Nepal has been in the news. Gen Z agitators, who began agitations following a ban on several social media platforms, were rooted in public anger at corruption and display of wealth by government figures and their families, and complaints about mismanagement of public funds. This is hardly the full story, which needs to be discussed at length. What is significant however, is that these agitations come after a protracted period of government by various parties and Prime Ministers claiming to be communist.
The Gen Z agitations seem concentrated in large cities. In rural areas, the various Communist Parties, the Nepali Congress, and, in some parts of Southern Nepal, certain Madhesi parties have considerable influence.
Meanwhile, a joint statement has been issued by the Embassies of Australia, Finland, France, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, expressing sadness at the loss of life, and affirming the right to protest peacefully. The UK and the USA, the principal backers of the Gaza genocide, defending democratic rights! No doubt, if a leftwing government of any stripe is discredited, they will be happy. However, no knee-jerk reaction, simply identifying this as an imperialist plot, will be adequate.
Stages in the Development of Nepal Politics:
In 1990, there was a mass movement (Jan Andolan) in which the bourgeois Nepali Congress and the United Left Front, a coalition of left parties, collaborated. The army shot people in Patan in April. This was followed by a mass demonstration of some 200,000 people who marched opposing the monarchy in the capital city Kathmandu. Eventually, a Constitutional Monarchy (with ample powers remaining with the King) was set up. But there was a clear disconnection between the elite political leaders and the masses of people. Some of the Communist fractions came together to form the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist). Between 1990 and 2006, the elected government was dominated by the Nepal Congress, with the CPN(UML) elected once, for less than a year.
Meanwhile, in 2001, King Birendra and most of his family were killed in the royal palace by his son, who also died in self-inflicted violence. Birendra’s brother Gyanendra ascended the throne and sought to seize full power in 2005. An emergency was declared; dissent was met with repression.
In 1994, a different Communist Party, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre), broke up, and the group that split soon renamed itself the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre). The major leaders of the CPN (MC) included Baburam Bhattarai and Pushpa Kamal Dahal, more popularly known as Prachanda. Eventually, Prachanda became the key theoretician /ideologue, and at one stage the party swore by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Prachanda Path. The party launched an armed struggle from 1996. Its 1995 Plenum adopted a resolution that said that for “the true liberation of the people, all efforts must be concentrated for the development of a people’s war that would usher in the new people’s democratic form of government”. In late 1995, the Nepali Congress government under Sher Bahadur Deuba launched violent attacks on the Maoists. Hundreds of members of various left parties were arbitrarily arrested. On 4 February 1996, Baburam Bhattarai led a delegation to Deuba, with a memorandum warning that, unless their 40-point demands were met by 17 February, an armed struggle would be launched.
Soon thereafter, a ‘People’s War’ was launched. Between 1996 and 2001, there were periods of conflict, along with periods of attempted negotiations. Deuba took the help of the United States to suppress the Maoists. In 2001, the parliamentary (or “mainstream”) Communist Parties tried negotiating with the CPN(MC), through the mediation of the CPN(Masal). The talks broke down because the Maoists wanted support for the demand for a republic, which was non-negotiable, while the others were not for that.
It was only after 2005, when dreams of gently moving along the constitutional path were rudely shaken by King Gyanendra’s attempted coup (reversion to personal power) that the other political parties signed an agreement with the Maoists in Delhi, aiming to end the monarchy. In April 2006, Jan Andolan-2 (People’s Movement 2) started. After 19 days of massive protests, defying curfews, a prolonged general strike, the monarchy finally capitulated. Then came negotiations for an interim parliament. The Maoists also agreed to lay down weapons, in exchange for participating in elections. This resulted in several imperialist countries taking their name off the list of “terrorist organisation”. However, in this initial stage, Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal, popularly known as Prachanda, kept control over the 19,000 strong People’s Army and had them settled in the cantonment under UN supervision.
