Volume
The introductory text by Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis places the book in the perspective of a conjuncture marked by major popular movements characterised by forms of collective self-organisation and self-mobilisation. They insist that ‘[t]he horizontal, non-representative networks of autonomous multiplicities on the one hand, the struggles of popular blocs that claim to represent universal interests and strive to impose their sovereign will, on the other hand, offer two alternative ways to make sense of democratic agency and the strategies of social transformation’ (p. 5). In this sense, the opposing definitions of democratic agency in contemporary movements represent the main question that this collective volume attempts to answer.
Benjamin Arditi’s contribution to the volume attempts to revisit the contribution of Laclau and Mouffe to a post-Marxist conception of politics centred on the notion of hegemony.[11] Although Arditi praises the overall theoretical importance of the work of Laclau and Mouffe, he is critical of certain tensions within it. In particular, he stresses the fact that Laclau and Mouffe present hegemony as the paradigmatic or ‘universal form of politics or at least of democratic politics’ (p. 21). This conception sees ‘all politics as hegemonic politics’ (p. 24) without any outside. In contrast to this conception, Arditi introduces the concept ofpost-hegemony. He employs the example of the broad spectrum of protest in Argentina in December 2001, which saw mobilisations that were political, but which, according to Arditi, could not easily fit into the conceptualisation of hegemony. Arditi suggests that the same goes for new internationalist networks of solidarity. In contrast, the politics associated with a potentialexodus of the Multitude, either in the form presented in Hardt and Negri’s theorisation or in the work of Virno, offer a way to think a politics that includes and does not cancel the singularity of each element. Arditi also refers positively to the Deleuzian themes of rhizomatic politics and the politics of becoming-minoritarian, and he discusses John Holloway’s conception of politics and Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zones[12] as attempts to delineate a politics of defection. He also turns his attention to what he designates as ‘viral politics’ (p. 38) associated with internet-based initiatives and campaigns. His conclusion is that there are indeed ‘ways of doing politics that bypass the Neo-Gramscian logic of hegemony and counter-hegemony characteristic of most of what is usually inventoried under the name “politics” today’ (p. 41). Consequently ‘post-hegemony is a well-placed wager that validates a range of formats of collective action that were either ignored or dismissed by the advocates of the theory of hegemony’ (ibid.), ways to do politics that ‘certainly bypass the liberal democratic framework and that can function to trigger enthusiasm for politics among the disenfranchised and those who have become disenchanted by existing vehicles for participating in the process of shaping their lived world’ (p. 42). Overall, in Arditi’s case we are dealing with a post-hegemonic conception of politics, based upon an emphasis on singularity and a certain distrust of universalising discourses.
The second chapter of the volume is by Richard J.F. Day and Nick Montgomery, and represents a neo-anarchist position[13] according to which contemporary mass movements can be explained as ‘neither the People, nor the Multitude’ (p. 47). The authors accept some of the premises of Hardt and Negri’s conception of Empire, such as the decentralised character of Empire, the importance of enclosures and privatisation and the biopolitics of control over life. However, they think that the concept of the Multitude is an ‘abstract and universalizing’ one and that Hardt and Negri are themselves engaged in a ‘stagist narrative’ of ‘altermodernity’ (p. 56). Day and Montgomery reject both the notion of the Multitude and the notion of the People, since they both ‘remain excessively hegemonic in their orientation; that is, they seek to subsume disparate forces under a single banner, they seek to provide coherence and a centre, even while apparently insisting on decentralization and multiplicity’ (p. 59). Through their reading of Federici, they suggest that the very notion of the Common has to ‘beindigenized’ (p. 61) and that we must think the Exodus from the Empire in terms ofautonomies, deriving their inspiration from ‘non-sectarian, social anarchist traditions’ (p. 65), emphasising their plural character to avoid any conception of ‘transcendent totality’ (p. 69). What is interesting in Day and Montgomery’s contribution is precisely this combination of classical anarchist positions with a rejection of hegemony and any attempt towards universalising political interpretations, in contrast perhaps to the rather universalising conception of emancipation that historic anarchism shared with the socialist/communist tradition. By doing this, they also bring forward the limits of such anarchist positions, namely their inability to think of politics outside the terrain of movements and singular resistances.
Jodi Dean in her contribution[14] attempts to rethink the notion of the sovereignty of the people as part of her rethinking of communism. For Dean, the notion of the people is a ‘modulation of the idea of the proletariat as the subject of communism’ (p. 73). The sovereignty of the people refers to the dictatorship of the proletariat, ‘the direct and fearsome rule of the collective people over those who would oppress and exploit them’ (ibid.). Dean insists that the notion of the proletariat is relevant today, provided that we do not identify it with the traditional industrial working-class and take into account the shift toward the service economy. She supports her own conceptualisation of the people as ‘the rest of us’ by reference to Rancière’s notion of the ‘part-of-no-part’,[15] in order to think of the people as ‘a dividing and divisive force’, especially since, ‘[w]hile the people as the rest of us, as the part-of-no-part, is better than “proletariat” and “multitude” as a designator for the contemporary subject of communism, class struggle remains essential as the name for the fundamental antagonism through which society emerges – the division between the rich and the rest of us’ (p. 77). Consequently, the sovereignty of the people ‘points to a view of the state as what we use to govern forus as a collectivity. It is our collective steering of our common future for our common good’ (p. 79). Through a reading of Foucault’s theorisation of liberal governmentality, Dean suggests that ‘[l]iberal political economy is a limiting of the people as a collective force’ (p. 81).
However, there is the problem of the divisive character of the people in its ‘nonidentity with its sovereignty’ (p. 83). Through references to Susan Buck-Morris, Giorgio Agamben and psychoanalytic theory, Dean suggests that a way to think of this question would be to use the psychoanalytic distinction between desire (that which cannot be fulfilled) and drive as a repetitive process of not reaching jouissance.
The people as desiring have needs, needs they can only address together, collectively, active and in common. Their sovereignty can be reduced neither to their majority nor to their procedures. Rather it names the cause and reason for government: the collective people in their desire for a common good. The people as caught in drive are fragmented, dispersed into networks and tributaries. Stuck in drive’s repetitive loops, they pursue their separate enterprises even as they are governmentalized objects, a population. (p. 85.)
In order to theorise the conception of sovereignty as a ‘collective steering of our common resources and conditions’ (p. 87) Dean turns to Peter Hallward’s conception of popular will, which she defines as a dialectical ‘voluntarism’. According to Dean, ‘Hallward’s dialectical voluntarism suggests an understanding of the sovereignty of the people in terms of a collective egalitarian universalist desire’ (p. 89). This dialectical voluntarism can only be thought in terms of Marx’s ‘description of communism as the free development of each compatible with the free development of all’ (p. 90). In this sense, sovereignty is ‘unavoidably partial and incomplete’ (ibid.), but we must insist on this struggle as the condition of keeping the communist desire alive. In Dean’s case we are dealing with a very interesting attempt to combine the reference to the people and popular sovereignty with a class perspective and a communist orientation.
Saul Newman’s contribution attempts to theorise the new political terrain opened up by the politics of occupation of public space, a terrain of autonomous politics, that cannot be thought of in terms of the People or the Multitude, but rather ‘through the figures of exodus and insurrection as the reclamation of self’ (p. 94). Newman stresses the importance of the ‘deconstruction of the essentialism of traditional Marxist class identities’ (p. 95), which is necessary in order to theorise the plural character of contemporary mass movements, that are anticapitalist but at the same time against environmental destruction, state authoritarianism and enclosures. However, contemporary autonomous politics goes beyond the politics of hegemony, especially since hegemony ‘is a project of power, a project which aims to take over a position of power’ (p. 98). Contemporary movements do not ‘seek to participate in state power, or even to take it over in some revolutionary sense, but to foster autonomous relations and ways of being in the here and now’ (p. 99). Consequently, a politics of autonomy today can be better thought of in terms of ‘Miguel Abensour’s anarchic insurgent democracy’ (p. 100)[16] than in terms of the redefinition of populist politics suggested by Laclau and Mouffe. Regarding the conception of the Multitude offered by Negri and Hardt, Newman disagrees with what he defines as the ‘immanentist theory that underpins it’ and a ‘certain developmental logic […] in which the extension of global capitalism and its biopolitical processes and technological developments is welcomed as an inevitable stage before the coming of the multitude’ (p. 104). Instead, he suggests a politics around the concept of insurrection which ‘involves not so much the seizure of the apparatus of power, but rather a micro-political and ethical transformation of ourselves’ (p. 107), a politics of the transformation of the subject that is opposed to the notion of the revolution, which is associated with the imposition of a social and political order in contrast to autonomous self-arrangement. Again we have here the opposition between a politics of hegemony and an insurrectionary autonomous politics, a thread common to many interventions in this debate.
The contribution by Yannis Stavrakakis attempts to deal with criticisms against the positions of Laclau and Mouffe. He begins with Norman Geras’s critique of the supposedly idealist-relativist discursive conception of reality, as an archetype of this kind of criticism.[17] He also points to recent criticisms of the very notion of hegemony exemplified in positions such as Day’s. For Stavrakakis there are two variants to this argument. The first argument, which Stavrakakis attributes to Scott Lash,[18] is that hegemony was relevant within specific historical periods, but now we have entered an era of ‘post-hegemony’ (p. 116). The second argument rejects this temporal/historical aspect and instead considers hegemony as politically suspect, since it mimics ‘the power structures’ (p. 118). He attributes this line of criticism in particular to Jon Beasley-Murray,[19] and his insistence that it is not hegemony that secures social order but rather habit and affect. In contrast, Stavrakakis insists that ‘a multitude of autonomous struggles have become historically effective only when articulated within a common counter-hegemonic horizon of representation’ (p. 120), exemplified both in contemporary movements of indignation but also in the importance of populist (in Laclau’s sense of the term) parties such as ‘SYRIZA in the contemporary Greek situation [and] Kirchner’s Peronists in Argentina’ (p. 121). Stavrakakis rejects both the ‘quasi-eschatological structure’ (p. 122) of Lash’s passage to post-hegemony and the binary dichotomies associated with criticisms of hegemony – ‘inside/outside, before/after, hegemony/post-hegemony, representational/real, meaning/being, horizontality/verticality, discourse/affect’ – because they underestimate the extent to which these distinctions function ‘within a historical dialectics of mutual engagement and co-constitution’ (p. 122). Through references to Foucault, Elias, Bourdieu, Thrift and Lazzarato, Stavrakakis rejects this kind of exclusive binary oppositions.
Not only are Day, Lash and Beasley-Murray incapable of registering the constitutive interpenetration between representation and affect, the symbolic and the real, discursive hegemony and biopolitics – precisely what the work of Foucault, Elias, Bourdieu, Thrift and Lazzarato seems to allow and encourage. By sticking to a caricature of Laclau’s discursive theory of hegemony, they have also failed to take notice of developments within the terrain of discourse theory which have been following a similar direction. (p. 127.)
In particular, Stavrakakis refers to the evolution of Laclau’s thinking and his engagement with the ‘problematics of affectivity and jouissance […] [and] the more affirmative modalities of the Lacanian real’ (p. 127). Stavrakakis’s conclusion is that such criticisms of Laclau, in their ‘passion for the real’, in the end fail to stress contradictions which precisely have to do with the unavoidability of representation: ‘there is no repression without a return of the repressed; thus representation and discourse return to haunt post-hegemonic arguments. Leading them to one contradiction after the other’ (p. 130). In the case of Stavrakakis we are dealing with a defence of the relevance of Laclau for contemporary social and political developments, and in particular of the relevance not only of the notion of hegemony but also of Laclau’s conception of populism for the analysis of broad-left movements such as SYRIZA. In particular, it is important to highlight Stavrakakis’s insistence on the importance of representation as an unavoidable aspect of any attempt to articulate contemporary struggles into hegemonic projects.
The contribution of Paul Rekret returns to the debate between Laclau and Negri as a return to the question of an ontology of the political. He insists that ‘[i]f the broad claim articulated by post-foundational thinkers is that political philosophy and political science “displace” or disavow the political by seeking to eliminate dissonance, difference, conflict or struggle, then the widely shared aim of the ontological turn in post-foundational political thought might be defined as the attempt to think the being of the political in itself and not to confine politics to the juridical or regulative tasks to which it has traditionally been limited’ (p. 134). For Rekret the theoretical importance of Laclau lies in his ‘post-Marxist political logic of contingency’ (p. 135), and his reappropriation of the notion of hegemony from Gramsci along with his rejection of any ‘privileged agent of emancipation’ (p. 136). He also suggests that there are similarities with Hardt’s and Negri’s project which ‘can thus best be understood as an attempt to develop a post-Marxist political theory that would not reduce class struggle to the traditional notion of the working class but which engages with the variety of heterogenous actors engaged in political struggles in late capitalism’ (p. 137). At the same time he stresses their main difference, namely the fact that there is a distance between Laclau’s insistence on political contingency and Negri’s ‘focus upon the emancipatory potential contained in changes to the forces of production’ (p. 138).
