Edited by Max Horkheimer for the Institute for Social Research, the journal Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung stands in admirable contrast to the usual grey publications from the emigration-circles. From Thomas and Heinrich Mann to Brecht and Feuchtwanger, from Georg Bernhard to Hart and Hiller, from Stampfer to Walcher, Münzenberg and Pieck, those only reflect the general intellectual stagnation and decay. Apart from a small number of exceptions that we will discuss later, the contributions to this journal are on the contrary characterised by a high scientific level and purity in thought and words. Most of all, the essays by Horkheimer himself attract our interest. Horkheimer attempts to address the contemporary philosophical reaction – irrationalism, neo-empiricism, ‘neo-humanism’- with the tools of dialectical materialism, which he also calls critical theory.
- Philosophy and Politics
And yet this is where our criticism begins as this erudite philosopher and expert in Marxist theory always remains on the level of the most abstract philosophy. And this is in partial contradiction with himself. In his sterling settling of accounts with the dreadful ‘popular front philosopher’ Siegfried Marck, Horkheimer recognises that ‘philosophy that considers itself political since long has turned into the critique of political economy’,[1] and declares his agreement with the Marxist statement that the philosophers have sufficiently interpreted the word and today the point is to change it and realise philosophy. But the Institute for Social Research is far removed from a praxis that corresponds to this realisation. When radical philosophy has been turned into the critique of political economy and leaves abstract philosophising to ‘aesthetic epigones’,[2] then it follows that the radical political activist has inherited the legacy of the radical philosopher, that the latter has been transcended and preserved in the former. Horkheimer, though, seems to reject this conclusion, in that he wants to ensure a distinct existence for philosophers. In the already mentioned polemic against Marck it is said that ‘during certain phases of activity, the fear of isolation may with justification determine the deeds of a politician, but this does not suit a philosopher’. In an earlier essay, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, we find an attempt at a more through substantiation of this contradiction between the attitude and tasks of the political activist and the philosopher (or ‘critical theorist’). In what follows, we will show how and where wrong conclusions are drawn from correct presumptions. We will start by quoting the second.
- Theory and class-consciousness
But it must be added that even the situation of the proletariat is, in this society, no guarantee of correct knowledge. The proletariat may indeed have experience of meaninglessness in the form of continuing and increasing wretchedness and injustice in its own life. Yet this awareness is prevented from becoming a social force by the differentiation of its social structure which is still imposed on the proletariat from above and by the opposition between personal and class interests. Only at very special moments this awareness takes immediate effect. Even to the proletariat the world superficially seems quite different than it really is. Even an outlook which could grasp that no opposition really exists between the proletariat’s own true interests and those of society as a whole, and would therefore derive its principles of action from the thoughts and feelings of the masses, would fall into slavish dependence on the status quo. The intellectual who is satisfied to proclaim with reverent admiration the creative strength of the proletariat, who finds satisfaction in adapting himself to it and in canonizing it, fails to see that such an evasion of theoretical effort (which the passivity of his own thinking spares him) and of temporary opposition to the masses (which active theoretical effort on his part might force upon him) only makes the masses blinder and weaker than they need be. His own thinking should in fact be a critical, promotive factor in the development of the masses. When he wholly accepts the present psychological state of that class which in itself embodies the power to change society, he has the happy feeling of being linked with an immense force and enjoys a professional optimism. When this optimism is shattered in periods of crushing defeat, many intellectuals risk falling into a pessimism about society and a nihilism which are just as ungrounded as their exaggerated optimism had been. They cannot bear the thought that the kind of thinking which is most topical, which has the deepest grasp of the historical situation, and is most pregnant with the future, must at certain times isolate its subject and throw him back upon himself. [They have forgotten the relationship between revolution and independence].[3]
- Theory and Party