Parliamentary Left, Revolutionary Left
The politics of the so-called Communist Parties of Nepal must be understood with greater clarity. The Tienanmen Square violence, the collapse of the bureaucratised workers’ states across East and Central Europe, and then unravelling of the USSR, had contributed to a gloom and doom feeling not only within the surviving Stalinist parties, but elsewhere in the left too, including among Trotskyists. Other Trotskyists shrugged as if the bureaucracy pulling off a bourgeois restoration and the absence of a political revolution led by the working class made no significant difference. It was in such a situation that any growth, any electoral victory, of so-called Communist Parties, were being celebrated. This was context in which the CPs of Nepal started grabbing headlines in international left circles. This was particularly evident in South Asia. The CPI(M) hailed the CPN(UML). As late as 2008, the CPI(ML) Liberation also published without comment a note by Madhav Nepal on the situation in Nepal, which said, among other things:
Being one of the strongest members of the SPA [Seven Party Alliance] and its wider support base strong national and international organizational network, the CPN (UML) has played a decisive role in the people’s movement of April 2006. It played a catalyst role in bringing the seven mainstream political parties onto one platform and formulating a six-point understanding among them. It also took an active and leading role in developing the 12-point understanding with the CPN(M), holding several rounds of bilateral and multilateral talks with them to persuade them to agree for an understanding with the SPA.
The CPN(UML) was the first party to organise massive rallies and protest programmes against the royal regime at a nationwide level after the 1 February royal coup. It also took an active part in all the programmes organised jointly by the seven parties all over the country. During the second pro-democracy movement, 21 people were brutally killed by the royal regime, of whom 16 were active members of the CPN(UML). Among the 6,000 injured, more than half of them were members and supporters of the CPN(UML). Tens of thousands of members of this party were arrested and detained for long periods of time during previous fifteen months.
Generally, it is viewed that the CPN(UML) will emerge as the single largest party in the elections if the elections are held in a free and fair manner. It is a historic moment where the left forcers are in a majority and if they reach an understanding there is a chance of forming a majority government at the national level and ushering in a historic socio-economic transformation in Nepal”.[1]
Maoists in India were more elated by the role of the Maoists in Nepal. On April 24, 2008, they issued a statement, which began with the following:
The election results in Nepal have proved once again the overwhelming anger of the masses against the outdated feudal monarchic rule in Nepal, against the Indian expansionist’s bullying and domination of Nepal, against US domination and oppression, and are a reflection of the growing aspirations of the Nepali masses for democracy, land, livelihood and genuine freedom from imperialist and feudal exploitation. It is these aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the masses that had completely trounced the parties that had either supported the King and/or the Indian ruling classes or hesitated to come out strongly against feudal, imperialist oppression and Indian intervention in Nepal. Hence, when an alternative like the CPN(M) came to the fore, with its open commitment to abolish the feudal monarchy once for all, abrogate all unequal treaties signed with India by the former ruling classes of Nepal, and ensure democracy and equality for the oppressed sections of society such as Dalits, adivasis, national minorities and women, the masses enthusiastically veered towards the Maoists”.[2]
This was, however, accompanied with a more cautious statement, warning the CPN(M) about continuing class struggle, remembering the need to smash the existing state. It also warned that, lacking an absolute majority in the Constituent Assembly, too much reliance on moving along the upper layers would lead to poor compromises.
The reality of the CPs was different. The CPN (UML) was a veteran Stalinist party, firmly anchored to the rhetoric of the two-stage revolution theory. As Alex de Jong, a leading figure of the Fourth International, reminds us:
In the early nineties, its Secretary General Madan Bhandari formulated the party’s approach, the ‘theory of people’s multiparty democracy’. This was essentially a continuation of the party’s previous Stalinist stagist theory of revolution. It maintained the old conception that before any kind of socialism would be possible, there needed to be a phase in which, in alliance with so-called ‘national capitalists’, capital accumulation would be developed. Bhandari’s formulation added that this ‘New democratic’ phase would be achieved through electoral means, via parliament, and respect political pluralism. In what became the CPN UML’s foundational documents Bhandari, who died in 1994, stressed that New Democracy is ‘not different in socio-economic structure and production system’. It would be a ‘basically capitalist production system’, to be achieved by the ‘working people and common people’.[3]
This has been a fair assessment. At other times, other leading activists have been too soft on the Nepali Left. A few years back, leading Pakistani Trotskyist Farooq Tariq had an excessively positive assessment. To understand this, we need to look at events from 2006 to recent times.