One of the main points of Rekret’s contribution is that both Laclau and Negri display a certain ontological narcissism in the sense of an ‘understanding of the present as singular bearer of the ontological truths one holds’ (p. 139). In the case of Laclau this is evident in the centrality of the field of discursivity and its unavoidably antagonistic character, and in Negri in the centrality of the constituent power of the Multitude conceived as constant creativity and innovation. Consequently,
both thinkers shift the terrain of their arguments to the domain of ontological axioms. Thus, for Laclau class decomposition actualizes and confirms the possibility of antagonism in the abstractions of the absolute horizontality of the play of differences to which all phenomena are subsumed while for Negri the autonomy of the multitude against empire is grounded in the claim that the former is merely the embodiment of a generalized constituent power. Antagonism for both thinkers is thus premised upon the post-foundational move of locating the political in the ontological register. (p. 142.)
According to Rekret, in both cases, this kind of ontological grounding leaves no room for any other reference apart from the autonomy of the Multitude in the case of Negri and discourse in the case of Laclau. Thus there is no ‘criterion by which antagonisms can be evaluated and analyzed’ (p. 143). The result is that, although incommensurable, both ontologies lead to the same theoretical and political dead-end. In this sense, Rekret’s intervention is a useful reminder of both the persistence of ontological references to contemporary post-foundational political thinking but also of the limits of such an ontological approach.
This theoretical cul-de-sac of circular political debates is the direct result of the turn to the resources of post-foundational political ontology in the attempt to guarantee the possibility of political struggle in the absence or decline of a politicized working class. […] Sutured to ontology, political theory is caught in endless circles of self-reference. (p. 146.)
Alexandros Kioupkiolis sets out in his contribution to reject the commonly held assumption that contemporary movements ‘have ritually consigned hegemony to the dustbin of history’, suggesting instead that ‘hegemony should be radically recast beyond recognition, assuming a multitudinous form that can dismantle its hierarchical, homogenizing and ideological closures’ (p. 150). Kioupkiolis sets out to present both the main aspects of Hardt and Negri’s theorisation of the Multitude as an embodiment of contemporary capitalist biopolitics and of the emergence of new collective emancipatory collective practices. Then he presents the main criticisms against this conceptualization of the Multitude by Laclau and Rancière and their ‘charges of spontaneism, teleology and non-political nature’ (p. 155). However, he suggests that more recent interventions by Hardt and Negri, such as Commonwealth andDeclaration,[20] in fact answer some of these criticisms, by their references to constituent processes emerging in the democratic forms of contemporary movements of indignation and by referring to the Multitude as ‘a political project for the institution of an autonomous, egalitarian and common democracy, whose rudiments are furnished by the new forms of biopolitical labour and new social movements’ (p. 156). At the same time, he stresses the still ‘ontological and historical-material guarantees’ (p. 157) in Hardt’s and Negri’s theorisation. In light of these, Kioupkiolis attempts to offer a theoretical and political project that moves beyond the Multitude/hegemony dichotomy. In his own words:
autonomous multiplicities should actively pursue hegemonic forms of political intervention if they are to gain the power to change the world in their plural images of collective freedom, toppling the ruling forces of today. However, in their re-enactments of sovereign hegemony, such multitudes should effectively contest, twist, distort and reconfigure its prevailing structures if they aspire to enhanced freedom and equality. (p. 157.)
For Kioupkiolis, hegemony is still relevant for the analysis of contemporary movements. ‘Despite their explicit opposition to delegation, hierarchical organization, party partisanship and ideological unity, the core constituents of “hegemony” – representation, antagonism, uneven power and “chains of equivalence” which fashion collective identities around empty signifiers – stand out as building blocks of their political discourse and action’ (p. 159). Consequently, contemporary movements need first to ‘pursue hegemony as a struggle to reconfigure the existing composition of forces and replace it with a different power structure that will strain to minimize domination, hierarchies and exclusions’; secondly, ‘a variable degree of hegemony as collective unity-cohesion will be still needed to avoid mutually destructive collisions and incompatibilities’; and thirdly, ‘relations of representation and the dialectics of particularity/universality […] will be reproduced in any association in which the will of the many does not coincide with the will of all’ (p. 163). At the same time, contemporary mass movements as self-organised multiplicities of singularities will radically upset and reconfigure hegemonic politics through ‘variable hybridizations of verticality, concentration and horizontality’ (p. 164), the ‘affirmation of diversity and autonomous constituent practices’ (ibid.), a ‘composition of differences [that] will not be dictated by abstract, a priori laws’ (p. 165), and by making ‘representation accessible to the active engagement and the widening influence of the “represented”’ (ibid.). Consequently, this form of political association of the Multitude ‘could also fuel the relentless subversion of hierarchies, closures and new patterns of domination from within, holding out the prospect of a world beyond hegemony in a universe still bridled with it’ (p. 166). In the case of Kioupkiolis we are dealing with an interesting attempt towards a more transformative conception of hegemony, one that acknowledges its importance as part of the process of transforming movements into political forces of emancipation and, at the same time, stresses the need for collective political practices that subvert the reproduction of hierarchies and power relations.
Giorgos Katsambekis’s contribution attempts to think the Multitude/People cleavage in light of recent mass mobilisation in Greece, in order to go beyond this dichotomy. For Katsambekis it is possible to think of the politics of the Multitude and at the same time insist on the pertinence of the notion of the people as part of a ‘project of a radical and plural democracy’ (p. 171). For Katsambekis the best way to overcome this dichotomy is to think of a ‘multitudinous people’ that as a notion ‘can bring together in a single term at once the signification of the people’s constitutive internal divide and ambiguity, its irreducible heterogeneity and plurality, along with the multiplicity that characterizes collective action in the twenty-first century’ (p. 172). In this sense, ‘the “people” and the “multitude” mark certain potential crystallizations of collective/democratic agency and not empirical data’ (p. 177). The very emergence of a collective ‘we’ suggests precisely an act of representation and an assumption of universality that can be associated with the notion of the people. ‘The multitude can be seen, in these terms, as a state or metonymy of the people, or even as an internal moment/possibility’ (p. 179). Katsambekis uses the example of theaganaktismenoi movement in Greece, from May to July 2011, as an example of this collective performative production of the multitudinous people, emphasising its horizontal, democratic, participatory character and the emergence of a collective ‘we’. In this sense, Katsambekis insists ‘we can even go as far as to suggest that theaganaktismenoi constitute a form of progressive democraticpopulism in its purest form’ (pp. 183–4). Consequently, the notion of the multitudinous people expresses precisely this ‘inescapable slippage between people and multitude, already inherent in the conception of the “people”’. The people becomes less a reality and more a ‘constantpolitical project […] advancing […] an endless struggle for democracy’ (p. 187). This is indeed an interesting approach in order to combine the multitudinous character of contemporary mass mobilisation and the emergence of a certain notion of the people as a collective subject. However, especially regarding movements such as theaganaktismenoi in Greece, more attention is needed regarding the class composition of such movements and how they represent an alliancein actu of the working classes, with youths, with petit-bourgeois strata, in their common struggle against austerity.
The contribution by Andy Knott attempts a comparison of the positions of Laclau on the one hand, and Hardt and Negri on the other, regarding representation and political space using UK Uncut and Occupy as examples. Beginning with a reference to the relation between political space and representation, Knott stresses the persistence of spatial references in the work of Laclau leading to ‘both a pluralization and a complexification of political space’ (p. 193). However, ‘such spaces are never purely self-contained – they are never a pure particularity – but, rather, attempt to establish relations with other political spaces’ (p. 194). It is here that the possibility of representation emerges, despite Laclau and Mouffe’s initial rejection of representation in favour of articulation. However, since for Laclau the end of representation is full emancipation and a powerless society, and given the impossibility of this, relations of representation are inevitable, although we must ‘speak of representations in the plural’ (p. 197), whose expansion means that alternative political forms, apart from the political party, also emerge, as exemplified in movements such as Occupy and UK Uncut. Regarding the work of Antonio Negri, Knott stresses that, although there are not so many spatial references, in fact the transition from the mass worker to the social worker is also a change of topos in the sense of an exit from the factory. Spatial references are more prominent inEmpire, with its references to the deterritorialised space of the Empire and the metropolis as the site of bio-political production. In recent Hardt and Negri texts representation is linked only to a territorialising logic of sovereignty, meaning that in their work ‘[t]here are never representations in the plural […,] the concept of representation is necessarily associated with that of the transcendent One’ (p. 203). However, this means that ‘the application of a non-representational form of politics remains problematic’ (p. 204).
Knott then turns his attention to UK Uncut and Occupy as new forms of political space. He insists that ‘UK Uncut serves as yet another example of the expansion of the political space’ (p. 206) by subverting the role and function of retail outlets. In its turn, ‘Occupy sought to (re)appropriate public space, primarily through encampments which aimed to practice and promote open, participatory democratic forms and debate’ (p. 207). In contrast to the anti-representational positions of Hardt and Negri, and more in support of Laclau’s problematisation of representation, ‘these expanded political spaces, and their representative role, serve as an addendum to the traditional form of representation associated with liberal democracy’ (p. 209). What we have here is not only a defence of Laclau’s theorisation of representation, but also an important contribution to the importance of political space in the emergence of new collective movements.
The final contribution to the volume is by Marina Prentoulis and Lasse Thomassen, and attempts to consider the notions of autonomy and hegemony in regard to the 2011 protests in Greece and Spain. For Prentoulis and Thomassen the fact that the movements of indignation in Greece and Spain both rejected traditional party (and left-wing party) politics and sought new forms of representation implies that a ‘dialogue between hegemony and autonomy is necessary in order to grasp the movements of the squares’ (p. 214), overcoming the mutual suspicion of these two political logics, in both Marxism and anarchism. Beginning with the exemplification in post-Marxism of this opposition in the contrasting theorisations offered by Laclau and Hardt/Negri, they attempt to see the different interpretations of the movements of the squares either as emphasis on the need to transform themselves into a collective will, or as stressing their horizontal and leaderless character, or as bringing forward the fundamental antagonisms traversing contemporary societies. Consequently, the political challenge is ‘how these struggles can be connected or united, in a way that does not do violence to the singularity of the particular struggles, while also establishing some relation among the struggles’ (p. 218), something evident in the difficulties facing these movements regarding the creation of media forms that would not distort their voices or create centralised forms of communication. Regarding the movements in both Greece and Spain, they stress that in both cases ‘potentially universally inclusive signifiers’ (p. 224) emerged, enabled by the creation of an ‘antagonistic frontier vis-à-vis an “other”’ (p. 225), such as the Troika in Greece or national elites in Spain. However, in their organisational structure we can witness the ‘mutual contamination of horizontality and verticality, and of autonomy and hegemony’ (p. 226). Regarding the logic of hegemony, this emerges especially in the attempts to transform the social and political dynamics of the movements into electoral dynamics, exemplified in the metonymic displacements that led to the political and electoral prominence of SYRIZA, without reducing the reproduction of the tensions of the two logics. However, it is important to go beyond the simple opposition between autonomy and hegemony, since ‘in Laclau and Mouffe’s variant, the concept of hegemony can account for horizontal and autonomist struggles as the latter are always contaminated by vertical and representational relations’ (p. 231), while at the same time experiments in horizontality and autonomy also ‘influence the direction of democratic politics in a more radical direction’ (p. 232). Again, we have here a reference to the complexity of the collective politics of such movements that cannot be theorised by a simple dichotomy between autonomy and hegemony. However, again we face the question of the relation between the emergence of these movements and class relations, alliances and strategies.
An Assessment
It is obvious that we are dealing here with an important volume, not only because of the significance of the contemporary movements that form its reference point, but also because of the theoretical questions posed here. Of particular importance is this dialogue between, on the one hand, the problematic of hegemony, representation and populism in the work of Laclau and Mouffe, and on the other the new emphasis on autonomy in the work of Hardt and Negri but also in other recent neo-anarchist positions. The importance of this volume lies precisely in the fact that it does not only present the variations of a theoretical debate, but also engages in a dialogue with contemporary movements in their originality.