All of this is sharply observed and completely correct. But this historically inevitable temporary isolation of the masses from the most topical thought, the thought that is best able to grasp the historical situation and has the most potential for the future, makes the gathering and organisation of the carriers of this thought an absolute necessity. Indeed, reaction can be so thorough that even the most progressive party falls apart and that the individual representatives of revolutionary thought are on their own. But this can be no reason for such individuals to give up on the idea of the party: rather, from the very beginning of their isolation, all their efforts should be directed at the goal of founding anew the progressive party. However, in Horkheimer, there is a necessary and permanent contradiction between the progressive thinker and the progressive party:
Similarly, a systematic presentation of the contents of proletarian consciousness cannot provide a true picture of proletarian existence and interests. It would yield only an application of traditional theory to a specific problem, and not the intellectual side of the historical process of proletarian emancipation. The same would be true if one were to limit oneself to appraising and making known the ideas not of the proletariat in general but of some more advanced sector of the proletariat, for example a party or its leadership. […] If, however, the theoretician and his specific activity are seen as forming a dynamic unity with the oppressed class, so that his presentation of societal contradictions is not merely an expression of the concrete historical situation but also a force within it to stimulate change, then his real function emerges. The course of the confrontation between the advanced sectors of the class and the individuals who speak out the truth concerning it, as well as of that between the most advanced sectors, including their theoreticians, with the rest of the class, is to be understood as a process of interactions in which consciousness with its liberating as well as its driving, disciplining, forceful powers unfolds. The sharpness of the confrontation shows in the ever present possibility of tension between the theoretician and the class which his thinking is to serve. The unity of the social forces which promise liberation is at the same time their distinction (in Hegel’s sense); it exists only as a confrontation [Auseinandersetzung] which continually threatens the subjects caught up in it.[4] This truth becomes clearly evident in the person of the theoretician; he exercises an aggressive critique not only against the conscious defenders of the status quo but also against distracting, conformist, or utopian tendencies within his own ranks.[5]
- Theory and Praxis in Marx and Engels
From this text, certainly masterfully formulated, it follows that Horkheimer shares the historically obsolete ‘Western European’ conception of the workers’ party, even though he recognises its insufficiency. In the party of Bebel, the workers’ party in the traditional sense, which limited itself to systematising the substance of the consciousness of the progressive industrial proletariat, found its highest historical expression. But this kind of party has no future, fallen apart as it has under the violent blows of our epoch. In his exposition of the interaction between theoreticians, party and class, Horkheimer clearly has in mind the historical position taken by Marx and Engels in regard to the Social-Democracy of Bebel. The practical politics, the organisational leadership was left to Bebel and Liebknecht while Engels and Marx dedicated themselves to the creation of theory. But at no time the two senior figures sought, in Horkheimian fashion, to idealise the conditions that were imposed on them. Never did they think of themselves as detached theoreticians who served the workers’ movement only from the elevated heights of theory and left banal organisational matters to philistines. This is sufficiently shown by their activity during the revolution of 1848 and in the General Council of the First International. Even when isolation was forced upon them after the collapse of the First International, they remained in steady contact with the workers movement on the continent, first and foremost with the German party. Although not always or even only rarely fully successful, they sought to influence the politics of the party, to permeate its practice with their theory. And they were always ready, when conditions enabled and stimulated it, to leave aside the literary work and jump with both feet into practical politics.
- In Kautsky
The two old war-horses did not have the privilege of going into battle once more and take position at the head of a party. This was left to the ‘practicians’ of the second generation, those who, as Horkheimer correctly points out, in their hearts held theory to be a frivolity. The legacy of theory fell to Kautsky, who, in this aspect, as in all others, was only a powerless epigone. Instead of raising the unity of theory and practice to a higher level, corresponding to the challenges of the emerging imperialist epoch, instead of raising practice to the level of theory, he lowered theory to the level of vulgar practice, an enterprise that in the later Communist Party was taken on by August Thalheimer, who, in turn, was only a pale epigone of Kautsky.