The Stalinism of the Nepali Left lies not only in its two-stage theory/strategy of revolution, which, as we shall see, leads inevitably to a succumbing to the charms of bourgeois democracy in some form, but in a Stalinist organisational model. Thus, the CPN (UML) national Congress of 1993 adopted a resolution that called for:
- creating a disciplined party infused with the Marxism-Leninism doctrine;
- creating a disciplined army to work under the party’s leadership; and
- creating a united front of all parties and groups willing to unite and work under the control of the communist party.[4]
The party control over mass organisations and movements was also flaunted in the Maoist approach. Rather than highlighting any need for moving towards workers’ democracy, towards a political system where political parties supported by workers and peasants would have the right to freely operate, and where democracy would mean actual control of the state apparatus by popular, elected bodies, where trade unions, peasant associations, and collectives based on workplaces,[5], the binary they proposed was one party “dictatorship of the proletariat” [through a double substitutionism –the peasants, for the main moving agency, the party, and, eventually a party-state bureaucracy for the real authority] versus multiparty politics in bourgeois liberal democracy. Thus, during the negotiations between the Maoists when they were still waging the “people’s war” and the parliamentary parties, the author previously quoted tells us:
The CPN (Maoist) actually used the party’s transformative moment to strike a bargain with the political parties —Baburam Bhattarai reportedly told the parties, ‘You accept republicanism and we will accept multipartyism.’ (Bhattarai, Baburam. 2002. “Nepal: Triangular Balance of Forces”, Economic & Political Weekly”, November 16, 2002.) In striking up an alliance with the mainstream parties, the CPN (M) revised its immediate goals from that of a quest to set up an NPD to a Completion of Bourgeois Democratic Transition (CBDT). In its proposed transitional arrangement, called ‘Democracy in the 21st Century’, which was chalked up in June 2003, the CPN (Maoist) cited the acceptance of the multiparty system as one of its key features”.[6]
This indicates that the Maoists are willing to accept liberal democracy in elections, but want tight control over mass of supporters, and no acceptance of workers’ democracy
In the post-2008 era, also, party functioning has been top down. This has led to splits, though not all have been big. One interesting dimension has been an attempt to be inclusive in leadership building. Although hill high caste brahmins and chhetris are still dominant, one third of the strategically important positions —the high commands, the central secretariat, the regional commands and the bureau— is occupied by leaders from different ethnic groups. There have also been conventions of its caste (Dalit), ethnic and regional (Madhes) based organizations at different levels, from district to central levels.
This is somewhat akin to the Maoist strategy. On one hand, from the 1930s, there was little democracy. “As Peng Dehuai wrote in his memoirs from prison: ‘Everybody in the Army worried about his safety’ (he was speaking of conditions as early as 1931 and 1932). There was not much democracy. The Section for Eliminating Traitors, which had originally been under the Political Department, now became a Security Bureau at the same level as the Political Department.”[7]
As Rousset explains later in his pamphlet, talking about the Maoist conception of the United Front:
Despite the remarks we have just made and contrary to certain widespread notions, I believe that the main danger embedded in the Maoist conception of the united front is in the direction of opportunism, but of sectarianism. The Maoist conception of alliances can be set out graphically in a pattern of concentric circles. At the centre stands the Communist Party. The first thickly drawn ring represents the bedrock alliance or fundamental class alliance; the second, the broad alliance (whether national or anti-fascist) with its potential for conflict; the third, the enemy forces that one is striving to isolate. Any number of an additional intermediate circles can be introduced into the figure to make it more complex. This fundamental approach is alien to any conception of alliances in which the Communist Party would be given a subordinate place. It places the party, its leadership activity and its control mechanisms at the very center of the united front. It is far more likely to give rise to a sectarian and manipulative conception of alliances, in an ultra-left direction.
The Maoist theory of the united front contains the presupposition that there is now and will always be only one “proletarian” party” worthy of the name in any given country. For the “concentric” schema leaves no room anywhere for a second revolutionary party. Other political forces must either represent intermediate (petty-bourgeois) or enemy social layers. They must be placed either in a relation of subordination or in one of antagonism”.[8] The repeated reaffirmation of Maoism, as well as of the “Prachanda Path” by the Maoist party, along with actual study of its organisational practice, strongly suggest its adherence to this model, even while it moves more and more away from any genuine revolutionary politics.
From Interim Parliament to the Making of the Constitution and Beyond
King Gyanendra had dissolved Parliament in 2002. It was reinstated in 2006 with 204 of the original members. By 2007, this had to change. The Maoists had come to an agreement with the seven-party alliance. The Maoist representatives were included and it became an interim parliament. There were thirteen parties represented, with the Nepali Congress having 85 (elected and freshly nominated), and the two main CPs 83 each. Out of 329 seats, these three controlled 251. The interim legislature dissolved the old parliament and drafted an interim constitution. The subsequent 2008 election for the Constituent Assembly led to a 601-member assembly that abolished the monarchy in May 2008 and subsequently failed to complete a new constitution by 2012, leading to its dissolution.