Moreover, the different positions presented here are not only expressions of different conceptual frameworks or theories but also of different directions within radical social theory when faced with the interpretation of such forms of mass-politics. On the one hand, we have all the emphasis on singular resistances and movements, in their insurrectionary potential that forms the basis of the interventions of Arditi, Day and Montgomery, and Newman; interventions that, at the same time, bring forward the limits of the negation of the hegemonic aspect of the politics of emancipation. On the other hand, the interventions that stress the importance of the hegemonic articulation of the notion of the people in contemporary movements, such as the ones by Stavrakakis, Prentoulis and Thomassen, tend to give less importance to the relation between hegemonic projects and class strategies. In his turn, Knott combines the reference to representation with the importance of the creation of political spaces, whereas Rekret’s intervention is interesting in this sense because it underlines the fact that a certain degree of ontological thinking is common to both approaches. Inside the dialogue between these different approaches, the interventions by Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis attempt a more complex approach that combines the emphasis on the singularity of resistances with the importance of the hegemonic instance and a certain notion of the people, whereas Dean attempts an interesting rereading of the notion of the people as part of a communist perspective.
If we try to reflect upon this debate we can see that there is a tension running through it. On the one hand, there is the need to ground the formation of social agents in the dynamics and antagonisms of capitalist production, both in the sense of the classical Marxist emphasis on class determination and of Negri’s conception of an immanent political potentiality of the forces of labour. On the other hand, there is the realisation that political mobilisation is never simply a reflection of the antagonisms at the level of production, but is always formed through forms of political metonymy and condensation, or what Althusser already in the 1960s defined as overdetermination.[21] It is here that the dialogue with the Gramscian conception of hegemony enters the stage.
At the same time, this volume brings forward the limits of remaining within the framework of this tension. I am not denying that in a certain sense this tension can be found even in classical Marxism exemplified, as Étienne Balibar has shown, in the discrepancy between the proletariat as potentially political collective force and labour as part of the constitutive antagonistic relation at the heart of capitalist production and reproduction.[22] However, to take this discrepancy as given and remain within its contours can only lead to dichotomies such as the one between the Multitude and the People. These dichotomies cannot be superseded by simply subsuming one term to the other, either by treating the People as a simple reflection of the forces of labour in contemporary capitalist production or by treating the Multitude as, basically, a politically performative concept. The reason is that such a dichotomy only reproduces the limitations of both perspectives. On the one hand, any attempt towards thinking in terms of an immanent grounding of collective subjects in the antagonisms of capitalist production runs the risk of essentialism and leaves no room for political practice other than simply helping the emergence of teleologically determined eventualities. From classical Hegelian-Marxist or Stalinist narratives of the primacy of the forces of production to Negri’s conception of biopolitical production, there is always the danger of a theorisation of a teleology inscribed in capitalist production as the constant production of its inescapable opposite, precisely something that represents historicism in the negative sense that had been the target of Althusser’s critique.
On the other hand, the complete delinking of politics from production-based social antagonisms, especially in the case of the work of Laclau, runs the risk, despite Laclau’s numerous warnings, of treating politics as a fully autonomous sphere, with no other determination than the constitutive lack and antagonism in social practices as discursive practices. It is true that Laclau tried at length to insist that his own notion of discourse refers mainly to the relational and articulated character of social practices, but still the problem of treating politics as a signifying process remains. Or to put it differently, the fact that politics includes signifying practices does not mean that politics is a signifying process. In this sense, Rancière’s conception of the People as the part of those that are not part has the theoretical advantage of including a reference not only to political non-representation, but also to class domination and exclusion. Moreover, the tendency to treat forms of collective mobilisation, such as the ones that we have experienced in the past few years, as mainly processes of political performativity and signification indeed runs the risk of obliterating the importance of class analysis and of class strategies in contemporary debates regarding the politics of both movements and left-wing fronts.
Moreover, this book brings forward some crucial theoretical and, in the last instance, political problems. One is the opposition between hegemony and post-hegemony. Here the very notion of hegemony in a large part of the debate misses all the complexity of the Gramscian notion of hegemony.[23] Instead, hegemony is either identified with the emphasis on consent alongside coercion, or with the relative autonomy of the political, or with its necessarily metonymical, symbolic and discursive character. Consequently, post-hegemony is identified in fact with anti-politics, with the return to the real of social antagonism and the potentiality of the Multitude. What is missing is precisely the relational and strategic character of the notion of hegemony as an attempt to think political power, class antagonism and transformation in class societies. In its original Gramscian formulation, hegemony cannot be reduced to the terrain of discourse, or ideology, or of politics as representation. Gramsci’s constant references to the grounding of hegemony in all aspects of social praxis, including the antagonisms within capitalist production, his attention to ‘molecular’ social and political practices, his interest in the hegemonic aspects of emerging capitalist regimes of accumulation as exemplified in his interest in ‘Americanism’ and ‘Fordism’, all these attest to the limits of treating hegemony in discursive or performative terms.
In this sense, it is still necessary to retrace what Balibar defined as Marx’s theoretical short-circuit between production and politics, which did not imply a simple grounding of politics in the economy or a conception of politics as the epiphenomenon of the economic essence but rather a different conception of both economy and politics. Within this context, the economy becomes a terrain of political struggles, the political a terrain of antagonisms that have to do with class strategies that in the last instance relate to antagonistic positions on the terrain of production. Moreover, a different conception of political practice emerges, a new practice of politics, a politics of labour, a politics that suggests: ‘(1) the political power of the workers (or better, of citizens in as much as they are workers); (2) the transformation of the forms of labour through political struggle; and (3) the transformation of forms of “government” by the recognition of labor-power’s capacities to expand (unlike productivism which represses such capacities)’.[24] This new practice of politics, based upon this ‘short-circuit’ between the economic and the political in capitalism, is – in a certain way – the answer to the dichotomy between stressing the political instance, as the terrain of the emergence of hegemony, and stressing social potentiality at the level of social production. What this conception of a new practice politics offers is, in a certain way, a combined socialisation of politics and politicisation of the social that enables us to think movements of emancipation as at the same time processes of political constitution and social transformation.
The other crucial problem is the danger of reducing the political alternatives to the opposition between a neo-anarchist emphasis on social movements, in their nomadic horizontality and refusal of political mediation, and a neo-populist conception of radical democratic politics aiming at the formation of broad political movements organised around the reappropriation of signifiers such as democracy, dignity and sovereignty. What is missing in this opposition is precisely the class-strategic character of (counter)hegemonic projects, its relation to the contradictions of capitalist accumulation and contemporary forms of imperialism, the necessity to rethink radical democracy in its relation to socialist transformation. And this can also have serious political consequences. The example of Greece and the experience of SYRIZA show that the simple translation of social dynamics into political representation by means of a broad anti-austerity front, based upon the new discursive constructions of the people emerging from the movement, does not of itself constitute a new hegemonic project. This would have required a more ‘organic relation’ to particular social movements and class practices and a programme that transforms the demand for democracy or dignity into a new narrative antagonistic to the dominant capitalist strategy and the embedded neoliberalism of the European integration process.
But what about the People, this ‘we’ that emerges in contemporary movements, if we avoid treating it as a simple metonym for the Multitude, or the Labour Force, or the Proletariat, and also refuse to treat it as the contingent outcome of the interplay in the chain of political signifiers? I think that it is here where the very notion of hegemony in its Gramscian sense arises. In contrast to the version of hegemony offered in the work of Laclau, which in a certain way presents hegemony as simply the political/discursive aspect of social relationality, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony refers to the complexity of political power and its strategic relational character while retaining the connection between hegemonic projects and class positions and antagonisms. In this sense, the People, at least as regards capitalist societies, is not just a metonym for the plebeian or excluded social strata, but instead refers to the potentially hegemonic role of the working classes and their ability to forge a broader alliance of the subaltern classes around a common project that attempts to undermine bourgeois hegemony and open up new possibilities of socialist transformation. To this we could also add another strategic concept: that of the historic bloc, that refers precisely to the combination between a social alliance, a hegemonic project and new forms of organisation, of doing politics.[25]
In light of this, the particularity and the importance of contemporary movements is that they are not simple expressions of social and political contestation. Nor can they be described in terms of simple nomadic practices and resistances. The references to social majority, not only the reclaiming of public space but also the demand for a central political role, the demand for radical solutions, the demand for dignity and democracy as active opposition to neoliberalism, the demand for popular sovereignty as a class project, all these attest to the emergence of potential new historical blocs. Rethinking hegemony requires us to think of the historical bloc as a strategic and not descriptive notion. It points to the need to rethink the political programme as radical alternative, to the importance of forms of collective organisation of the subaltern classes, to the necessity of political forms that can help the emergence of new forms of mass-political intellectuality.
Consequently, the challenge is not simply to oppose the horizontal to the vertical forms of organisation, or to think in terms of oppositions between the new forms of democracy of struggle and the potential political or even electoral translation of the new movements, or in terms of an opposition between politics and anti-politics. What is needed is to think in terms of a new practice of politics. One that could combine the challenge of political power with the emphasis on autonomous democratic forms of popular organisation which could offer the surplus of force ‘from below’ to counter the capitalist strategies that are inscribed in the very materiality of state institutions and practices, thus extending the potential of contemporary democratic practices in the movements. Moreover, this also requires strategic answers to the question of political strategy and programmes, in order to make sure that we are not dealing simply with a list of grievances but with elaborated alternative anticapitalist narratives for our societies. The contradictions and shortcomings of any attempt to simply translate movement dynamics and demands into electoral dynamics without autonomous forms of popular organisation and without elaboration of the conditions for an alternative programme were more than obvious in the Greek case. This also requires that we treat contemporary movements as learning practices, both in relation to the elaboration of alternative social configurations and in relation to the emergence of new democratic practices.
However, these points should not be read as an attempt to underestimate the scope of this collective volume. In contrast, they point to its importance and usefulness, as a contribution to an open debate that is not only theoretical but also political.
References
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Althusser, Louis 1969, For Marx, translated by Ben Brewster, London: Allen Lane.
Arditi, Benjamin 2007, Politics on the Edges of Liberalism: Difference, Populism, Revolution, Agitation, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Balibar, Étienne 1994, Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy before and after Marx, London: Routledge.
Beasley-Murray, Jon 2010, Post-Hegemony: Political Theory and Latin America, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Bey, Hakim 1991, T.A.Z.: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchism, Poetic Terrorism, New York: Autonomedia.
Buci-Glucksmann, Christine 1980, Gramsci and the State, translated by David Fernbach, London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Day, Richard F. 2005, Gramsci Is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements, London: Pluto Press.
Dean, Jodi 2012, The Communist Horizon, London: Verso.
Geras, Norman 1987, ‘Post-Marxism?’, New Left Review, I, 163: 40–82.
Geras, Norman 1988, ‘Ex-Marxism without Substance? Being a Real Reply to Laclau and Mouffe’, New Left Review, I, 169: 34–61.
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Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri 2000, Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri 2012, Declaration, New York: Argo-Navis Author Services.
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Laclau, Ernesto 2005, On Populist Reason, London: Verso.
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[1] Hardt and Negri 2000; Hardt and Negri 2004; Hardt and Negri 2009.
[2] ‘Instead revolution must simultaneously be both insurrection and institution, structural and superstructural transformation. This is the path of the “becoming-Prince” of the multitude.’ (Hardt and Negri 2009, p. 367.)
[3] Rancière 1995; Rancière 1999; Rancière 2001; Rancière 2006.
[4] In particular in Laclau 2005.
[5] Mouffe 2013.
[6] For Stavrakakis’s theoretical contributions, see Stavrakakis 1999; Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis (eds.) 2000; Stavrakakis 2007.
[7] Laclau 2005, p. 117.
[8] Laclau 2005, p. 110.
[9] Laclau and Mouffe 1985.
[10] Laclau 2015, p. 216.
[11] For Arditi’s positions, see also Arditi 2007.
[12] Bey 1991.
[13] For Day’s neo-anarchist positions, see Day 2005.
[14] Which is based upon a chapter of her Communist Horizon (Dean 2012).
[15] Rancière 2001.
[16] On the notion of insurgent democracy, see Abensour 2011.
[17] For the dialogue between Geras and Laclau & Mouffe, see Geras 1987, Geras 1988, and Laclau and Mouffe 1987.
[18] Lash 2007.
[19] Beasley-Murray 2010.
[20] Hardt and Negri 2012.
[21] Althusser 1969.
[22] Balibar 1994, pp. 125–49.
[23] Gramsci 1971; Buci-Glucksmann 1980; Thomas 2009.
[24] Balibar 1994, p. 141.
[25] On this reading of the historical bloc, see Sotiris 2014.