- In Lenin
The task that was neglected by the entire German movement, including Luxemburg and Liebknecht, was recognised and taken up by Lenin. Already at the beginning of this century, he counter-posed to the traditional conception of the party a critical one. The practice of the revolutionary party must be one with revolutionary theory, the place of the theoreticians is at the head of the revolutionary party. The task is not to systematise the consciousness of the proletariats but to transform it along the lines of revolutionary theory. Without revolutionary theory, the political organisation is doomed. The unity of both guarantees victory.
- In Horkheimer
But Horkheimer, unlike Lenin, does not go beyond Marx and Engels: he, rather, falls back far behind them. In Horkheimer, that what is possible only through the organised efforts of theoreticians appears as a spontaneous process. But it is the organised vanguard, not the isolated theoretician, that can be successful in the struggle against the apologists of the existing order as well as against the distracting, conformist, utopian and treacherous tendencies within the own ranks. Horkheimer fails to shed the skin of a bourgeois professor. Despite his recognition and mastery of the materialist dialectic he remains among the clouds of philosophy where he elegantly dispenses with the aesthetic epigones, but without daring the jump towards earth. While, in theory, he recognises the necessity of the unity of theory and practice, he rejects it in practice. The most severe tremors of our epoch, the rise and victory of National Socialism, the decline and decay of the Soviet Union, the civil war in Spain did not cause Horkheimer to solidify his political stance. Remarkably enough, he is all the same fully aware of the need to take a position in regard to such developments, as is clearly shown by the following lines:
At present, certain fundamental insights into the essence of society are more decisive for the truth of an overall view than the possession or lack of extensive specialized knowledge. In these fundamental insights themselves, the most apparently trivial shadings are crucial. The boundary that one could draw today between human beings with respect to the weight of their knowledge would thus be oriented less to the extent of their academic training than to certain features of their behaviour, in which are expressed their stance toward social struggles.[6]
But if, in the confrontation with its opponents, ‘critical theory’ comes to such profound insights, it has as its first duty to define its stance towards social struggles and, since the most apparently trivial shadings are crucial, to do this as concretely as possible. In the polemical destruction of the scarcely aesthetic misosopher Marck, Horkheimer comes close to such a concrete political stance and precisely this essay draws attention to his work. He clearly shows himself to be an opponent of the Popular Front and correctly points out that today hope for humanity is to be found among those in the concentration camps, rather than in neo-humanist and anti-fascist concentrations. And, against the demand for a ‘second republic’, Horkheimer declares; ‘Even those who personally have all reasons for it, should not wish themselves and others a repeat’. ‘Even the most extreme horrors of today have their origin not in 1933 but in 1919 with the executions of workers and intellectuals by the feudal helpers of the first republic. The socialist governments were essentially powerless. Instead of penetrating to the roots, they preferred to remain on the shaky ground of the given facts. In their hearts, they held theory for a frivolity. The government made freedom a political philosophy instead of a political practice.’[7] Such sentences are truly straight from our heart and once again one would assume that such an insight would entail a commitment to a specific political programme, a programme that must lead to a clear demarcation from, and struggle against, those movements that are ‘a matter of interest only to [their] own bureaucracy’.[8]
The Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung and the Soviet Union
Unfortunately, the journal not only fails to develop a cohesive political programme, it also violates the programmatic guidelines that the editorial board itself committed it to in the introduction to the sixth volume. There, we are promised the upholding of certain ideas as well as the application and development of a unified philosophical perspective—but the stance of the journal towards such an important contemporary phenomenon as the Soviet Union remains extremely ambiguous. While it appears to us that Horkheimer’s works imply a deep understanding of the reactionary turn in the Soviet Union, the specialists for Soviet literature on social research appear to be helpless in face of the repulsive eclecticism of Soviet jurists à la Andrey Vyshinsky, whose writings amount to banal apologetics of Stalin’s cynical practice. Consistency with its programme would require the journal to defend Pashukanis’ Marxism and the Philosophy of Law. The dreadful brick of the old Webbs, Soviet Communism, a compilation from official Russian propaganda-sources without a trace of independent scientific thought, is praised to high heavens in the pages of the journal. Should one really value a vague friendship with Stalin more than the upholding of certain ideas?