The elections were delayed, first because the Election Commission had not prepared properly, and then because the Maoists demanded an abolition of the monarchy and a fully proportional representation. The Nepali Congress opposed the call for a proportional representation. Eventually it was agreed that 60% of the elected seats would come through proportional representation, and the other 40% through direct, first-past-the-post system. 26 members would be nominated by the Prime Minister.
The Maoists left the interim government on 18 September 2007, citing the non-fulfilment of their demands (which included declaration of a republic before the elections). They stated they would launch street protests in favour of a republic and to ensure that the elections were really held, but would also keep to the ceasefire. The Prime Minister stated that declaring a republic through the interim parliament would lack legitimacy.
Eventually, out of the 575 elected seats, the CPN(M) won 220, making it the largest party. The Nepali Congress got 110 elected members and the CPN (UML) 103. Madhesi parties had a large number of elected members. The Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum, in particular, got 52 representatives. Royalist parties, though often defeated, still got some seats and a not insignificant number of votes.
After initially asking for both the posts of President and Prime Minister, once Nepal became a republic, the CPN(M) ultimately focused on the position of Prime Minister and the acceptance of a minimum programme. By the end of July, they advanced three terms:
- that the Maoists would have at least two years of work without being voted out of government,
- that the alliance of NC-CPN(UML)-MJF was dissolved, and
- that the Maoists would be allowed to get a “minimum programme” voted through.
There was a contest for the position of Prime Minister, which was won by Prachanda, who got 464 votes while NC’s Deuba got 113. However, infighting between the parties meant that the first Constituent Assembly never adopted the constitution, and extended its term repeatedly. The Second Constituent Assembly elections showed a drastic fall in the Maoist votes, at least in part because they had been more concerned with power and positions at the top, rather than mass struggles to push for a democratic constitution. The NC got 196 seats, the CPN (UML) 175, and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) only 80 seats. Three smaller “Communist” formations got 12 seats. Thirty parties and two independents shared the 575 seats. After initially claiming vote fraud, the UCPN (Maoist) agreed to join the Constituent Assembly and offered support to the NC in forming the next government. The CPN (UML) and most Madhesi parties did likewise. Eventually, a constitution was drafted, which among other things had the following:
- Nepal as an independent, indivisible, sovereign, secular, inclusive, democratic, socialism-oriented, federal democratic republican state.
- Nepali language in the nagri script as the official language of Nepal and all languages spoken as the mother tongues in Nepal being the languages of the nation.
- Provision of affirmative action for the protection, empowerment or development of citizens including socially or culturally backward women, Dalit, indigenous, indigenous nationalities, Madhesi, Tharu, Muslim, oppressed class, Pichhada class, minorities, the marginalised, farmers, labours, youths, children, senior citizens, gender and sexual minorities, persons with disabilities, pregnant persons, incapacitated or helpless, backward region and economically indigent Khas Arya.
- Commitment to competitive multi-party democratic governance system, civil liberties, fundamental rights, human rights, adult franchise, periodic elections, complete press freedom, independent, impartial and competent judiciary and the concept of rule of law and build a prosperous nation.
- At least one third of the total number of members elected from each political party representing in the Federal Parliament are to be women.
- Election is to be so held that there is one woman out of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives and one woman out of the Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson of the National Assembly.
These appear good liberal-democratic commitments, with some gestures towards special oppression and its alleviation, but notwithstanding the reference to “socialist-oriented”, there was no commitment to crucial issues like radical land reform, the root-and-branch transformation of the non-elected components of the state apparatus, and no clarity on the Nepali working class. This is an issue we will return to. What this shows is, there was no orientation to socialism, not even to the so-called new democracy.
The Integration in Bourgeois Parliamentarism
In 2018, the CPN (UML) and the Maoist Centre united to form the Nepal Communist Party. Then-Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli and Maoist leader Prachanda came to power with a joint leadership. It was promised that this unity would lead to communist hegemony and long-term stability. This came after the 2017 elections, when the CPN (UML) and the CPN (Maoist Centre) joined hands in the elections. In early 2018, Farooq Tariq wrote an article praising the CPs. The article started with election results, stating: “In total, out of the 275 seats in the House of Representatives, the left alliance holds 174 (121 for the CPN-UML and 53 for the Maoists), the NC 63, the RJPN 17, and the SSF 16”. He went on to say:
The two main parties of Nepal, UML and Maoist Center, had decided prior to the elections, not only to form the alliance but also to merge within six months to form one united Communist party. This was approved very well by the people as this brings the two parties into a binding contract to unite and not just an election alliance.