Two Revolutions, One International Legal Order
A Review of Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World by Jeremy Friedman
Eric Loefflad
Department of Law, University of Kent
edl4@kent.ac.uk
Abstract
While the Sino-Soviet spilt may have been one of the largest Left political schisms in history, comprehensive analysis of it is relatively rare. In this review-essay on Jeremy Friedman’s detailed historical account Shadow Cold War, the context and contemporary relevance of these events are thoroughly engaged. Towards this end, particular focus is placed upon Friedman’s depiction of a predominantly ‘anti-capitalist’ Soviet strategy and a predominantly ‘anti-imperialist’ Chinese strategy. Here an application of international legal theory as an analytical lens provides contextualisation of the historically contingent construction of ‘anti-capitalist’ versus ‘anti-imperialist’ strategies, as well as an explanation as to how the existing order’s rules and structures contributed to the contentious division between these two revolutionary movements.
Keywords
Cold War – international law – sovereignty – revolution – Soviet Union – People’s Republic of China – Third World – decolonisation
Jeremy Friedman, (2015) Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Introduction
In Shadow Cold War, historian Jeremy Friedman provides a rigorous and comprehensive account of the Sino-Soviet split in relation to Soviet and Chinese competition for influence in Asia, Africa and Latin America, with a core analytical focus on 1956–76. In framing this account, Friedman’s central point is that while both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’) were opposed to the Western capitalist order, their strategies differed in deeply consequential ways. This divergence is analysed under the banner of ‘Two Revolutions’, whereby the Soviet agenda was predominantly ‘anti-capitalist’ and the Chinese agenda was predominantly ‘anti-imperialist’. According to Friedman, when it came to building alliances with Third World states and national liberation movements in the era of decolonisation, these two revolutionary approaches addressed different issues, called for different tactics, and together form a vital, yet neglected, vantage point for understanding conflict and ideology during the Cold War.
In terms of the substantive divergence that justifies this ‘Two Revolutions’ label, for Friedman the Soviet Union’s predominantly ‘anti-capitalist’ approach could be viewed as confronting the primary problem of inequality within nations (with the issue of Western dominance being a consequence of capitalism’s expansive logic). As such, the solution consisted in transforming global relations of production through proletariat self-organisation within the world’s most advanced economic sectors. This was to be achieved by the promotion of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’, whereby the possibility of armed confrontation amongst the ideologically divergent superpowers would be displaced into the realm of competing socioeconomic models. By contrast, the PRC’s predominantly ‘anti-imperialist’ approach could be viewed as confronting the primary problem of inequalitybetween nations (with the issue of capitalism’s dominance being a consequence of Western imperialism). Under this view, the solution was to establish the colonised/postcolonial world as a base of global power capable of actively confronting the West. The intended mode of achieving this being militant ‘anti-imperialism’, whereby foreign influence was to be expunged in order to create the conditions whereby the non-Western world could pursue its destiny unimpeded.
Shadow Cold War’s Account
As a preliminary matter, an overview of Friedman’s account is in order. In terms of structure Shadow Cold War is divided into seven chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. While the introduction and conclusion provide theoretical reflections on the respective origins and legacies of the ‘two revolutions’, the five substantive chapters detail the specific instances of interaction between Third World states/liberation movements and the Soviet and Chinese governments from 1956 to 1976. In capturing the uniqueness of this history, Friedman’s treatment of the United States, while acknowledging its importance, is minimal for two reasons: ‘The first is that far more scholarship is available on its role in the Third World than on the Soviets or Chinese, and this book seeks to help bridge that gap. On a deeper level, however, the attention given to the United States is limited because this book is about the policy and ideological debates on the left, among those who already took the role of Washington as the leader of the imperialist powers to be axiomatic.’ (p. 22.) In making his argument, Friedman draws upon an impressive array of archival materials from ten different nations. Thus,Shadow Cold War provides an invaluable resource for those undertaking detailed contextual study of Cold War political/diplomatic interaction.
According to Shadow Cold War’s historical narrative, the Russian Revolution occurred with the expectation that the revolutionary current would move westward through Europe. This is reflected in the fact that ‘[m]any of the key figures of the Bolshevik Revolution – Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev and others – spent most of the decade before 1917 in European exile, in constant contact with their French and German comrades and viewing Russia from a distance.’ (p. 7.) Given its failure to spread in this capacity, it was only after the Second World War that the Soviet Union actively sought alliances with non-European revolutionary forces. In this context, early interactions between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’) were largely characterised by Soviet patron and Chinese client status. However, largely through the efforts of Mao, the PRC ultimately asserted an alternative revolutionary approach that drew upon its colonial experience and placed primacy on differences between European colonisers and the people they ruled.
This approach reflected two elements: a nationalist desire to incorporate as much of the nation as possible in the effort to build ‘New China’ and a consequent shift in the notion of class from one built strictly on one’s relations to the means of production to a more a more malleable one based on loyalty to the political system and its ideology. (p. 11.)
While largely concealed by the display of a united front against the capitalist powers, Shadow Cold War’s first chapter shows how these ideological tensions became increasingly unavoidable in the late 1950s. This was motivated immensely by Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 statement calling for ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ between the Soviets and the West that ‘… dispensed with the traditional Leninist notion that war between capitalism and socialism was ultimately inevitable’ (p. 25). While the PRC’s initial internal instability and lack of broad international influence limited its immediate ability to contest this idea, it became increasingly clear that ‘China’s priority was to unite as much of the world as possible in a broad anti-imperialist coalition for the sake of confronting the West.’ (p. 40.) In this capacity it was ‘meticulously analyzing class origins of individual leaders, class compositions of movements and regimes in order to better understand which leaders, movements, and states could be expected to be reliably anti-imperialist …’ (p. 40.) From this basis, Friedman shows how this tense dynamic manifested in a wide array of Soviet and Chinese interactions with Third World actors whereby ‘Sino-Soviet divisions exploded into the open in the spring and summer of 1960’ (p. 51).
From here, Chapter Two details how contentions were furthered when in 1961 the Soviet Union began to apply the originally Western-focused project of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ in the postcolonial world by promoting socialist socio-economic development projects. While the Soviets were able to take advantage of colonialism-based anti-capitalist sentiments, its own approach of ‘scientific socialism’ had to adapt to popular local projects ‘… ranging from Nasser’s “Arab Socialism” to Nkrumah’s “African Socialism”’ (p. 70). Moreover, in the process of doing so, the Soviets were competing with a West pursuing its own development agenda. It was thus hoped that ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ could be pursued through competing socio-economic models as opposed to armed confrontation. However, as Friedman shows, such a path alienated national liberation movements. This provided an audience for the PRC strategy of externally opposing the US and international organisations (especially the UN) ‘and internally in terms of expelling all Western influence at any cost’ (p. 86). Against this backdrop, much emphasis is given to the PRC’s propagandistic usage of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Here ‘[t]he image of the small, heroic island of Cuba facing the full might of the American imperial colossus, willing to risk annihilation in the cause of socialism, only to be betrayed by the cowards in the Kremlin, had captured the world’s attention and seemed to distil into its purest form everything the Chinese had been saying about the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and its consequences for world revolution.’ (p. 96.) Thus the Soviet Union was forced to choose between furthering Peaceful Coexistence via development or world revolution via militant decolonisation.
Following this, Chapter Three explains how by 1963 underlying tensions manifested in a highly visible Sino-Soviet split whereby ‘… Moscow and Beijing were left with no alternatives to a naked competition for influence’ (p. 102). Here, Friedman explains how the Soviets sought to limit Chinese-inspired diversion from their anti-capitalist agenda by replacing local nationalistic assertions with ‘revolutionary democracy’, whereby nationalist consolidation would go hand-in-hand with building transnational class solidarity. In addressing charges of ‘white interference’ in the non-European world, the Soviets sought to portray themselves as non- or quasi-Western and emphasised their Central Asian projects to show their model’s applicability to non-European societies. However, despite these efforts, Soviet success was limited by an influential Chinese diplomatic campaign that took advantage of Third World resentment at Soviet paternalism and concerns of future Soviet betrayal through an ultimate rapprochement with the colonial powers. These diplomatic endeavours were furthered by the articulation of a Chinese alternative to the Soviet development model that placed primacy on economic autonomy as opposed to building socialism, expanding production as opposed to equitable distribution of ownership over the means of production, and light industry and agriculture as opposed to heavy industry. Through these tactics, the PRC was able to compensate for a massive gap in military and economic aid compared to the Soviet Union. However, circumstances dramatically changed with the ousting of Khrushchev by Leonid Brezhnev, who was more concerned with establishing Soviet leadership over the world revolution than preserving the project of Peaceful Coexistence. This led to substantial Soviet engagement in numerous anti-imperialist activities in the mid-1960s, especially in the UAR (United Arab Republic), Algeria and Indonesia.
While the Soviet Union had committed itself to militant anti-colonial struggle largely in response to pressure from the PRC, Chapter Four details this dynamic in light of the PRC’s Cultural Revolution. While this event led to a mass diplomatic recall and prolonged Chinese absence from world affairs, this did not allow the Soviets to institute an unadulterated return to their previous strategy. For, ‘[t]he newly militant Soviet anti-imperialist policy had created certain expectations among friends and foes alike and backtracking would be difficult, if not impossible.’ (p. 155.) As an expression of this new militancy, earlier policies of economic development were subordinated to political/ideological initiatives, largely centred around national Communist parties. Towards this end, Soviet scholars portrayed the Cultural Revolution as the logical result of an ‘ideological heresy’ within Marxism that posed ‘… a particular danger for countries that had only just recently liberated themselves on the back of nationalist movements’ (p. 162). However, asserting this disciplinary role also meant increased Soviet entanglement in complex situations, including the Arab–Israeli Conflict and the Vietnam War, where Chinese influence continued to resonate. Yet, while the Soviet embrace of anti-imperialism strengthened its claim to world-revolutionary leadership, it nonetheless detracted from the Soviets’ Western-oriented strategy and greatly entrenched their commitments in a Third World where their influence was limited.
In Chapter Five, Shadow Cold War’s core account concludes with the early 1970s, when formal decolonisation had been largely accomplished. As a result of this change, the greater Third World project shifted from armed struggle to transforming the global mechanisms of resource production/distribution. Within this timeframe the Soviet Union’s Third World strategy was deeply influenced by the 1971 election of Salvador Allende in Chile, which led to the articulation of an ‘electoral path to socialism’. However, such endeavours that fixated on inequalities within nations had to contend with the rise of dependency-theory, which offered an account of inequalities between nations that, absent systemic re-ordering, could persist indefinitely after formal colonisation had ended.
For the Soviets dependency theory presented two major problems. First, it diminished the role of domestic political and economic transformations in favour of an analysis based on global mechanisms. Second, it divided the world not between East and West, socialism and capitalism, but between the ‘poor South’ and the ‘rich North,’ which once again separated the socialist and developing worlds and grouped the Soviets with the capitalist powers. (p. 193.)
Moreover, the PRC’s 1971 re-emergence onto the international stage and assumption of roles within international organisations (which included a seat on the UN Security Council) led many to believe it would assert itself as the leader of the new distribution-focused Third World agenda that was rallying around the New International Economic Order proposals. Furthermore, ambivalence concerning new Third World projects coupled with militant commitments led the Soviets to double-down on supporting the few remaining armed contestations linked to the original cause of world revolution, particularly in southern Africa and Palestine. While Chinese links with Israel and Apartheid South Africa fatally damaged claims to the mantle of revolutionary leadership, the PRC’s newfound coexistence with the West and international standing caused it to pursue its interests in a decidedly de-radicalised capacity. The Soviets, on the other hand, continued with militant anti-imperialism, yet dwindling resources and multiple tensions led it to draw clear distinctions in giving its support to Third World states firmly within the socialist camp – ‘Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Yemen, etc.’ (p. 214) – as opposed to those who were not. In this way, the Soviet endeavour of working towards a united revolutionary Second–Third World front broke down and the Third World was left divided.
In concluding, Friedman explains how the Soviet continuation with militant struggle in the Third World fuelled its internal contradictions and hastened its decline. Thus, by the early 1990s when Soviet collapse drew near, ‘leadership of the anti-imperialist struggle, which Moscow fought so hard for, became not only unnecessary, but also a liability and a rueful memory.’ (p. 221.) As for the PRC, despite turning away from world revolution, it maintained an independent, anti-imperial stance and thus (in stark contrast to locations such as post-1989 Eastern Europe) was able to incorporate capitalist practices on its own terms. As a final note, Friedman views the lesson of Shadow Cold War as a confluence between the demand for dignified existence amongst those emerging from colonialism and the fact that both the Soviet Union and PRC could strategically promote methods of addressing these demands. Given that such demands still exist the world over, we can expect continued attempts to implement solutions.