K.A. Wittfogel, Asian society and the Moscow Trials
Among the collaborators of the journal is K.A. Wittfogel, who has the study of Asian societies as his speciality and published a series of very interesting works on this topic in its pages. Until the very recent past, Wittfogel was an active Stalinist. In Germany, he defended the ‘theory’ of social fascism as well as that of ‘socialism in one country’, both of which have little to do with social research but all the more with social demagogy and effectively disempowered the working class and enabled Hitler’s victory. Until today, we are not aware of Wittfogel distancing himself from Stalinism. Still, the scientific study of Asian society is without doubt a more honourable work than for example defending the Moscow Trials and their counterpart, the Popular Front. But such studies do not absolve one from the duty to take part in the struggles of today. The ‘old men’ also found time and energy to busy themselves with ancient society, maternal law, the history of the family and private property, but, for them, such studies always had the purpose of deepening the analysis of contemporary questions, of showing the way to the future. Marxism as a refuge from the present – that must be the most grotesque variation so far. But exactly this grotesqueness seems to have found a home in the Institute for Social Research. Publisher and collaborators of the journal obviously put more value on agreement on abstract method than on concrete questions of today. But Marxist philosophy is essentially a guide to practical activity. In one of Horkheimer’s essays, one finds the revealing statement, which has been confirmed a hundred times in the past decade: ‘Indifference in regard to the idea in theory is the harbinger of cynicism in praxis’. Yet, this sentence requires an addition: abstaining from practice leads to sterility of theory. The only criterium for the truth of Marxist theory is its confirmation in practice. If ‘critical theory’ does not want to become a pastime of aesthetic minded epigones, it must achieve political praxis.
Originally published in Unser Wort volume 7, nr. 6/7 (97/98, late June, early July 1939).
Translated by Alex de Jong
References
Horkheimer, Max 1937, ‘Traditionelle und Kritische Theorie’, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, VI:2, 245-294.
Horkheimer, Max 1938, ‘Die Philosophie der Absoluten Konzentration’, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, VI:2, 245-294.
Horkeimer, Max 1972, Critical Theory. Selected Essays, New York: Continuum.
Horkheimer Max 1993, ‘The Rationalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy’, in: Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings. Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, 217-265.
[1] Horkheimer 1938, p. 385.
[2] Helmut Dahmer adds the following note: [Siegfried Marck wrote of schöngeistigen Epigonen in his Der Neuhumanismus als politische Philosophie (Zürich 1938), the book criticised by Horkheimer: ‘Marck agrees […] not with a Marxist socialism but a ‘‘socialism that is cultural and directed against materialism’’ and would have had no objection to being called an idealist, if not ‘‘the word idealism had been made abstract through the use of it by beaux-esprits epigones and become discredited’’.’ Horkheimer 1938, p. 380. As Held would after him, Horkheimer took up the formulation; ‘Philosophy either unmasks the historical situation or falls into the hands of aesthetic epigones’’. Horkheimer 1938, p. 385].
[3] Horkheimer 1972, p. 214. Translation modified. The sentence ‘They have forgotten the relationship between revolution and independence’ was removed from the 1968 re-publication.
[4] The 1938 version of the essay uses the term Auseinandersetzung, replaced in the 1968 version with Konflikt. In the 1972 English translation, the distinction between Auseinandersetzung and Konflikt is lost as both are translated as conflict.
[5] Horkheimer 1972, pp. 215, 216. Translation modified. Emphasis by Walter Held.
[6] Horkheimer 1993, pp. 261, 262.
[7] Horkheimer 1938, p. 384.
[8] Horkheimer 1937, p. 251.