There were celebrations in the street of the Katmandu after this historic victory of the Communists. This was the first time that Communists have an almost two third majority in Nepal, the most poverty stricken country of South Asia. The UML and Maoist Center have been in power several times since 1994 but always for a short time and as part of coalitions.
The appeal of UML for a stable and strong government worked very well among the Nepali masses who were tired of weak coalition government of opposite ideologies. The Nepali Congress was also taught a lesson for their impression of a pro Indian party.[9]
This was a total misreading of the situation. The CPN (UML), as we have seen, had been committed to basic parliamentarism even under the monarchy, and had even been in government once during royal rule. And, while the Maoists had talked about armed revolution, the end goal of that revolution had not been socialism. As Alex de Jong notes, “When speaking in 2001 with a reporter from The Washington Times, Baburam Bhattarai, their main ideologue at the time, implored him to ‘please note that we are not pressing for a “communist republic” but for a bourgeois democratic republic.’”[10] In other words, the end goal was the same – move on to a stage of so-called ‘national capitalism’, including through the creation of a bourgeois-democratic republic. So, the preparatory stage might include taking up of arms, but, ultimately, bourgeois parliamentarism was going to be the answer. This strategy was similar to that of CPN (UML) but differed on how to achieve the preparatory phase of ‘national capitalism’, either through elections or armed struggle.
Given the increasing integration into bourgeois parliamentarism, its jockeying for posts and privileges, the unity was built on quicksand. The unity was declared on 17 May 2018. The Nepal Communist Party was founded, with the two parties dissolved. K.P. Sharma Oil, formerly of the CPN (UML), and Prachanda, became joint chairpersons of the party. The party also named its Standing Committee consisting of 26 members of the former UML and 19 members of the former Maoist Centre on 12 June 2018. But internal tensions soon became apparent. In a 2019 leadership meeting, Oli was accused of trying to monopolise power, not following the “One Leader, One Position” principle. In a subsequent meeting, Prachanda was made the executive head, while it was agreed that Oli would complete the full term as a Prime Minister, instead of the agreement between the two leaders to lead the government in turns.
In 2020, the political crisis reached its peak. Prachanda submitted a political document accusing Oli of not following the party’s directions, unilaterally leading the government and turning a blind eye towards corruption. Oli’s response in December was to call on President Bidhya Devi Bhandari to dissolve the House of Representatives and call for fresh elections. Opponents labelled this act as not only unconstitutional but overtly anti-democratic. Eventually, the Supreme Court reinstated parliament. Meanwhile, the two factions called separate Central Committee meetings. The Supreme Court also got involved, annulling the legality of the Nepal Communist Party, due to registration errors and unresolved internal conflicts. As a result, the Maoist Centre and CPN (UML) split apart again. However, quite a few leaders of the CPN (Maoist Centre) left to join the CPN (UML) sometime after the split. Accusations also came of Prachanda having been leader for too long, making decisions like a dictator, etc. In the CPN(UML) too, Madhav Kumar Nepal’s faction opposed Oli and eventually founded the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Socialist).
What this long narrative has shown is that none of the CPs, whatever their documents and party flags proclaim, have been engaged in class struggle.
The turn in 2022
Since 2008, left parties have never been fully out of power. There have been 14 governments. None has completed a full term. Ten times, “Communists” have been the PM – Prachanda thrice, Oli four times, Baburam Bhattarai, Madhav Kumar Nepal and Jhala Nath Khanal once. The Left rode to power thanks to great popular expectations but betrayed them. Repression, corruption, the use of governmental power for petty gains, these have become routine.
Nepal is the poorest country in South Asia, with a per capita GDP of around US$1400. Owing to massive unemployment, approximately 3.5 million Nepalis work as migrant workers, this being 14% of the population. Apart from informal migration to India, they work mainly in Malaysia, and the six countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). Nepalese migrants are involved in semi/unskilled labour, mainly on building sites, in factories and in domestic work. Migration for foreign employment has become a major source of income for the country as migrant workers send around US$4 billion home every year, comprising 28% of Nepal’s gross domestic product in 2018 (World Bank, 2019).