‘Anti-Capitalism’ versus ‘Anti-Imperialism’ through an International Legal Lens
In assessing Shadow Cold War, a key point warranting careful attention is the book’s structuring dichotomy of ‘anti-capitalism’ versus ‘anti-imperialism’. As a preliminary matter, it must be noted that Friedman provides no indication he is writing as a Marxist and his method appears that of a conventional, context-focused political/diplomatic historian. Thus, he does not engage with the broad tradition of Marxian theories focused on the inter-relationships between capitalism and imperialism. Rather, for Friedman, questions of ‘anti-capitalism’ versus ‘anti-imperialism’ are depicted in a capacity that is relative and contextually-limited to the immediate actions/perceptions of stakeholders participating in the Sino-Soviet split. While Marxist debates on the relationship between capitalism and imperialism are mentioned for their contextual value, their broader implications are generally left unexplored. However, in his documentation of recurring arguments emanating from official channels in the Soviet Union, the PRC and various Third World states, Friedman does make a convincing case that many of the actors involved understood the Sino-Soviet split in such dichotomous terms.
Yet, when it comes to critically theorising why this precise variation of ‘anti-capitalism’ versus ‘anti-imperialism’ came to define Sino-Soviet relations during this book’s prescribed timeframe, a key task is to account for contingency in light of the constraints of existing structures. After all, the Soviets and the Chinese where neither bound by their ideologies as matters of essential truth, nor were they radically free agents somehow existing outside the institutions of the global order they sought to transform. Thus, when accounting for why the Sino-Soviet spilt manifested itself along the precise lines in which it did, a theory of the larger global order’s inherited structures and their variable catalysing functions is in order. Such an account would certainly provide a resource for those seeking to apply the lessons of this era while avoiding the divisive pitfalls which helped to derail so many revolutionary aspirations. It is in this capacity that Marxist theories of (anti-)capitalist-(anti-)imperialist co-constitution largely absent from Shadow Cold War can be mobilised to interpret the events this book so rigorously depicts. Yet, given the numerous issues that can be analysed within the scope of this theoretical tradition, which precise structural constraints should provide an analytical entry-point?
In light of this question, while in no way the only avenue, international legal theory provides a comprehensive lens for contextualising the distinct ideological formations presented in Shadow Cold War. While international law is certainly not Friedman’s explicit focus, engagement with it opens the door to a deep systematic analysis of his ‘Two Revolutions’ framework. For in considering the challenges presented to both the Soviet Union and the PRC, in the words of Barry Buzan and George Lawson: ‘… there is a great paradox at the heart of the relationship between revolutionary states and international society – revolutionary states must establish relations with other states and coexist with the system’s rules, laws and institutions even while professing to reject these practices.’[1] This core premise is taken to an entirely new level of complexity when the transformative force of decolonisation becomes the object of focus. Here ‘revolution’ in the colonial world was experienced as both a multitude of localised assertions and a zeitgeist of universal upheaval that tasked its participants with the challenge of balancing the affirmation of unique identities with the embrace of all-pervasive transformation.[2]
Thus, in their respective leadership bids to gain influence in the decolonising/postcolonial states as a means of entrenching their preferred vision of ‘world revolution’, the Soviet Union and PRC could be viewed as the leading participants in a global ‘Inter-Revolutionary Rivalry’. Yet, when considering the operation of international law in light of this dynamic, a fundamental consideration is the emancipatory hope that many anti-colonial actors ascribed to it in support of various causes.[3] While Third World opinions on this subject were in no way uniform, a highly influential idea was optimism that the inclusion of colonised peoples could force international law to transcend its imperial/Eurocentric bias and become truly universal.[4] Thus, while extensive Marxist critiques of international law’s bourgeois nature were asserted by both Soviet and Chinese communist jurists,[5] the hopes of a reformed international legal order amongst Third World actors, to whom both factions contentiously appealed, incentivised them to reinterpret/modify such positions.[6]
However, when appraising the logic of the international legal order in this context, a core feature to account for is its perpetual balancing of sovereign autonomy on the one hand and the facilitation of institutionalised international interaction on the other. This tension gives rise to structural indeterminacy where, in the absence of a centralised enforcement mechanism capable of resolution, international legal discourse perpetually oscillates between arguments for preserving the existing order and arguments for building a future ‘global community’.[7] That said, by virtue of this indeterminacy, any attempts to use international legal argument to promote a radical agenda can be contested in a manner that is equally valid within the confines of international law’s internal logic.[8] This ability of the existing order to constrain challenges through international legal counter-claims was a persistent presence in the decolonisation context.[9] Against this backdrop, the ever-shifting multitude of revolutionary activity strengthened arguments that the system’s established rules needed to be fundamentally affirmed in order to provide stabilising coherence in the face of advancing chaos.[10]
Beyond this base-level indeterminacy, there is also the deeper issue of legal argument’s abstraction of actually-existing social relations through its production of fictitious ‘legal persons’ ideologically severed from their generative material conditions.[11] Thus while materially-rooted interests produce the impetus for specifically characterising issues as ‘legal’, the determination of the precise material interests at stake in such contestations is actively obscured by this process of juridical abstraction.[12] This is especially true of international law, where ‘legal persons’ are sovereign states whose lack of any overarching authority structure renders enforcement of obligations matters of ‘self-help’ that can only justified by affirming their sovereign status.[13] While contradictions growing out of this concealment of materiality through international legalist abstraction have long been identified in the context of ‘Inter-Imperial Rivalry’,[14] to what extent was a similar logic at play in the dynamics of ‘Inter-Revolutionary Rivalry’? Thus, the diverging trajectories of ‘anti-capitalist’ versus ‘anti-imperialist’ strategies can be vastly illuminated by analysing how the Sino-Soviet split’s key protagonists ended up unconsciously subjecting themselves to profound contradictions through their engagements with the structures of international legalism. This entails mapping the precise contradictions exposed by theorising Shadow Cold War’s foundational categories, the Soviet strategy of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ and the Chinese strategy of ‘Anti-Imperialism’, as distinctly international-legal phenomena.
The Law of Soviet ‘Peaceful Coexistence’: Between Abstracted Sovereignty and ‘Global Community’
In applying this analytical frame, an appropriate place to begin is with Friedman’s portrayal of the Soviet strategy of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’. According to his summation:
The Soviet Union’s basic focus was on lowering international tension and reducing the perceived threat of communism both in the West and in the newly emerging states…. This stance would not only raise the USSR’s international prestige, but it would also allow it to find more open doors and willing audiences for its economic advice and aid. The Soviets could then use such opportunities to promote their own political-economic approach: focus on state-controlled industrialization, long-term economic planning, construction of large enterprises of heavy industry, and nationalization of banks, transportation, and trade. According to Soviet thinking, this would inevitably lead to the growth of working class political power and organizations and ultimately produce governments more friendly to the Soviet Union, not to mention the ascendancy that such development would give the ideology of socialism around the world. (p. 39.)
While this depiction of peaceful coexistence reveals the Soviet objective of strengthening their system of political economy through a transformation of internal class structures, what must be accounted is the way in which this strategy was framed through international law,[15] particularly its forcing of Western powers to account for their conduct in relation to their proclaimed ideals.[16] This is certainly consistent with Shadow Cold War’s argument that the original Soviet strategy was directed to the West in the form of both mobilising its working classes and constraining its governments. That said, it is unsurprising that following Khrushchev’s announcement of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ at the 1956 Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party ‘more works on international law appeared after … than in the preceding forty years of Soviet legal history’.[17]
When observing international law as a channel for ‘Peaceful Coexistence’, it becomes clear that the international legal order’s core task of balancing institutionally-facilitated international cooperation with the affirmation of state sovereignty was at the heart of Soviet strategy. One the one hand, by actively engaging with postwar international institutions, the Soviets were provided with a platform for appealing to receptive audiences in the West.[18] In this capacity, Friedman’s observation that the Soviets sought to shift revolutionary struggle from military confrontation to competing socioeconomic models must be considered in light of the newly-formed United Nations system’s unprecedented general ban on war as a matter of national policy. One the other hand, sovereignty was of paramount value given its purpose of safeguarding a state’s absolute discretion in adopting the political/economic system of its choice. Through this understanding, any state that frustrated another’s attempt to implement the type of reforms promoted by the Soviet development model could be condemned for interference in domestic affairs and violating the postwar international order’s axiomatic pronouncement of respect for sovereign autonomy. However, this specific approach to ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ presumed that actually-existing international law was ideologically neutral enough to support an effective project of radically transforming the global class/economic system. This was not the position of earlier Soviet jurists, whose interpretation of international law as a tool of capitalist expansion cast serious doubt on its compatibility with revolutionary change.[19]
Yet, explaining this divergence calls for analysis of a formative Soviet development that complicates Shadow Cold War’s portrayal of Soviet ‘anti-capitalism’. For it was through these events that an intensely ‘anti-capitalist’ strategy ultimately lost to one with deep nationalistic consequences. This was the infamous schism between Leon Trotsky’s ‘Permanent Revolution’ and Joseph Stalin’s ‘Socialism in One Country’.[20] Under Trotsky’s theoretical framing, the Soviets inherited a ‘backwards’ situation where external pressures merged with local practices to produce the unsustainable class-based contradictions that led to revolution.[21] Yet, this context raised the key issue of whether the Soviet Union, as a solitary actor, could continue the process of world-revolutionary transformation given its inheriting a class dynamic whereby, according to Alexander Anievas, ‘… islands of the most advanced capitalist relations and productive techniques enmeshed within a sea of feudal relations’.[22] For Trotsky, these contradictions rendered the Soviets unable to achieve their revolutionary objectives alone and, thus, he advocated for a German revolution to capture the most advanced means of production.[23] This point forms a major consideration in Shadow Cold War’s framing of Soviet anti-capitalism where it is noted at the onset that ‘the leaders of the Bolshevik Party believed that the survival and success of the world’s first socialist revolution depended upon its being immediately followed by socialist revolutions in more developed capitalist countries, above all Germany.’ (p. 8.)
Yet, what must be considered in light of this foundational premise is how the triumph of Stalin’s ‘Socialism in One Country’ model trapped Soviet anti-capitalist strategy within the ideological confines of the nation-state (i.e. an entity presumed capable of standing on its own within the international order). In an intimately related capacity, international law, as an embodiment of the existing order’s systemic constraint on revolutionary anti-capitalist transformation, must be understood as actively enabling the victory of Stalin’s vision over Trotsky’s. After all, ‘Socialism in One Country’ as a statement of absolute sovereign discretion over internal affairs is deeply consistent with international law’s foundational premises of sovereign equality, nonintervention, and toleration of ideological pluralism. By contrast, Trotskyism’s active call for exporting revolution across borders as a matter of fundamental urgency is substantially more difficult to reconcile with these principles.
Moreover, the early Soviet Union was plagued by denials of its international legal standing. For many prominent Western international lawyers this stance was problematic given that the international legal standing of governments, even revolutionary ones, traditionally focused on determining the presence of objective territorial authority via ‘facts on the ground’ in a manner divorced from the normative/ideological considerations of those tasked with making recognition judgements.[24] Thus, the eventual universal recognition of Stalin’s ‘facts on the ground’ could be viewed as evidence of international law’s ideological neutrality in that it ultimately accommodated membership of a system deemed repugnant to the global ruling classes. However, a necessarily corollary to this development is the reality that, while accommodating of ‘Socialism in One Country’, international law’s foundational presumption of sovereign statehood rendered Trotsky’s more radically anti-capitalist objectives beyond the pale of possibility, thus exposing clear limits to this ‘ideological neutrality’ presumption.
Thus, Shadow Cold War’s portrayal of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ as emblematic of the Soviets’ ‘anti-capitalist’ strategy must account for the reality that ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ emerged through the failures of more radical attempts to transcend the ideological constraints of the nation-state in their quest to transform global relations of production. As for how international law concealed the contradictory foundations of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’, one need only consider the foundational international legal tension between upholding sovereign autonomy and building ‘global community’. In the realm of sovereign autonomy, this question was settled through the acceptance of ‘Socialism in One Country’ within international law’s acceptable ambit of ideological pluralism. However, on the question of building ‘global community’ along distinctly Soviet lines, this could be viewed as a channel for the ambitions of trans-border solidarity expressed through Trotsky’s vision of ‘Permanent Revolution’. Yet, given that building ‘global community’ through international law is premised on the affirmation of a system of sovereign states, the very ability of ‘Permanent Revolution’ to expose state-centric constraints on radical transformation becomes fundamentally neutralised. Thus, attempts to further creative, materially-grounded solutions through international institutions would be constrained by the contradictory reality that such solutions ultimately depended on accepting legal forms whose existence was only possible by abstracting ‘juridical persons’ from material conditions.