The nature of the working class is not a fixed thing over time and place. An article on the Red Mole Substack takes up the issue in connection with Nepal. It notes that Andy Wilson, formerly of the International Socialist Tendency, raised arguments from the perspective of the “deflected permanent revolution” line of argument. Nepal lacks the concentrated industrial proletariat that characterized Russia’s revolutionary centres like the Putilov works. Without massive factory concentrations, can permanent revolution theory apply?
The Red Mole article replies:
Tony Cliff’s framework anticipated that peasant-based revolutionary movements led by non-proletarian forces would achieve democratic tasks (abolishing monarchy, ending feudalism) but stop short of establishing genuine working-class power.
Nepal validates this prediction perfectly: the CPN (Maoist) successfully overthrew the monarchy and landlord system, then transformed into a conventional parliamentary party competing for government positions.[11]
It is possible to argue that this actually goes too far. Nepal’s land reforms have not gone very far. Though the Haliya bonded labour system was officially abolished in 2008 and state landlordism was reformed, the traditional system of private landlordism and limited tenant rights remains, with little enforcement of land reform laws and inadequate support for freed labourers. Residues of old landlordism have combined with support for SEZs, Indian companies and their land encroachment, and other neoliberal assaults.[12] In other words, it has been as much co-optation as a “deflected permanent revolution”.
However, the Red Mole article notes correctly that the focus on “Putilov type” factories can actually suggest that, in today’s changed working-class structure, proletarian revolution strategies will not work. The Red Mole responds by pointing to the actual character of the working class of Nepal.
This international proletariat experiences classic exploitation: construction, manufacturing, domestic labour under brutal conditions. Their remittances exceed Nepal’s entire industrial output, making them economically central to the country’s reproduction.
Historical precedent supports this analysis. The 1947 Biratnagar Jute Mill Strike demonstrated how small industrial concentrations could trigger national transformation. A local labour dispute rapidly became a nationwide anti-regime movement that shattered the political status quo.
Revolutionary potential lies not in concentrated heavy industry but in politically conscious workers occupying strategic economic positions—whether in Nepal’s limited industrial sectors or the international labour circuits that sustain the domestic economy.[13]
This does not mean inevitable success. But this points to the road not taken. As a result, popular anger grew. Its first major manifestation was the Kathmandu Municipal election of 2022. The electorate elected a Mayor, a Deputy Mayor, 32 ward chairs and 128 ward members. A wave of independent candidates trounced the party candidates. In the country overall, local body elections were held in 753 local bodies, and 79 political parties contested the polls. The Nepali Congress-led five-party alliance and the CPN (Unified Marxist–Leninist) four-party alliance were the major competitors in the local elections. Nepali Congress won the maximum number of seats, with 329 mayor posts and 300 deputy mayor posts. CPN-UML won the second-highest seats with 206 mayor posts and 241 deputy mayor posts. CPN (Maoist Centre) won the third highest seats with 121 mayor posts and 128 deputy mayor posts. In Kathmandu, however, Balen Shah, a rapper and engineer, contested as an independent candidate, polled over 61,000 votes, with his two main rivals from the Nepali Congress and the CPN (UML) both polling a little over 38,000 votes. His campaign focused on waste management, road traffic control, public service delivery, anti-corruption, and preservation of the city’s cultural heritage. Shah emerged as a voice against the established political set-up. His election was bigger than merely a token protest, becoming a challenge to routine politics. This was a rejection of what was perceived as communist politics.
However, since, in the country as a whole, the dominant political parties won the mayoral posts, the danger signal was ignored. The parliamentary elections of 2022 saw the CPN (UML) getting 44 seats, the Nepali Congress 57, the CPN (Maoist Centre) – Nepal Socialist Party 18, Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Socialist) 10, out of 275 seats in all. Deuba and Prachanda were in a five-party alliance. However, Prachanda broke away after the elections and became PM by getting support from a range of parties including a monarchist party and Hindu nationalist party. Subsequently, musical chairs followed, sometimes including the NC, sometimes the CPN(UML). But, on 12 July 2024, he lost a vote of confidence, and Oli formed the last government before the uprising of September 2025.
Simply or chiefly a right-wing conspiracy?
Such a claim has been made quite a number of times, in social media, and elsewhere. This needs to be clearly rejected. An Indian Express report regarding unemployment in Nepal says the following:
In Nepal, the country’s statistics office said in July that the employment challenge was “significant”.
The high dependence on foreign employment and remittances, coupled with limited industrial development and job creation in the formal sector, presents ongoing challenges for policymakers,” the National Statistics Office said in a report titled Demographic Dividend in Nepal, adding that the labour market sector had not shown any improvement, with unemployment increasing to 12.6 per cent in 2022-23 from 11.4 percent in 2017-18.