The Law of Chinese ‘Anti-Imperialism’: Between Solidarity and Autarky
In turning to the Chinese rejection of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ as ‘revisionist’ betrayal of anti-imperial struggle through this international legal lens, as a preliminary matter what must be considered is the PRC’s exclusion from the UN. This by extension meant exclusion from the Security Council where China’s permanent seat/veto-power remained held by Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China, despite this overthrown regime’s effective presence being limited to the island of Taiwan. Furthermore, this situation was maintained through arbitrary administrative procedures difficult to reconcile with international law’s ‘non-ideological’ focus on objective territorial authority.[25] For the Chinese, this failure emanating from novel international legal mechanisms was reflective of their national experience of historical subordination to the West facilitated through juridical innovations.[26] Moreover, the Soviets were hamstrung in offering solidarity, for their entire strategy of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ depended upon the success of the elaborate architecture of the UN system conforming with their interpretation of its stated ideals.[27] Thus the Chinese strategy of ‘Anti-Imperialism’ presented itself as the necessary alternative to ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ by exposing its contradictions through charges of ‘revisionism’.
Furthermore, for the PRC, Third World projects, including the Non-Aligned Movement, seeking to use Western-created international organisations for peaceful emancipatory purposes were dangerously delusional. Here, Friedman notes Chinese contentions with Nehru’s India and Nasser’s UAR, where ‘[b]oth countries were pushing African decolonization through nonviolent means through the United Nations, a stance China found doubly troubling, not only because it would reduce the possibility for a broad militant international front against imperialism, but because it asserted the validity of a world organization from which the PRC was excluded.’ (p. 41.) This being the case, unburdened by adherence to international institutionalism as an object of idealisation premised on abstracted legal forms, the Chinese could theorise state sovereignty as the condition of political independence in a substantive capacity. Thus, ‘Anti-Imperialism’ directly confronted the historical reality of sovereignty being premised on a ‘public’/‘private’ distinction where bounded-territorial authority was decoupled from transcendent economic interests and, as such, independence was never a guarantee of material self-sufficiency.[28]
Such a move was consistent with China’s history whereby the very reality of formal (semi-)sovereign status, demonstrated by lack of formal conquest, led it to identify with ‘myths’ of international inclusion that actively enabled Western domination.[29] Moreover, this position directly addressed widespread fears of ‘neocolonialism’ amongst newly independent states whose challenging path to national consolidation left them open to external predation.[30] In succinctly encapsulating the PRC’s position on the inadequacy of formal sovereignty, Shadow Cold War quotes a 1960 statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry on the Congo crisis stating that:
The Congolese and Cameroonian peoples conducting armed struggle after achieving independence are struggling between real and fake independence…. African people cannot be limited to the independence that imperialism is ready to agree to …. they need to struggle to achieve the independence imperialism opposes …. they also cannot only be limited to political independence, they will endeavor to attain economic independence. (p. 56.)
The great contradiction of this situation begins with the premise that the ultimate goal of ‘Anti-Imperialism’ is to build enduring, trans-border solidarity amongst the non-European world rendering it capable of directly challenging Western dominance. However, by adhering to the sovereign nation-state form as a necessary, albeit insufficient, means of achieving this end, individual actors were fully empowered to retreat into an isolated state of autarky as a matter of sovereign prerogative regardless of how severely this may have damaged transnational solidarity efforts. This situation was especially precarious given the tension between affirming unique identities (typically grounded in the nation-state form) versus working towards global transformation that was prevalent in the postcolonial world.[31] Thus, revolutionary actors experienced a variant of the frustration long highlighted by liberal theorists whereby a system of law premised on relations between sovereign states constructs a barrier to building a transformative system of law premised on closer interactions between peoples.[32] Yet, in accounting for the material conditions that made autarkic withdrawals derail the promises of solidarity, what must be considered are the internal class dynamics that informed the reception of Sino-Soviet appeals by Third World actors in this context of decolonisation.
As a fundamental matter of context, the reality was that postcolonial states inherited economies established to produce value for a distant metropole as opposed to building self-sustaining societies. As Shadow Cold War has shown, this resulted in the inheritance of agrarian, light industrial and extractive economies with primarily peasant-based, as opposed to industrial-proletariat based, labour forces. This exposed the limits of the heavy-industry promotion envisioned by Soviet ‘Peaceful Coexistence’. These realities forced the Soviets to modify their development models given that suppressing the peasantry in the name of bolstering the industrial proletariat, along the lines of Stalin’s ‘Socialism in One Country’,[33] was an unpopular option in the postcolonial world. However, a key factor highly relevant to this modification of Soviet strategy was the particular nature of elite-class formation/conflict common across a highly diverse array of postcolonial settings. Here the persistence of old elites empowered by colonial systems and the emergence of new elites empowered by independence created a volatile class situation where, across a diverse array of contexts, ‘determining … [class] composition has been the major political struggle of the revolutionary and immediate post-revolutionary periods.’[34] Thus, while Soviet ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ sought accommodation, this unique class dynamic would prove highly consequential in light of the challenge of ‘Anti-Imperialism’ and its central contradiction of solidarity versus autarky produced by the attempt to radicalise state sovereignty.
What the PRC faced was a dilemma regarding postcolonial actors, including many in the Non-Aligned Movement, where internal class struggles between old and new postcolonial elites resulted in internationalist ambitions that were decidedly more reformist and accommodating to Western influences/institutions than what ‘Anti-Imperialism’ mandated. How could Beijing pressure these actors into adopting a more radical approach without being seen as infringing upon the ‘true’ sovereign independence that formed the touchstone of its appeal to the Third World? While condemning revisionist, de-radicalised Soviet ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ as a new manifestation of white Western interference in the non-European world was certainly one strategy, a more fundamental move involved the PRC’s high-stakes attempt to lead the world revolution by example through invoking its sovereign prerogative to fundamentally re-order its own internal society along autarkic lines. Thus, under Mao’s leadership, the PRC embarked upon the Cultural Revolution, where, in the name of purifying itself of foreign influence, diplomatic staff were recalled. The result was a general withdrawal from international affairs that reduced the Chinese attempt to lead the world revolution to little more than a propaganda-dissemination campaign.
While a few postcolonial leaders expressed some support, Friedman makes clear that ‘[o]verall, however, the Cultural Revolution was an unmitigated disaster for Chinese foreign policy. Most Afro-Asian observers were horrified by events in China as well as offended by crude Chinese attempts to spread the Cultural Revolution abroad, and little in terms of an economic, political, or ideological model seemed attractive to Afro-Asian elites trying to build their own countries.’ (p. 155.) This general response is unsurprising given the complex, ongoing issues of inter-ruling-class rivalry in postcolonial states. Thus, through the Cultural Revolution’s pursuit of internal transformation in a manner that led to external alienation, the PRC highlighted ‘Anti-Imperialism’s’ solidarity-versus-autarky contradiction that grew out of the foundational international legal principle of sovereignty whereby states are free to form and dissolve associations for any reason regardless of the impact this may have on collective endeavours.
International Legal Theory beyond Contradiction?
When confronted with international legal contradictions that were called-out in the presumptions of Soviet ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ only to manifest differently through Chinese ‘Anti-Imperialism’, questions are raised as to what theoretical tools are needed to confront such recurring contradictions. In addressing this question, a place to begin might be the work of Chinese Marxist legal theorists who sought to develop a class-based theory of international law more sophisticated than anything their Soviet contemporaries were doing at the time. Although subject to variation, for these theorists, ‘international law’ was not a single universal system, but existed in multiple forms corresponding to class categories where an entity’s legal obligations depended upon its position within the global class structure.[35] Some of these approaches even scrutinised the very act of formulating legal theory as a direct indication of material, class interests. Here, the reality of multiple material interests explained the contradictory existence of multiple, ostensibly valid justifications for the supposedly ‘universal’ system of international law.[36]
Such approaches to law had the potential to directly confront the abstraction-generating quality of legal forms that constrained the Soviets through their embrace of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ and persisted despite their heightened commitment to militant liberation struggles. Regarding Shadow Cold War’s observation that the Soviets responded to Chinese ‘Anti-Imperialism’ by beginning to ‘… increasingly … emphasize that peaceful coexistence did not exclude armed struggle in the developing world’ (p. 109), it must be noted that in doing so they remained bound by ‘Peaceful Coexistence’s’ international legal orthodoxy despite this strategic modification. Towards this end, Soviet efforts fixated heavily on developing expansive, periphery-friendly definitions of ‘aggression’ as a fundamental international legal breach, as well as the notion of ‘wars of national liberation’ whereby anti-colonial struggles would be elevated from internal affairs of colonial powers to international conflicts, thus bestowing an enhanced degree of legal protection and legitimacy upon national-liberation fighters.[37]
Yet, the great pitfall here was that Western powers could condemn these assertions as attempts to politicise international law’s ‘ideologically neutral’ principles. Here, claims abounded that such definitions of ‘aggression’ were cynical attempts to exclude non-Western coercive practices,[38] and ‘wars of national liberation’ threatened to undo progressive legal developments within the law regulating armed conflict.[39] Such focus on symbolically powerful, yet ultimately constraining, international legal issues provides context regarding the Soviets’ bind in producing creative juridical innovations when the greater Third World struggle shifted from armed struggle to productive/distributional mechanisms in the 1970s. Thus, in considering the radical nature of international legal theories that developed in the PRC, the question arises as to what alternative institutions could have been developed based on these theories had the project of ‘Anti-Imperialism’ not succumbed to deep division triggered in great part by the solidarity/autarky contradiction.
While the PRC’s post-Cultural Revolution re-entry onto the international stage led to a de-radicalising of its approach to international law (amongst other things),[40] we must remember Shadow Cold War’s point that Chinese anti-imperial leadership would have been a seemingly obvious choice for a refocused Third World ‘… attempt to overturn the existing international economic order’ via the New International Economic Order (‘NIEO’) (p. 206). While this type of revolutionary leadership did not occur due to rapid Chinese rapprochement with the West, these circumstances highlight the vast degree of contingency concerning the connections between law, class, and world revolution. After all, the failures of the NIEO have been assessed as a problem of emancipatory visions being constrained by the unforeseen structures of actually-existing international legality.[41] To some extent, these systemic barriers were recognised by the Soviets who denounced these endeavours as ‘… not yet truly “anti-imperialist” … because they did not attack the very basis of the capitalist system itself’ (p. 208). However, given that the Soviets had committed themselves to constraining structures of international legalism, they were profoundly limited in their ability to offer alternatives.
Yet, what if the PRC’s anticipated leadership did occur and the newfound distribution-focused Third World projects were guided by the radically class-conscious approach to international law formulated by the Chinese jurists? Could such a move have exposed the constraining contradictions of international law that fundamentally divided shared revolutionary ambitions? What new contradictions might have arisen and how might they have been confronted? The centring of such questions has much to offer contemporary theorists seeking to articulate radical, class-conflict based approaches to international law.[42] Furthermore, if these pursuits are to be historicised within the broader scheme of struggle amongst diverse revolutionary actors on a global scale, Shadow Cold War offers a vast treasure trove from which materialist accounts can be constructed. That said, questions surrounding class and international legal contradictions form only one path of exploration amongst many that stand to be expanded by this book’s profound contribution regarding the critically important, yet long-neglected, dynamic of ‘Inter-Revolutionary Rivalry’.
Acknowledgments
This piece benefitted immensely from conversations with numerous friends and colleagues, with special thanks due to Luis Eslava, Ahmed Raza Memon, Rose Sydney Parfitt, Mia Tamarin and the participants in the 2016 ‘Legacies of the Tricontinental’ conference. All errors, oversights, omissions and mischaracterisations are mine and mine alone.
References
Anand, R.P. 1971, ‘The Development of a Universal International Law’, in The Search for World Order: Studies by Students and Colleagues of Quincy Wright, edited by Albert Lepawsky, Edward H. Buehrig and Harold Lasswell, New York: Appleton-Century-Croft.
Anderson, Perry 1983, ‘Trotsky’s Interpretation of Stalinism’, New Left Review, I, 139: 49–58.
Anievas, Alexander 2014, Capital, the State, and War: Class Conflict and Geopolitics in the Thirty Years’ Crisis, 1914–1945, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Baxter, Richard 1975, ‘Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics? The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law’, Harvard International Law Journal, 16, 1: 1–26.
Bowring, Bill 2008, ‘Positivism versus Self-Determination: The Contradictions of Soviet International Law’, in International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies, edited by Susan Marks, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buzan, Barry and George Lawson 2015, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chimni, B.S. 2004, ‘Prolegomena to a Class Approach to International Law’, European Journal of International Law, 21, 1: 57–82.
Chiu, Hungdah 1966, ‘Communist China’s Attitude towards International Law’, American Journal of International Law, 60, 2: 245–67.