With underemployment even more prevalent, especially among those aged 15-24, young Nepalis were looking abroad for jobs, resulting in remittances accounting for nearly a quarter of the country’s GDP. “These trends highlight the urgent need for domestic job creation in emerging sectors and industries to retain talent and support the economy sustainably… without sufficient job creation, Nepal risks missing out on the economic benefits of its demographic dividend.[14]
Economic inequality has also increased. A Nepal Economic Forum report of January 2024 informs us, that Nepal’s Gini coefficient moved from 0.49 in 2010-11, to 0.58 in 2019, showing increase in income differences. The report also said, the income of richest 10% of Nepalis is more than three times than that of the poorest 40%. Similarly, the richest 10% of Nepali have more than 26 times the wealth of the poorest 40%. The reasons included privatization, commercialization, and cuts in state spending on education and health.[15] The agricultural sector has declined, while a large part of the population lives and suffers in the countryside.
There is tremendous anger among the youth over the fact that they cannot get decent jobs in Nepal and must migrate in order to eat and to send remittance home. After the suicide of one young Nepali worker in South Korea early in 2025, it emerged that, over the last five years, at least 85 Nepali workers in South Korea have died, nearly half by suicide.
The US and India
All this is not to say that US imperialism and Indian regional hegemonism do not matter. But we need to understand how they do. US imperialism had been investing in Nepal since Cold War times. The transformation of China from a bureaucratised workers’ state to imperialism did not change the US drive. And the CPN (UML) was not free of the lures. Oli in a previous stint as PM, had tried to join the US government’s Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in February 2017, but large sections of the left opposed this. Due to the pressure from below, the government did not enter the MCC. Oli welcomed John Wingle (Deputy Vice President of the MCC) to Kathmandu in August 2025 to hold talks about resumption of US aid and to discuss the continuation of infrastructural projects.
Meanwhile, soft control also exists. Not all NGOs are nice, humanitarian organisations, providing soft-landing in an age of neoliberalism. In fact, even when the left tries to use NGOs, it creates North to South dependency, local power brokers, the use of NGO funding to steer political activism in ‘desired’ directions. Imperialism does all that much more successfully. The risk for Nepal’s youth movement is that its genuine anger, its grievances could be steered by Western forces into a right-wing political agenda, that ultimately leave dependency untouched, and imposes right-wing, safe political (or seemingly nonpolitical) forces at the top.
And then there is India. India has always tried to influence Nepal due to India’s own conflictual relationship with China. But, with the BJP in power, this goes beyond that level. Narendra Modi sought to promote the role of the Hindu nationalist far right party in Nepal, which has thus far been on the margins. Some attempts were actually made to project it as though the youth wanted a Modi type figure as the PM. Significantly, the RPP, a Hindu and monarchist party, was not attacked at any stage, while various CP offices and homes of leaders were attacked. The RSS had greatly mourned the end of the monarchy and Nepal’s existence as a Hindu state. It has hopes of steering the movement in a Hindu right-wing direction. The movement is not immediately going in that direction. Indeed, during negotiations, many Gen Z representatives walked out when Hindu and monarchist leaders were invited for the negotiations, saying these people did not represent the movement. But Bangladesh shows the risks. However, if the revolutionary forces see only these risks, and not the rebellion, they will be committing a terrible mistake. From beyond the borders, we need to express solidarity even while providing warnings.
A Short Note on Major Political Parties of Nepal:
NC – Nepali Congress, formed in 1950 by the merger of the Nepali National Congress and the Nepal Democratic Congress. Leaders included B.P. Koirala and Subarna Shamser Rana. Dominated government in 1950-1959, till the royalist restoration of 1960. In 1990 cooperated with left parties in opposing the monarchy. Has continued to be one of the three major parties in Nepal under the republic.
Rastriya Swatantra Party – currently fourth largest party in Parliament. In Nepal most parties pay lip service to socialism. But in fact this party stands for economic liberalism.
Rastriya Prajatantra Party – The Rastriya Prajatantra Party was formed by the ruling elite of the Panchayat era on 29 May 1990. The party has allied with various parties to form governments, including the NC, the CPN(UML) and the CPN (MC). It is a pro-monarchist party.
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) – The original Communist Party of Nepal was formed in 1949. Active from 1949 to 1962, the CPN sought to challenge the autocratic Rana regime, feudalism, and imperialism.
The party faced internal divisions early on, leading to multiple factions with differing views on the direction of the communist movement. The CPN(Marxist) led by Man Mohan Adhikari, and the CPN (Marxist-Leninist), led by Madan Bhandari, which was inspired by the Naxalbari movement, were predecessors of the CPN (UML),and joined to form the party. Though it claimed to be influenced by the Naxalbari movement, it took part in elections under constitutional monarchy, and increasingly took a purely electoral path. It has remained one of the three biggest political parties under the republic.
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) – It was founded in 1994 after breaking away from the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre). Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) has served as the most important leader of the party since its foundation. After the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre –Mashal) and its electoral front, Janamorcha merged with the party in 2009, the unified party came to be known as the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). The party emerged in its current state in 2016 following the unification of various splinter groups with the party. In 2018 the CPN (UML) and the Maoists united, but this broke up in 2021. But a number of members left to join the CPN (UML).
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) – Split from the CPN (UML) led by Madhav Kumar Nepal. Former prime minister Jhala Nath Khanal, party vice presidents, and as many as 31 members of parliament (MPs) joined the new party.
Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum, Nepal (MJFN), or the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum, Nepal – founded in the mid-1990s as a cross-party NGO, demanding rights for minority Madhesis. In the Constituent Assembly elections, it won 52 seats to the First Constituent Assembly. Its main leader is Upendra Yadav.
[1] ‘Historic Moment in Nepal’, Liberation, January 2008, https://liberation.org.in/detail/historic-moment-in-nepal
[2] Azad, ‘CPI (Maoist) Statement On Nepal Election’ , https://www.marxists.org/archive/azad/2008/april/24.htm
[3] Alex de Jong, ‘Nepal protests have deeper roots’, https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article9166
[4] Krishna Hachhethu, ‘The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist): Transformation from an Insurgency Group to a Competitive Political Party’, p. 45 https://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/ebhr/pdf/EBHR_33%2634_03.pdf
[5] This brief outline is based on a historic document adopted by the Fourth International. Titled “The Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Socialist Democracy”, this restates and develops the understanding of workers’ democracy under the dictatorship of the proletariat. See https://fourth.international/en/world-congresses/537/51
[6] Krishna Hachhethu, ‘The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist): Transformation from an Insurgency Group to a Competitive Political Party’, p. 55
[7] The quotation is taken from Peng Dehuai’s Memoirs of a Chinese Marshall, written while he was in jail, during the cultural revolution and published in Peking in 1984,as reproduced in Pierre Rousset, The Maoist Project Tested in the Struggle for Power, International Institute for Research and Education Number 3,p.15, https://www.iire.org/sites/default/files/iire-shop/pierreroussetnr3englishfinal.pdf
[8] Ibid.,p.30.
[9] Farooq Tariq, ‘Hay Days of Nepali Communists’, https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article5319
[10] Alex de Jong, ‘Nepal protests have deeper roots’, https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article9166
[11] https://redmole.substack.com/p/strategic-lessons-why-cliff-and-kidons?r=4n5gl3&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&fbclid=IwY2xjawMyVX9leHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHpGTls8Cr-btn-me6uR_I_3W3Bfi4zMmpbUYkCoq9FAyx49E-bBLIEVleSnn_aem_MKHCt8e6-vfLqGQOE02Zog&triedRedirect=true
[12] For land relations and related issues see Pramesh Pokharel, Review of Land Policies in Nepal, SAAPE Working Paper3.3, December 2019, https://saape.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Land-_-Resource-Grabbing_Nepal.pdf
[13] https://redmole.substack.com/p/strategic-lessons-why-cliff-and-kidons?r=4n5gl3&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&fbclid=IwY2xjawMyVX9leHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHpGTls8Cr-btn-me6uR_I_3W3Bfi4zMmpbUYkCoq9FAyx49E-bBLIEVleSnn_aem_MKHCt8e6-vfLqGQOE02Zog&triedRedirect=true
[14] ‘Nepal, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka: When demographic dividend isn’t delivered’ , Indian Express, September 11, 2025. https://indianexpress.com/article/business/nepal-indonesia-bangladesh-sri-lanka-demographic-dividend-isnt-delivered-10242985/
[15] Mahotsav Pradhan, ‘Examining the Dynamics of Wealth and Income Inequality in Nepal’, January 31, 2024, https://nepaleconomicforum.org/examining-the-dynamics-of-wealth-and-income-inequality-in-nepal/