Craven, Matthew 2005, ‘What Happened to Unequal Treaties? The Continuities of Informal Empire’, Nordic Journal of International Law, 74, 3: 335–82.
Dickinson, Edwin 1931, ‘The Recognition of Russia’, Michigan Law Review, 30, 2: 181–96.
Eslava, Luis, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah (eds.) 2017, Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Geertz, Clifford 1973, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books.
Ginsburgs, George 1964, ‘“Wars of National Liberation” and the Modern Law of Nations – The Soviet Thesis’, Law and Contemporary Problems, 29, 4: 910–42.
Hazard, John 1938, ‘Cleansing Soviet International Law of Anti-Marxist Theories’, American Journal of International Law, 32, 2: 244–52.
Kim, Samuel 1987, ‘The Development of International Law in Post-Mao China: Change and Continuity’, Journal of Chinese Law, 1, 2: 117–60.
Knox, Robert J. 2010, Review of The Degradation of the International Legal Order? The Rehabilitation of Law and the Possibility of Politics by Bill Bowring,Historical Materialism, 18, 1: 193–207.
Knox, Robert J., 2016, ‘Valuing Race? Stretched Marxism and the Logic of Imperialism’, London Review of International Law, 4, 1: 81–126.
Korovin, Eugene 1946, ‘The Second World War and International Law’, American Journal of International Law, 40, 3: 742–55.
Koskenniemi, Martti 2005, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, Second Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Li Chen 2011, ‘Universalism and Equal Sovereignty as Contested Myths of International Law in the Sino-Western Encounter’, Journal of the History of International Law, 13, 1: 75–116.
McWhinney, Edward 1962, ‘“Peaceful Co-Existence” and Soviet-Western International Law’, American Journal of International Law, 56, 4: 951–70.
Miéville, China 2005, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law,Historical Materialism Book Series, Leiden: Brill.
Neff, Stephen G. 1990, Friends But No Allies: Economic Liberalism and the Law of Nations, New York: Columbia University Press.
Newton, Scott 2014, Law and the Making of the Soviet World: The Red Demiurge, London: Routledge.
Nkrumah, Kwame 1976, Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, London: Panaf Books Ltd.
Ozsu, Umut 2017, ‘Neoliberalism and the New International Economic Order: A History of “Contemporary Legal Thought”’, in Searching for Contemporary Legal Thought, edited by Christopher Tomlins and Justin Desautels-Stein, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pahuja, Sundhya 2011, Decolonising International Law: Decolonisation, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pashukanis, Evgeny 1987, Law and Marxism: A General Theory, New Edition, London: Pluto Press.
Pashukanis, Evgeny 2005, ‘International Law’ (Appendix), in Miéville 2005.
Quigley, John 2007, Soviet Legal Innovation and the Law of the Western World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Raimundo, Bernard 1967, Peaceful Coexistence: International Law in the Building of Communism, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Rasulov, Akbar 2010, ‘“The Nameless Rapture of the Struggle”: Towards a Marxist Class-Theoretic Approach to International Law’, Finnish Yearbook of International Law, 19, 1: 243–95.
Rosenberg, Justin 1994, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations, London: Verso.
Rosenberg, Justin 1996, ‘Isaac Deutscher and the Lost History of International Relations’, New Left Review, I, 215: 3–15.
Roth, Brad 1999, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Roth, Brad 2012, ‘Sovereign Equality and Non-Liberal Regimes’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 43, 1: 25–52.
Stone, Julius 1977, ‘Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression’, American Journal of International Law, 71, 2: 224–46.
Trotsky, Leon 2017 [1932], The History of the Russian Revolution, translated by Max Eastman, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Vamvoukos, Athanassios 1979, ‘Chinese and Soviet Attitudes toward International Law: A Comparative Approach’, Review of Socialist Law, 5, 2: 131–56.
[1] Buzan and Lawson 2015, p. 146.
[2] Geertz 1973, p. 240.
[3] See Eslava, Fakhri and Nesiah (eds.) 2017.
[4] See, for example, Anand 1971.
[5] See Hazard 1938; Chiu 1966.
[6] One example being the Soviet embrace of ‘national self-determination’. See Bowring 2008.
[7] Koskenniemi 2005.
[8] See Knox 2010, pp. 197–9.
[9] See Pahuja 2011.
[10] In this capacity, the fundamental international legal norms of sovereign equality and non-intervention became entrenched as a means of managing the conflicting agendas of Cold War forces. See Roth 2012, pp. 32–3.
[11] See Knox 2016, p. 89.
[12] See Pashukanis 1987.
[13] Miéville 2005, pp. 135–7.
[14] Pashukanis 2005, p. 325.
[15] See Raimundo 1967.
[16] McWhinney 1962.
[17] Vamvoukos 1979, p. 136.
[18] See Quigley 2007.
[19] See Pashukanis 2005.
[20] For an overview, see Anderson 1983.
[21] Trotsky 2017, pp. 3–12.
[22] Anievas 2014, p. 96.
[23] Rosenberg 1996, p. 10.
[24] See Dickinson 1931, pp. 184–5, 193.
[25] Roth 1999, pp. 261–3.
[26] See Craven 2005.
[27] On Soviet hopes for the UN system, see Korovin 1946.
[28] Rosenberg 1994, pp. 129–31.
[29] See Li 2011.
[30] See Nkrumah 1976.
[31] Geertz 1973, p. 240.
[32] Neff 1990, p. 1.
[33] Newton 2015, pp. 165–6.
[34] Geertz 1973, p. 236.
[35] See Chiu 1966, pp. 245–62.
[36] See Chiu 1966, p. 262.
[37] Ginsburgs 1964.
[38] Stone 1977.
[39] See Baxter 1975.
[40] See Kim 1987.
[41] See Ozsu 2017.
[42] See Chimni 2004, Rasulov 2010.
Everyday Life in the Paris Commune

A Review of Communal Luxury: The Political Imaginary of the Paris Commune by Kristin Ross
Massimiliano Tomba
Department of History of Consciousness, University of California, Santa Cruz
mtomba@ucsc.edu
Abstract
Kristin Ross’s book on the Paris Commune points simultaneously in two directions, one historical, the other political. It is a political intervention that goes back to the Commune in order to rethink and reopen emancipatory paths after 1989 and the collapse of the idea of state-communism. It is an intervention in the field of historiography because it challenges the idea of state-communism that played an important role in the communist historiography of the Commune. These two dimensions, politics and historiography, are strictly related to each other.
Keywords
Paris Commune
Kristin Ross, (2015) Communal Luxury: The Political Imaginary of the Paris Commune, London: Verso.
The literature on the Paris Commune is vast. It is often repetitive. Certainly, as Trotsky wrote, one looks back to the Commune whenever the question of revolution has to be reconsidered in theory and practice: ‘Each time that we study the history of the Commune we see it from a new aspect, thanks to the experience acquired by the later revolutionary struggles and above all by the latest revolutions, not only the Russian but the German and Hungarian revolutions.’[1] For Trotsky, in comparing 1871 and 1917, the central issue was the party, or the lack of the centralisation of power in the Commune. And now? Why, how and to what end should we turn back to the Commune?
The virtue of Kristin Ross’s book is that it returns to the Commune from a very new perspective. Her temporal-historical register is that of everyday life and its legacy. This is the reason why Ross looks at the Commune though the lens of actors like Gustave Lefrançais and Elisée Reclus, among others, and the legacy taken up by thinkers like Morris and Kropotkin. Ross is not interested in the question of strategy, which is usually judged by the ex post wisdom of those who blame the Commune for having been defeated. As is well known, the Commune is often accused for not having an organised party or for not seizing the Bank of France. By contrast, Ross privileges the political and social change in the temporal dimension of the everyday. Her book points out the quality of the transformations in human relations, work and art, which the communards anticipated in the everyday.
Kristin Ross’s book points simultaneously in two directions: one historical, the other political. It is a political intervention that goes back to the Commune in order to rethink and reopen emancipatory paths after 1989 and the collapse of the idea of state-communism. It is an intervention in the field of historiography because it challenges the idea of state-communism that played an important role in the communist historiography of the Commune. These two dimensions, politics and historiography, are strictly related to each other.
Benedetto Croce once stated that history is always contemporary history. He was almost right. Indeed, Croce’s statement has to be amended with Antonio Gramsci’s correction that history is not just erudite or bookish, but requires the identification of history and politics.[2] From that standpoint, politicians are historians who, by operating in the present, interpret the past; and historians are politicians who dig into the past in order to reopen abandoned and repressed alternative pathways. The political criterion of a historiographical intervention is given by the standpoint of the historian, a standpoint that can never be neutral. According to Walter Benjamin, the supposed neutrality of the historicist’s perspective coincides with the point of view of the dominant classes. By contrast, the materialist historian, he states, develops the ability to look at the past not as an object to be investigated, but as something incomplete and open to possible futures, which are still encapsulated in ‘what-has-been’.[3] Ross is familiar with this way of looking at the past and her book is an extraordinary combination of historiography and politics.
William Morris is a constant presence in Ross’s reading of the Commune and allows her to place it in a temporal dimension that exceeds the historical existence of the Commune itself. In this way, the Commune does not coincide with the massacre of the Communards and the failure of that political experiment. Instead, it links up with temporalities that precede it and prolong its gesture. Morris once said that his tales of the past were parables of the days to come. A parable, comments Ross, is ‘not about going backwards or reversing time, but about opening it up – opening up the web of possibilities’ (p. 75). Kristin Ross’s book is fully entitled to be considered part of the tradition of political historiography that digs into the past in order to extract encapsulated futures.
Let us examine this issue more closely. Communal Luxury re-reads the political experiments of the Commune in the light of our present, namely the recent forms of protest on the world-political scene. It is not by chance that Occupy movements were looking for a tradition that originated in the Paris Commune. One could easily remark that such references to the Commune are rather common on the left. However, what is new is the entire post-1989 political context, which designates a political imaginary that is no longer organised around an end that must be realised. In other words, the collapse of a certain idea of socialism dragged with it an entire imaginary, but also the instrumental conception of praxis, according to which means were justified by the end – socialism – to be realised.
How to provide a new imaginary? This is one of the questions that the book raises. ‘The Political Imaginary of the Paris Commune’ – this is the subtitle of Ross’s book – is an alternative legacy that invites us to rethink political and social change in a new framework. Ross’s book looks back at the Commune without any nostalgia, but in order to grasp alternative trajectories of emancipation, i.e., trajectories that do not lead to the centralism of the socialist state. On the contrary, they express a new hope, which is no longer interested in taking power and the control of the state, but in practising politics beyond the state. Ross writes, ‘The end of state-communism freed the Commune from the role it had played in official communist history’ (p. 4). And it may well open new possibilities of liberation. In any case, one can say about 1989 what the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in his famously misinterpreted answer said when, in 1972, he was asked about the impact of the French Revolution: ‘too early to say’.
The end of Real Socialism becomes the condition of possibility for a different historiography that allows us to think politics differently. Ross states: ‘if we begin with the state, we end with the state. Let us begin instead with the popular reunions at the end of the Empire, the various associations and committees they spawned, and the “buzzing hives” that were the revolutionary clubs of the Siege. Then we see a different picture.’ (p. 14.) Communal Luxury aims to show us this different picture.
The title of the book – Communal Luxury, overlaid onto a blue painting by William Morris – is taken from the Manifesto of the Federation of the Parisian Artists written during the Commune. In the manifesto, ‘communal luxury’ expressed the demand for public beauty, i.e., a complete reconfiguration of everyday life according to which art and beauty must be integrated into life and work and not be confined in private spaces for the enjoyment of the privileged class. Communal luxury is, on the one side, the vantage point from which to observe the aesthetic reinvention of everyday life; on the other, it is a kind of prefiguration of William Morris’s idea of a new space/time, which is harmonised with the rhythm of nature. This is the space of experimental politics beyond the binary opposition of city and country, the space of the reinvention of the human within a plethora of human and non-human differences (p. 136). But not only that. It is also a trans-national space and the space of political and socio-economic experimentation. Indeed, ‘communal luxury’ reconfigures wealth into a new wealth that is no longer ‘an immense accumulation of commodities’[4] subjugated to the tyranny of exchange-value. Instead, it is a liberated wealth, which contributes to the regeneration of society through new values and solidarity. Not by chance, the last chapter of the book is titled ‘Solidarity’.
The book begins with the flag of the Universal Republic and concludes with the reinvention of wealth beyond exchange-value. But a new history of the Commune requires a new starting point and new references. In fact, the book observes the Commune through the viewpoint of William Morris, Elisée Reclus, Peter Kropotkin, Elisabeth Dmitrieff and Napoléon Gaillard, among others. Lenin is mentioned solely for his ‘apocryphal dance in the snow in front of the Winter Palace on the seventy-third day of the Russian Revolution – the day, that is, that the Revolution had lasted one day longer than the Commune and in so doing turned the latter into the failed revolution of which the new one would be the corrective’ (p. 4). Ross does not develop an analysis of the Bolshevist’s claim of correcting the failed insurgency of the Commune. This is not the task of her book. Instead, the image of a dancing Lenin leaves the historical bifurcation open.[5] It is the same alternative that tormented the Commune’s existence: state-centralisation versus a universal federation of peoples or, to employ the terminology of Arthur Arnould, Unité versus Union.[6] In order to investigate this bifurcation in a non-dogmatic way, one has to pay attention not so much to military events before and after March 18, but, as Ross does, to popular reunions, clubs and various associations, which constituted the social and political fabric of the Commune. From this perspective Ross’s book is able to shed light on the often-forgotten ‘non-nationalist originality of the Commune’ (p. 12).
To the extent that the Paris Commune freed itself from the nation-state, it developed ‘a new vision of revolution based on communal autonomy’ (p. 111), which exceeds both the geographical-political provincialism of space – the nation – and the temporal provincialism of the unilinear conception of time: ‘The new, for Kropotkin as for Morris, could only be modelled on anachronisms land-locked in the present’ (p. 116). I want to give a couple of examples of the move that deprovincialises space and time, which this book helps us to think.
Let me begin with the international participation in the Commune and the diverse contributions to the ‘working laboratory of political inventions’ (p. 11). Ross tells us the story of Elisabeth Dmitrieff, the young member of the Russian section of the First International who joined the Commune and created the Women’s Union for the Defence of Paris and Aid to the Wounded. Dmitrieff was the theoretical mediator between Marx and Chernyshevsky who alerted Marx to the possibility of skipping capitalist accumulation. She was also the practical mediator between the French idea of the commune and the Russian collectivism of the obshina (p. 29). Ross suggests that when Marx looked to Russia, he saw its rural and non-capitalist communities ‘through the filter of the Parisian insurrection’ (p. 82). He could see in the Russian peasant commune and in the ‘archaic’ societies ‘the traces of the primary communism he had observed in the Paris Commune’ (p. 82). However, communism is not the consolation prize for the working class for suffering through primitive accumulation. After the Paris Commune and in dialogue with the Russian Populists, Marx abandoned the unilinear vision of historical time and began to consider history as ‘a series of layers from various ages, the one superimposed on the other’.[7] From this standpoint the ‘“archaic” type of communal property’ can prefigure different historical trajectories that lead to non-capitalist forms of society without undertaking primitive accumulation.[8] Marx’s recommendation (to himself and us) is therefore precious: ‘We should not, then, be too frightened by the word “archaic”.’[9]
From this angle we can see Dmitrieff and Chernyshevsky teaching Marx ‘the possible conjunctures between traditional and modern structures’ (p. 26). There are forms of the past that can be mobilised in the present and show trajectories, whose unexplored potentialities contain possible futures. The story of the Commune that Ross relates to us breaks with the history of the forms of transition and its stagist model. William Morris beautifully expressed the perspective of a different kind of historiography that is required today: the Federalist Administration of the Commune is, he wrote, politically ‘entirely opposed to French tradition since the time of Richelieu’, while socially it gives birth to the new world of ‘the workman organically associated for the first time since the Communes of the Middle Ages, and since 1793’.[10] There are two traditions: on the one hand, there is the tradition of the state and its centralisation of power; on the other, there are the traditions of insurgency, which does not create new political institutions ex nihilo. New institutions root their practices in the sunken legacy that links to the communes of the Middle Ages and the French Revolution.
Morris was an artist of the combination of modern and non-modern temporalities. The latter are not an expression of nostalgia, but rather visions of non-alienated labour. According to Ross, ‘Evoking communitarian or tribal societies of the past may provide clues to the free forms of a whole new economic life in the future’ (p. 75). The encounter of different temporalities generated a new field of possibilities in which the new life of the Commune was experimented with by putting together art, work and revolution.
Ross explores this field through ‘marginal’ actors and thinkers of the Commune. Gaillard is one of those actors. He was not only a revolutionary but also a shoemaker; an excellent one, it appears. During the period of the Commune, Gaillard the shoemaker built a massive barricade that barred access to the rue de Rivoli. He considered his barricades, no less than his shoes, works of art and luxury. Barricades became works of art of the revolution. And daily artisanal production became revolutionary. ‘“I believe myself to be a worker,” wrote Gaillard to Vermorel, “an ‘artist-shoemaker,’ and though making shoes, I have the right to as much respect from men as those who think themselves workers while wielding a pen”’ (p. 56). Claiming the same dignity of intellectual labour for manual labour, Gaillard does not trivially dispute the division of labour. He goes much further. The new revolutionary principle of the Commune digs like a mole in the ground of everyday life. As Ross emphasises, Gaillard was questioning the familiar distinction between the useful and the beautiful (p. 57). Indeed, Gaillard’s philosophy of the shoe claims to bring the work of the artist shoemaker ‘back to the anatomical principles of the foot’ (p. 57). Gaillard alleged that the modern shoe has imprisoned the foot in a narrow, deforming instrument of torture. Bringing back the work of the artisan to the ‘anatomical principles of the foot’ expressed an attempt to mobilise past temporalities in order to recombine in a new form production and art, two dimensions which, in ancient Greek, were merged in the same word: poiesis. Recalling the old principle of artistic production by the artisan, Gaillard challenged the series and mass production in which the product is no longer shaped according to human needs. Instead people have to adapt themselves to objects, and both producers and consumers have to adapt themselves to the tyranny of exchange-value. The Women’s Union made this point very clear in a document addressed to the Labour Commission: blaming the ‘disastrous implications of repetitive work on body and mind’, the Women’s Union claimed the ‘diversity of work in any profession’.[11]
In the revolutionary experience, art could no longer remain external to the everyday. Ross shows how the intermixture of art, revolution and work redefines the relationships between human beings and use-value, on the one hand, and working time and free time, on the other hand. In the interruption of the dominant temporality of the state, there emerges a different quality of time, which is both social and political. Reconfiguring the distinction of labour time and free time, social and political life, private and public life, the Commune was giving birth to a new humanity, which was not an abstract word, but a matter of education, art and works. ‘Everywhere the word “commune” was understood in the largest sense, as referring to a new humanity’, stated Elisée Reclus (p. 5). The ‘new humanity’ concerns a different configuration of social, economic and political life according to the principles of cooperation and association. However, as Ross reminds us by referring to Morris, this new life, the possibility to ‘live communistically’, cannot be achieved without the ‘abolition of private property’ (p. 118). This statement has not ceased to be disturbing in the eyes of the dominant class. Nevertheless, it remains the cornerstone of any real political and social change.
Ross redirects our attention to the fact that during the period of the Commune words such as citoyen and citoyenne ‘no longer indicate national belonging – they are addressed to people who have separated themselves from the national collectivity’ (p. 16). The story of this separation is the story told by Communal Luxury. It is in this separation that the flag of the Universal Republic appears. This flag merges dimensions that transcend the borders of nationality and its historical time. As Ross reminds us, the term ‘Universal Republic’ did not originate with the Commune, but with the Prussian-born Anacharsis Cloots, who was naturalised in 1792 and became a member of the National Convention in September of the same year. During the Revolution, the Universal Republic was not just an abstract ideal of sharing the principles of the Declaration of the Rights of Man with the whole world. Cloots himself acted as universal citizen beyond the nation and beyond his aristocratic status when he joined the Revolution. Many foreigners, like Cloots, took part in the Revolution, becoming political citizens in the everyday political practice of assemblies, sections and clubs. The 1793 Constitution ratified this political circumstance in article 4, which stated that ‘aliens whom the legislative body has declared as one well deserving of the human race, are admitted to exercise the rights of a French citizen.’ Reactivating an ancient conception of mediaeval rights, the same article extended the exercise of the rights of French citizens to ‘every alien, who has attained the age of twenty-one, and has been domiciled in France one year’. The Universal Republic in the French Revolution was more than a principle; it was a practice that the 1793 Constitution had to assimilate.[12]
Regarding the tradition of the Universal Republic, Ross states that, ‘far from implying a return to the principles of the bourgeois 1789 revolution, the slogan universal republic, when spoken by Communards, marks their break from the legacy of the French Revolutions in the direction of a real working-class internationalism’ (p. 23). However, if Ross had applied to the French Revolution the multitemporal framework through which she had analysed the Commune, she would have had a different view of the tradition of the Universal Republic. Indeed, the French Revolution was more than a bourgeois revolution. There were many revolutions within the Revolution, revolutions which exceeded the narrow political-temporal definition of a bourgeois revolution. For instance, the Women’s Union in 1871 ‘showed no trace of interest in parliamentary or rights-based demands’ (p. 28). Similarly, in 1792, Pauline Léon demanded not political rights but a revolutionary citizenship for women, which included the right to bear weapons. In both cases, women were already acting as political citizens despite the fact they did not have legal citizenship; in 1792 as in 1871 they were ‘indifferent to the vote and to traditional forms of republican politics in general’ (p. 28).
To conclude, I want to raise the question of universalism. It is true that the universality of the Universal Republic is not about scale. It expressed political inclusion beyond national identity. Being ‘French’ in Paris during March through May 1871 was not matter of national belonging but of a political and social practice. The adjective ‘universal’ may find an explanation in the Declaration to the French People of April 19, which states that Paris reserves the right ‘to universalise power and property’.[13] The universalisation of power through assemblies and the imperative mandate and the universalisation of property through a new regime of property relations were the two sides of the Universal Republic. These dimensions prefigured new institutions, which were not based on the logic of the modern national state. Ross’s book focuses brilliantly on the everyday life and various associations and committees of the Commune, but it does not address the new institutions in which the forms of a new political life were being worked out.
Édouard Vaillant, who oversaw work on education and culture during the Commune, offers us an insight into the correlation between the universalisation of power and that of property when he said: ‘we must apply to the theatres […] the regime of associations. […] The general management of theatres is charged with replacing the existing regime of proprietors and privilege with a system of association to be run entirely by the artists themselves.’[14] Private property was not in question merely abstractly, but rather in the everyday practices that sought to overcome the separation between the means of production and performers at any level. The communal practice, which simultaneously questioned state centralisation and property, induced the Federations of the artists to claim the abolition of subsidy as well: ‘In the place of state subsidies, the Federation looked to cooperation among the artists themselves as a way forward, rather like a trade union whereby each artist’s dignity was protected by all the others’ (p. 51). Indeed, the radical manifesto of the twentieth arrondissement demanded the abolition of all subsidies, not just those related to religion, but also to theatres and the press.[15] Decentralisation and distancing from the state were made possible through a new institutional articulation. Addressing the question of institutions would have been important in order to show how the collective creativity of the Commune, which was at the same time international and ecological, tried to reshape social life in a new political order and new property relations in the short time available to it.
References
Arnould, Arthur 1981, Histoire Populaire et Parlementaire de la Commune de Paris, Lyon: Éditions Jacques-Marie Laffont et associés.
Benjamin, Walter 1999, The Arcades Project, translated by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Blanqui, Louis-August 2013, Eternity by the Stars: An Astronomical Hypothesis, translated by Frank Chouraqui, New York, NY: Contra Mundum Press.
Bourgin, Georges and Gabriel Henriot 1924–45, Procès-verbaux de la Commune de 1871, Volume II, Paris: E. Leroux-Lahure.
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Marx, Karl 1983, ‘Marx–Zasulich Correspondence’, in Shanin 1983, pp. 95–137.
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Morris, William, Ernest Belfort Bax and Victor Dave 2013, ‘A Short Account of the Commune of Paris of 1871’, in The Commune: Paris, 1871, edited by Andrew Zonneveld, Atlanta, GA: On Our Own Authority! Publishing.
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Rougerie, Jacques 1971, Paris libre 1871, Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
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[1] Trotsky 1921.
[2] Gramsci 1977, p. 1242 (Q 10II §2).
[3] Benjamin 1999, pp. 463–4.
[4] Marx 1990, p. 125.
[5] Blanqui 2013.
[6] Arnould 1981, p. 275.
[7] Marx 1983, p. 103.
[8] Marx 1983, p. 107.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Morris, Bax and Dave 2013, p. 20.
[11] Rougerie 1971, p. 182.
[12] Tomba 2015.
[13] Edwards (ed.) 1989, p. 82.
[14] Vaillant, 19 May, in Bourgin and Henriot 1924–45, p. 427.
[15] Rougerie 1971, p. 138.